Classics in Game Theory
Edited by Harold W. Kuhn

Book Description | Reviews

TABLE OF CONTENTS:

	Permissions
	Foreword
	An Appreciation
1	Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games	3
2	The Bargaining Problem	5
3	Non-Cooperative Games	14
4	An Iterative Method of Solving a Game	27
5	Equivalence of Games in Extensive Form	36
6	Extensive Games and the Problem and Information	46
7	A Value for n-Person Games	69
8	Stochastic Games	80
9	Recursive Games	87
10	Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions to Cooperative Games without Side Payments	119
11	A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy	127
12	The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games	140
13	Existence of Competitive Equilibria in Markets with a Continuum of Traders	170
14	The Core of an n-Person Game	192
15	Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. Part I: The Basic Model	216
	Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. Part II: Bayesian Equilibrium Points	247
	Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. Part III: The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game	268
16	The Big Match	289
17	On Market Games	296
18	Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games	317
	List of Contributors	355
	Index	357

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File created: 11/5/2009

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