The Macropolitics of Congress
Edited by E. Scott Adler & John S. Lapinski

Book Description | Endorsements
Introduction [HTML] or [PDF format]

TABLE OF CONTENTS:

List of Contributors ix
Acknowledgments xv

Introduction: Defining the Macropolitics of Congress by John S. Lapinski and E. Scott Adler 1

Part I: Theoretical Approaches to the Macropolitics of Congress

Chapter 1: Macropolitics and Micromodels: Cartels and Pivots Reconsidered by Keith Krehbiel 21
Chapter 2: Bureaucratic Capacity and Legislative Performance by John D. Huber and Nolan McCarty 50

Part II: The Macropolitics of Representation

Chapter 3: Public Opinion and Congressional Policy: A Macro-Level Perspective by Robert S. Erikson, Michael B. MacKuen, and James A. Stimson 79
Chapter 4: The Substance of Representation: Studying Policy Content and Legislative Behavior by Ira Katznelson and John S. Lapinski 96

Part III: Testing Theories of Macropolitics across Time

Chapter 5: Macropolitics and Changes in the U.S. Code: Testing Competing Theories of Policy Production, 1874-1946 by Valerie Heitshusen and Garry Young 129
Chapter 6: Does Divided Government Increase the Size of the Legislative Agenda? by Charles R. Shipan 151

Part IV: Macropolitics and Public Policy

Chapter 7: The Macropolitics of Telecommunications Policy, 1899-1998: Lawmaking, Policy Windows, and Agency Control by Grace R. Freedman and Charles M. Cameron 173
Chapter 8: The Influence of Congress and the Courts over the Bureaucracy: An Analysis of Wetlands Policy by Brandice Canes-Wrone 195
Chapter 9: Legislative Bargaining and the Macroeconomy by E. Scott Adler and David Leblang 211

Part V: Understanding the Macropolitics of Congress

Chapter 10: Lawmaking and History by David R. Mayhew 241
Chapter 11: Rational Choice, History, and the Dynamics of Congress by David Brady 251

Index 259

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File created: 11/5/2009

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