TABLE OF CONTENTS: PREFACE ix
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xi
Chapter 1. Indeterminacy 1
Strategic Interaction 3
Ordinalism 9
Mutual Advantage: The Collective Implication of Self-Interest 12
Concluding Remarks 14
Chapter 2. Beyond Basic Rationality 16
Basic Rationality 17
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma 20
Dominance 25
Equilibrium 28
Contract by Convention 32
Nuclear Arms Control 34
Against Determinacy 36
Concluding Remarks 38
Chapter 3. Mutual Advantage 41
Social Order 42
Ex Ante Mutual Advantage 44
Institutional and Policy Choice 46
Policies 51
Concluding Remarks 53
Chapter 4. The Greatest Sum 55
Subjective Benthamite Utility 58
Labor Theory of Value 60
Wealth Maximization 62
Mutual Advantage and Interpersonal Comparisons 63
Ordinal Utilitarianism 65
Concluding Remarks 68
Chapter 5. Marginal Determinacy 70
Indeterminacy on the Frontier 71
Marginal versus Fundamental Values 74
Transaction Costs 78
Concluding Remarks 79
Chapter 6. Rules for Determinacy 81
Rules 83
A Kantian Principle 87
Institutional Decisions 93
Public Policy 96
Concluding Remarks 98
Chapter 7. Indeterminate Justice 102
Equality versus Productive Efficiency 106
Justice as Fairness 108
Mutual Advantage 109
Justice as Fairness and the Coase Theorem 111
Resources 112
Primary Goods 114
The Difference Principle 116
Concluding Remarks 118
Chapter 8. Mechanical Determinacy 121
Marginalism 123
Two-Stage Theory 125
Institutional Fallibility 127
Institutions as Meliorative 131
Contractarian Arguments 134
Concluding Remarks 135
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2:
DETERMINACY IN ITERATED PRISONER'S DILEMMA 139
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4:
INDIVIDUALLY CARDINAL UTILITY 141
NOTES 143
REFERENCES 151
INDEX 159
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