Google full text of our books:


Running the World's Markets:
The Governance of Financial Infrastructure
Ruben Lee

Book Description | Reviews
Introduction [in PDF format]


Foreword and Acknowledgments xi
List of Acronyms xiii
Introduction 1
Nature of Governance 1
Concerns 2
Issues 3
Approach 3
Structure 4

Part One: Background Information and Analysis 7

Chapter One: Definitions 9
Infrastructure 9
Exchanges, Central Counterparties, and Central Securities Depositories 21
Conclusions 36

Chapter Two: Market Power 40
Preliminary Comments 40
Exchanges 45
CCPs 61
CSDs 71
Conclusions 81

Part Two: Survey Evidence 83

Chapter Three: The Allocation of Regulatory Powers over Securities Markets 85
World Federation of Exchanges 85
International Council of Securities Associations 88
Infrastructure Institutions in Major Markets 90
Conclusions 114

Chapter Four: Regulation and Governance of MarketInfrastructure Institutions: Global Perspective 117
The Financial Sector Assessment Program and Securities Markets Assessments 117
Observations 125
Conclusions 141

Chapter Five: Governance of Market Infrastructure Institutions: A Snapshot 145
Data 146
Analysis 151
Conclusions 164

Part Three: Case Studies 167

Chapter Six: Exchanges 169
Deutsche Börse / London Stock Exchange: Proposed iX Merger 2000 170
Euronext: Purchase of LIFFE 2001 177
Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing: The Penny Stocks Incident 2002 180
NASDAQ: Attempted Takeover of London Stock Exchange 2006-8 189
New York Stock Exchange: Resignation of Chairman-CEO 2003 194
Osaka Securities Exchange: "Murakami Fund" Purchase of Shares 2005 198

Chapter Seven: CCPs and CSDs 201
Canadian Depository for Securities: Ownership, Usage, and Board Representation to 2008 201
Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation: EuroCCP 2000-2002 207
Deutsche Börse: Creation of Clearstream International 1999-2002 213
Euroclear: Creation, Ownership, and Board Structure up to 2006 217
LCH.Clearnet: Creation and Difficulties 2003-6 231

Part Four: Policy Analysis and Recommendations 245

Chapter Eight: What Is the Most Efficient Governance Structure? 247
Ownership and Mandate: Archetypal Models and Primary Goals 248
Ownership Model and Mandate: Critical Factors Affecting Efficiency 253
The Board: Role and Composition 276
Concluding Discussion and General Propositions 293

Chapter Nine: Who Should Regulate What? 301
Complexity 301
Factors and Constraints Affecting Relative Merits of Different Allocation Structures 307
Concluding Discussion and General Propositions 334

Chapter Ten: How Should Market Infrastructure Institution Governance Be Regulated? 339
Preliminary Comments 339
Investor Protection 342
Efficiency, Fairness, and Transparency 348
Systemic Risk Reduction 353
Concluding Discussion and General Propositions 357

Authorities 363
Cases and Decisions 365
Notes 367
References 395
List of Contributors 433
Index 437

Return to Book Description

File created: 4/21/2017

Questions and comments to:
Princeton University Press

New Book E-mails
New In Print
PUP Blog
Princeton APPS
Sample Chapters
Princeton Legacy Library
Exam/Desk Copy
Recent Awards
Princeton Shorts
Freshman Reading
PUP Europe
About Us
Contact Us
PUP Home

Bookmark and Share