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Monitoring Democracy:
When International Election Observation Works, and Why It Often Fails
Judith G. Kelley

Book Description | Reviews
Chapter 1 [in PDF format]

TABLE OF CONTENTS:

Illustrations xi
Tables xiii
Preface xv
Abbreviations xix

PART I

Chapter 1: Introduction 3
Two Questions 6
Methods of Analysis 12

Chapter 2: Th e Rise of a New Norm 16
The Changing Normative Environment 21
Contestation 23
Increased Supply and Demand 26
The Popularization of Monitoring 28
Monitoring Today: Organizational Variation 34
Summary 41

Chapter 3: Th e Shadow Market 43
Disagreements about Contested Elections 47
Who Invites Whom? 54
Discussion 56

Chapter 4: What Infl uences Monitors’ Assessments? 59
Analyzing Summary Monitor Assessments 60
Five Types of Bias 63
Discussion 75

Chapter 5: Do Politicians Change Tactics to Evade Criticism? 77
What Constitutes Evidence of a Monitor- Induced Shift ? 78
What Are the Safer Forms of Cheating? 80
Data: Th e Varieties of Irregularities 82
The Record 84
Discussion 92

PART II

Chapter 6: International Monitors as Reinforcement 97
Altering Incentives to Cheat 99
Altering Domestic Conditions 104
If It Works, When Should It Work? 107
Summary 109

Chapter 7: Are Monitored Elections Better? 112
Measures of Election Quality 112
An Overview of the Record 115
Statistical Analysis 121
Discussion 129

Chapter 8: Long- Term Eff ects 131
Selection of Countries and Method of Analysis 133
Do International Monitors Improve Elections Over Time? 136
When Do Countries Follow the Recommendations of International Monitors? 141
Discussion 151

Conclusion: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly 155
Do Monitors Assess Elections Accurately and Objectively? 156
Do Monitors Improve the Quality of Elections? 166
Closing Th oughts 176

Appendix A: Data Description 181
Two Datasets 181
Variables 184
Appendix B: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 3 195
Appendix C: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 4 197
Dependent Variable 197
Analysis 197

Appendix D: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 7 199
with Mark Buntaine
Additional Description of Matching Process 199

Appendix E: Case Summaries 211
with Kiril Kolev
Albania: Th e Importance of Leverage 211
Armenia: Paper Compliance 214
Bangladesh: Slowly but Surely? 218
Bulgaria: Motivated but Slow 221
El Salvador: International Meddling for Both Good and Bad 223
Georgia: Not So Rosy 228
Guyana: Uphill Battle 232
Indonesia: A Sluggish Behemoth 237
Kenya: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back 242
Lesotho: Deadlock 245
Mexico: Constructive Engagement 247
Nicaragua: Excessive Meddling and Deal Making 252
Panama: Both a Will and a Way 256
Russia: Goliath Beats David 258
South Africa: Remarkably Unremarkable 261

Notes 265
References 293
Index 321

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File created: 10/23/2013

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