| Figures | |
| Tables | |
| Preface | |
| 1 | Introduction | 3 |
| The Study of Economic Sanctions | 4 |
| The Study of International Cooperation | 7 |
| Methodology | 10 |
| Pt. 1 | Theory and Data | 13 |
| 2 | Model and Hypotheses | 15 |
| A Model of Economic Sanctions | 16 |
| Identifying Cooperation Problems | 25 |
| What Explains Cooperation? | 31 |
| Bandwagoning | 40 |
| 3 | Measuring Cooperation and Explanatory Variables | 46 |
| Measurement and Description: The Dependent Variable | 46 |
| Measurement and Description: Explanatory Variables | 54 |
| 4 | Estimating Models of Cooperation | 61 |
| Regression Analysis | 62 |
| Ordered-Probit Analysis | 67 |
| Event-Count Analysis | 74 |
| The Effect of Declining Hegemony | 86 |
| Pt. 2 | Case Studies | 93 |
| 5 | Human Rights in Latin America: Explaining Unilateral U.S. Sanctions | 99 |
| Congress versus the President: U.S. Human-Rights Policy, 1973-76 | 101 |
| The Carter Administration | 106 |
| Economic Sanctions and the Multilateral Development Banks | 111 |
| Attitudes and Responses to U.S. Human-Rights Sanctions | 119 |
| Pinochet's Chile: U.S. Leadership or Resistance? | 124 |
| 6 | The Falkland Islands Conflict | 131 |
| The Falklands Crisis, 1982 | 132 |
| The Falklands and the European Community | 138 |
| Sanctions and War: The Case of Ireland | 153 |
| Responses of the United States, Latin America, and Others | 159 |
| 7 | Western Technology-Export Controls | 169 |
| American, European, and Japanese Views on East-West Technology Transfer | 171 |
| Institutional Coordination of Export Controls: CoCom | 185 |
| Responding to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, 1980 | 191 |
| Responding to Dissident Trials, 1978 | 198 |
| 8 | The Polish Crisis and Gas-Pipeline Sanctions | 204 |
| Martial Law in Poland and the Siberian Gas Pipeline | 206 |
| The Effect of Declining Hegemony | 225 |
| Siberian Gas and European Preferences | 228 |
| The Grain Embargo: Why It Mattered | 234 |
| 9 | Conclusion | 241 |
| Explaining International Cooperation on Economic Sanctions | 241 |
| Additional Findings | 247 |
| Implications for Theories of International Cooperation and Economic Sanctions | 248 |
| Notes | 253 |
| Bibliography | 277 |
| Index | 293 |