Book Search:  

 

 
Google full text of our books:

bookjacket

Self-Policing in Politics:
The Political Economy of Reputational Controls on Politicians
Glenn R. Parker

Book Description | Reviews
Introduction [HTML] or [PDF format]

TABLE OF CONTENTS:

List of Figures and Tables ix
Acknowledgments xi
Introduction 1
Chapter 1
What is Opportunism and How Do We Control It? 15
Chapter 2
How Reputations Control Cheating in Economics and Politics 38
Chapter 3
Problems in the Market for Legislators 55
Chapter 4
Hypotheses, Measurement, and Data 71
Chapter 5
Constraining Opportunism through Self-Policing 85
Chapter 6
Reputational Capital and Job Security; or, If Trustworthy Legislators Are at a Premium, Are They Paid One? 103
Chapter 7
Weaknesses in Reputational Controls 124
Conclusion 139
Appendix 1
Most Important Characteristic for Legislator to Possess: Examples of Category Content 151
Appendix 2
Examples of Categories of Employment 153
Appendix 3
Codes for Identifying Faithful Agents 154
Appendix 4
Lifetime Judicial Appointments: 1965-1996 156
Appendix 5
Examples of Prestigious Post-Elective Employment Positions 157
Appendix 6
Electoral Defeat and Post-Elective Employment for Senators in the Analysis 158
Notes 159
References 169
Name Index 177
Subject Index 179

Return to Book Description

File created: 4/17/2014

Questions and comments to: webmaster@press.princeton.edu
Princeton University Press

New Book E-mails
New In Print
PUP Blog
Videos/Audios
Princeton APPS
Sample Chapters
Subjects
Series
Catalogs
Textbooks
For Reviewers
Class Use
Rights
Permissions
Ordering
Recent Awards
Princeton Shorts
Freshman Reading
PUP Europe
About Us
Contact Us
Links
F.A.Q.
PUP Home


Bookmark and Share