| Acknowledgments | |
| Pt. I | Lessons from Locke | |
| Introduction to Part I | 3 |
| Ch. 1 | Preview of the Normative Analysis of Personal Identity | 13 |
| 1 | Locke's Analysis | 13 |
| 2 | Rational Points of View | 19 |
| 3 | The Explanatory Goal of the Normative Analysis | 26 |
| 4 | Meeting the Explanatory Goal | 29 |
| 5 | A Final Comparison with Locke | 32 |
| Ch. 2 | On the Need for Revision | 35 |
| 1 | What the Lockean Thought Experiments Really Show | 40 |
| 2 | The Conflict Is Not Merely Apparent | 45 |
| 3 | Neither Side of the Conflict Is Incoherent | 49 |
| 4 | Seeking Positive Reasons to Embrace One Side of the Conflict | 59 |
| Ch. 3 | A Revisionary Proposal | 65 |
| 1 | What Are Agency-Regarding Relations? | 74 |
| 2 | The Ethical Criterion Meets All Three Constraints | 99 |
| Pt. II | Personal Identity: The Body Practic | |
| Introduction to Part II | 127 |
| Ch. 4 | A Sufficient Condition for Personal Identity | 136 |
| 1 | The Case for Group Persons | 137 |
| 2 | Intra- and Interpersonal Relations | 142 |
| 3 | The Normative Analysis of Personal Identity: A First Full Statement | 160 |
| Ch. 5 | The Sufficient Condition Is Also Necessary | 167 |
| 1 | A Rational Reconstruction of Multiple Personality Disorder | 169 |
| 2 | Justifying the Commitment to Overall Rational Unity | 179 |
| 3 | Some Remaining Metaphysical Issues | 183 |
| Ch. 6 | The First Person | 209 |
| 1 | The Distinctive Features of the First Person | 211 |
| 2 | Self-Oriented Ethical Relations | 232 |
| Postscript | 245 |
| Bibliography | 251 |
| Index | 255 |
