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Self-Policing in Politics:
The Political Economy of Reputational Controls on Politicians
Glenn R. Parker

Book Description | Reviews
Introduction [HTML] or [PDF format]

TABLE OF CONTENTS:

List of Figures and Tables ix
Acknowledgments xi
Introduction 1
Chapter 1
What is Opportunism and How Do We Control It? 15
Chapter 2
How Reputations Control Cheating in Economics and Politics 38
Chapter 3
Problems in the Market for Legislators 55
Chapter 4
Hypotheses, Measurement, and Data 71
Chapter 5
Constraining Opportunism through Self-Policing 85
Chapter 6
Reputational Capital and Job Security; or, If Trustworthy Legislators Are at a Premium, Are They Paid One? 103
Chapter 7
Weaknesses in Reputational Controls 124
Conclusion 139
Appendix 1
Most Important Characteristic for Legislator to Possess: Examples of Category Content 151
Appendix 2
Examples of Categories of Employment 153
Appendix 3
Codes for Identifying Faithful Agents 154
Appendix 4
Lifetime Judicial Appointments: 1965-1996 156
Appendix 5
Examples of Prestigious Post-Elective Employment Positions 157
Appendix 6
Electoral Defeat and Post-Elective Employment for Senators in the Analysis 158
Notes 159
References 169
Name Index 177
Subject Index 179

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File created: 7/11/2014

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