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Deterrence by Diplomacy
Anne E. Sartori

Book Description | Reviews
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TABLE OF CONTENTS:

Preface ix

Part I: Introduction 1

Chapter 1: Introduction 3
Three Misconceptions About Diplomacy 6
How Can a State Communicate That an Adversary Has Misjudged Its Resolve? 12
Overview of the Book 14

Part II: How Bluffs Can Hurt a State's Diplomacy, and Honesty Provides the Ability to Communicate 17

Chapter 2: The Failure of Chinese Diplomacy, 1950 19
The Chinese Attempt at Deterrence 22
The U.S. Dismissal of China's Threats as Bluffs 26
Would the United States and China Have Fought if China's Threats Had Been Credible? 30
Why Did the United States Dismiss China's Threats As Bluffs? 32
Conclusion 41
Chapter 3 A Reputational Theory of Diplomacy 43
Reputations for Honesty and Reputations for Resolve 44
Audience Costs, Cheap Talk, and Diplomacy 49
The Game-Theoretic Model 52
Effective, Cheap Diplomacy 56
Conclusion 71

Part III: Evidence That Honesty Matters 73

Chapter 4: Reputations for Honesty and the Success of Diplomacy 75
Central Empirical Implications of the Formal Model 77
Determining Empirical Implications of the Theoretical Model 78
Data and Methodology 81
The Escalation of International Disputes:Tests of the Theory 93
Robustness of the Empirical Results 99
Conclusion 109
Chapter 5: The Broader Importance of Reputations for Honesty 111
The Effect of the Defender's Reputation on States' Decisions to Begin Militarized Disputes and to Attempt Deterrence 112
The Role of the Military Balance 114
Conclusion 118

Part IV: Conclusion 121

Chapter 6: Conclusion 123

Part V: Appendixes 129

Appendix A: Characterization of the Equilibrium 131
Factorization 136
Choosing Thresholds So That Each Player-Type Prefers Its Equilibrium Strategy to Other Strategies Played in Equilibrium 139
Checking That No Player Prefers to Deviate to a Strategy No Type Plays in Equilibrium 141
No Player Prefers to Deviate at a Node Other Than the Player's First Node in the Stage Game 145
Appendix B: The Impact of Communication on War and on Welfare 146
Appendix C: Implications of the Theory 149
Appendix D: The E ffects of Power Status, Contiguity, and Democracy 151

Bibliography 153
Index 161

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File created: 10/23/2013

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