| List of Figures and Tables | |

| Preface and Acknowledgments | |

Ch. 1 | Overview | 1 |

| What Is Game Theory? | 1 |

| What Can You Do with Game Theory? | 2 |

| Four Problems in Political Science | 3 |

| Why Model? | 6 |

| The Rational Choice Approach to Social Modeling | 7 |

Ch. 2 | Utility Theory | 16 |

| The Concept of Rationality | 17 |

| How Do Utility Functions Predict Actions? | 22 |

| An Example: Nixon's Christmas Bombing | 25 |

| Certainty, Risk, and Uncertainty | 28 |

| Utility Theory under the Condition of Risk | 29 |

| Some Common Misconceptions about Utility Theory | 33 |

| Utility Functions and Types of Preferences | 34 |

| A Simple Example: The Calculus of Deterrence | 38 |

| Another Simple Example: The Decision to Vote | 43 |

| Why Might Utility Theory Not Work? | 44 |

Ch. 3 | Specifying a Game | 51 |

| Formalizing a Situation: Deterrence in the Cuban Missile Crisis | 51 |

| Games in Extensive Form | 58 |

| Games in Strategic Form | 65 |

Ch. 4 | Classical Game Theory | 73 |

| Defining the Terms of Classical Game Theory | 74 |

| Domination, Best Replies, and Equilibrium | 77 |

| Mixed Strategies | 81 |

| The Minmax Theorem and Equilibria of Two-Person, Zero-Sum Games | 89 |

| Characteristics of Nash Equilibria | 91 |

| Nash Equilibria and Common Conjectures | 94 |

| Rationalizability | 98 |

| Political Reform in Democracies | 101 |

| Candidate Competition in the Spatial Model of Elections | 104 |

| A Very Brief Introduction to Cooperative Game Theory | 111 |

Ch. 5 | Solving Extensive-Form Games: Backwards Induction and Subgame Perfection | 121 |

| Backwards Induction | 124 |

| Subgame Perfection | 128 |

| Sophisticated Voting | 133 |

| Agenda Control | 135 |

| Legislative Rules and Structure-Induced Equilibria | 138 |

| The Rubinstein Bargaining Model | 145 |

| Bargaining in Legislatures | 149 |

| Why Might Backwards Induction Yield Counterintuitive Results? | 156 |

Ch. 6 | Beliefs and Perfect Bayesian Equilibria | 161 |

| Bayes's Theorem | 163 |

| The Preference for Biased Information | 166 |

| Perfect Bayesian Equilibria | 170 |

| Nuclear Deterrence | 180 |

Ch. 7 | More on Noncooperative Equilibrium: Perfect and Sequential Equilibria | 188 |

| Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies | 189 |

| Perfect Equilibrium | 192 |

| Sequential Equilibrium | 196 |

| Deterrence and the Signaling of Resolve | 199 |

| "Why Vote?" Redux | 212 |

Ch. 8 | Games of Limited Information and Restrictions on Beliefs | 219 |

| Signaling Games | 222 |

| The Informational Role of Congressional Committees | 227 |

| Bargaining under Incomplete Information | 237 |

| Deterrence and Out-of-Equilibrium Beliefs | 241 |

| An Introduction to Restrictions on Beliefs | 244 |

| "Cheap Talk" and Coordination | 250 |

Ch. 9 | Repeated Games | 260 |

| Thinking about Repetition: Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma | 262 |

| Folk Theorems | 268 |

| Finite Repeated Games: The Chain Store Paradox | 279 |

| Stationarity | 291 |

| Retrospective Voting and Electoral Control | 293 |

Ch. 10 | Conclusion: Where Do We Go from Here? | 302 |

| How Do Formal Models Increase Our Knowledge? | 302 |

| The Weaknesses of Game Theory | 305 |

| How Does One Build a Model? | 311 |

| Appendix 1: Basic Mathematical Knowledge | 315 |

| Algebra | 315 |

| Set Theory | 318 |

| Relations and Functions | 320 |

| Probability Theory | 320 |

| Limits | 322 |

| Differential Calculus | 323 |

| Partial Derivatives and Lagrange Multipliers | 327 |

| Integral Calculus | 329 |

| The Idea of a Mathematical Proof | 331 |

| Appendix 2: Answers to Selected Problems | 333 |

| Notes | 345 |

| Glossary of Terms in Game Theory | 349 |

| Bibliography | 355 |

| Index | 365 |