| List of Figures and Tables | |
| Preface and Acknowledgments | |
| Ch. 1 | Overview | 1 |
| What Is Game Theory? | 1 |
| What Can You Do with Game Theory? | 2 |
| Four Problems in Political Science | 3 |
| Why Model? | 6 |
| The Rational Choice Approach to Social Modeling | 7 |
| Ch. 2 | Utility Theory | 16 |
| The Concept of Rationality | 17 |
| How Do Utility Functions Predict Actions? | 22 |
| An Example: Nixon's Christmas Bombing | 25 |
| Certainty, Risk, and Uncertainty | 28 |
| Utility Theory under the Condition of Risk | 29 |
| Some Common Misconceptions about Utility Theory | 33 |
| Utility Functions and Types of Preferences | 34 |
| A Simple Example: The Calculus of Deterrence | 38 |
| Another Simple Example: The Decision to Vote | 43 |
| Why Might Utility Theory Not Work? | 44 |
| Ch. 3 | Specifying a Game | 51 |
| Formalizing a Situation: Deterrence in the Cuban Missile Crisis | 51 |
| Games in Extensive Form | 58 |
| Games in Strategic Form | 65 |
| Ch. 4 | Classical Game Theory | 73 |
| Defining the Terms of Classical Game Theory | 74 |
| Domination, Best Replies, and Equilibrium | 77 |
| Mixed Strategies | 81 |
| The Minmax Theorem and Equilibria of Two-Person, Zero-Sum Games | 89 |
| Characteristics of Nash Equilibria | 91 |
| Nash Equilibria and Common Conjectures | 94 |
| Rationalizability | 98 |
| Political Reform in Democracies | 101 |
| Candidate Competition in the Spatial Model of Elections | 104 |
| A Very Brief Introduction to Cooperative Game Theory | 111 |
| Ch. 5 | Solving Extensive-Form Games: Backwards Induction and Subgame Perfection | 121 |
| Backwards Induction | 124 |
| Subgame Perfection | 128 |
| Sophisticated Voting | 133 |
| Agenda Control | 135 |
| Legislative Rules and Structure-Induced Equilibria | 138 |
| The Rubinstein Bargaining Model | 145 |
| Bargaining in Legislatures | 149 |
| Why Might Backwards Induction Yield Counterintuitive Results? | 156 |
| Ch. 6 | Beliefs and Perfect Bayesian Equilibria | 161 |
| Bayes's Theorem | 163 |
| The Preference for Biased Information | 166 |
| Perfect Bayesian Equilibria | 170 |
| Nuclear Deterrence | 180 |
| Ch. 7 | More on Noncooperative Equilibrium: Perfect and Sequential Equilibria | 188 |
| Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies | 189 |
| Perfect Equilibrium | 192 |
| Sequential Equilibrium | 196 |
| Deterrence and the Signaling of Resolve | 199 |
| "Why Vote?" Redux | 212 |
| Ch. 8 | Games of Limited Information and Restrictions on Beliefs | 219 |
| Signaling Games | 222 |
| The Informational Role of Congressional Committees | 227 |
| Bargaining under Incomplete Information | 237 |
| Deterrence and Out-of-Equilibrium Beliefs | 241 |
| An Introduction to Restrictions on Beliefs | 244 |
| "Cheap Talk" and Coordination | 250 |
| Ch. 9 | Repeated Games | 260 |
| Thinking about Repetition: Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma | 262 |
| Folk Theorems | 268 |
| Finite Repeated Games: The Chain Store Paradox | 279 |
| Stationarity | 291 |
| Retrospective Voting and Electoral Control | 293 |
| Ch. 10 | Conclusion: Where Do We Go from Here? | 302 |
| How Do Formal Models Increase Our Knowledge? | 302 |
| The Weaknesses of Game Theory | 305 |
| How Does One Build a Model? | 311 |
| Appendix 1: Basic Mathematical Knowledge | 315 |
| Algebra | 315 |
| Set Theory | 318 |
| Relations and Functions | 320 |
| Probability Theory | 320 |
| Limits | 322 |
| Differential Calculus | 323 |
| Partial Derivatives and Lagrange Multipliers | 327 |
| Integral Calculus | 329 |
| The Idea of a Mathematical Proof | 331 |
| Appendix 2: Answers to Selected Problems | 333 |
| Notes | 345 |
| Glossary of Terms in Game Theory | 349 |
| Bibliography | 355 |
| Index | 365 |
