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Strong Managers, Weak Owners:
The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance
Mark J. Roe

Book Description | Reviews

TABLE OF CONTENTS:

Preface
Introduction
Pt. IThe Economic Paradigm1
Ch. 1Diffuse Ownership as Natural Economic Evolution3
Ch. 2Fragmentation's Costs9
Pt. IIThe Political Paradigm19
Ch. 3Diffuse Ownership as Political Product21
Ch. 4A Political Theory26
Pt. IIIThe Historical Evidence51
Ch. 5Banks54
Ch. 6Insurers60
Ch. 7Banks Again94
Ch. 8Mutual Funds102
Ch. 9Pension Funds124
Pt. IVThe Contemporary and Comparative Evidence147
Ch. 10Takeovers151
Ch. 11Corporate Ownership in Germany and Japan169
Ch. 12A Small Comparative Test of the Political Theory187
Ch. 13Counterpoint I198
Ch. 14Political Evolution in Germany and Japan?210
Ch. 15Trends in the United States222
Ch. 16An American Crossroads226
Pt. VPolicy Recommendations231
Ch. 17Managers as the Problem?235
Ch. 18Short-Term Finance as the Problem?240
Ch. 19Industrial Organization as the Problem?248
Ch. 20Counterpoint II254
Ch. 21Changing the American Ownership Structure?263
Conclusion283
Bibliography289
Acknowledgments309
Index311

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File created: 11/11/2014

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