| Preface | |
| Introduction | |
| Pt. I | The Economic Paradigm | 1 |
| Ch. 1 | Diffuse Ownership as Natural Economic Evolution | 3 |
| Ch. 2 | Fragmentation's Costs | 9 |
| Pt. II | The Political Paradigm | 19 |
| Ch. 3 | Diffuse Ownership as Political Product | 21 |
| Ch. 4 | A Political Theory | 26 |
| Pt. III | The Historical Evidence | 51 |
| Ch. 5 | Banks | 54 |
| Ch. 6 | Insurers | 60 |
| Ch. 7 | Banks Again | 94 |
| Ch. 8 | Mutual Funds | 102 |
| Ch. 9 | Pension Funds | 124 |
| Pt. IV | The Contemporary and Comparative Evidence | 147 |
| Ch. 10 | Takeovers | 151 |
| Ch. 11 | Corporate Ownership in Germany and Japan | 169 |
| Ch. 12 | A Small Comparative Test of the Political Theory | 187 |
| Ch. 13 | Counterpoint I | 198 |
| Ch. 14 | Political Evolution in Germany and Japan? | 210 |
| Ch. 15 | Trends in the United States | 222 |
| Ch. 16 | An American Crossroads | 226 |
| Pt. V | Policy Recommendations | 231 |
| Ch. 17 | Managers as the Problem? | 235 |
| Ch. 18 | Short-Term Finance as the Problem? | 240 |
| Ch. 19 | Industrial Organization as the Problem? | 248 |
| Ch. 20 | Counterpoint II | 254 |
| Ch. 21 | Changing the American Ownership Structure? | 263 |
| Conclusion | 283 |
| Bibliography | 289 |
| Acknowledgments | 309 |
| Index | 311 |
