Introduction

Exploring Leisure, Morality, and Geography in South Beirut

It was a typical Thursday around three in the afternoon in late summer about a year after Bab al-Hara opened. We walked up a short flight of stone stairs and through a small outdoor seating area to the café entrance just above the level of the busy street. Two collection boxes for Shi'i charitable organizations flanked the main door—one for Al-Mabarrat, the organization affiliated with prominent religious leader Sayyid Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, and the other for Hizbullah’s Emdad Foundation. We stepped into a large room, its faux stone walls graced with antique objects and photographs from the popular Syrian television series that is the café’s namesake. Two television screens were tuned to Hizbullah’s Al-Manar station, with the volume set so low that it was barely audible. Toward the back of the room, beside a staircase leading to the first floor, a young couple was seated on one of the low couches arranged in a rectangle around a low wood and glass table. The couch was upholstered in the red-and-black-striped fabric common to these cafés. The wall behind them held an old clock, a sword, and a lantern, with a set of brass coffeepots resting on a narrow shelf below. The couple looked like they were twenty at most. Both wore jeans and sneakers, his accompanied by a black T-shirt with something printed on it, and hers by a long, loose purple blouse and brightly printed matching headscarf, pinned at the side to cover her neck but not her chin. His arm was draped lightly around her, and they appeared to be engaged in an intense conversation.

We walked up the stairs and were greeted by a sudden shift in décor. Red, black, white, and zebra-striped leather chairs and sofas with metal legs were arranged around ceramic and metal tables, with checkerboard tops in the same colors under glass surfaces. Horizontal purple stripes along one
wall framed a long poster of primarily red, black, and white computer graphic images ranging from a coffee cup and saucer to silhouettes of faces and bodies, with the English words “drink it” printed every so often. As it continued along the wall, the poster included enlarged photographs of groups of young people and more silhouettes, with the English phrase “I have something to tell you” accompanying them.

Besides our table, there were seven others with customers on this floor. A young man and woman, both wearing jeans and T-shirts, were drinking tall juices and having an animated conversation in one corner. Across the room sat another couple, drinking espresso. They looked a few years older, perhaps in their late twenties or early thirties, and were dressed more conservatively, he in slacks and a button-down shirt, and she in Islamic dress—a long, loose coatlike dress in navy blue with a blue and white printed headscarf. They seemed less familiar with one another; their conversation proceeded as though they were asking each another questions across the table. Scattered around the room were three tables of lone men sitting and smoking argileh (hookah); one seemed to be in his twenties, and the other two in their thirties or perhaps older. The coals for their argilehs were regularly replenished by men wearing two slightly different uniforms—one that resembled representations of Lebanese village dress during the Ottoman Empire, often seen on dolls or in folkloric performances, and the other that mimicked the outfits on the Bab al-Hara television series. One of the older men seemed quite familiar with the waitstaff and appeared at one point to be giving them instructions. Two tables were filled with groups of youths. Three young women and a young man pored over textbooks at one table, while three young men and two young women laughed and talked loudly at the other, making the most noise in the place.

We perused the menu, which was written in Arabic and frequently misspelled English, with a photo from the television series on the cover. The possibilities included a selection of coffee ranging from espresso to Arabic coffee to Nescafé, a variety of fresh fruit juices in various combinations, fresh fruit cocktails, sandwiches including shawarma (gyros) and taouk (grilled chicken) as well as frisco and other popular variations, a variety of saj (a thin bread folded over with a variety of fillings) options, and a selection of argilehs. Our young waitress was wearing tight black pants and a shiny pale-violet blouse in the latest fashion, with a sheer sparkly white and violet headscarf draped around her hair several times to provide coverage along with full makeup in intense colors. She took our order of fresh fruit cocktails and a chicken sandwich (which was delicious) to share, and stopped to flirt with one of the argileh smokers on her way downstairs to give the order to the kitchen. The other waiters were all young men wearing black shirts and pants with the café’s logo on the shirt pocket. On this level, one television screen was set without sound to Al Jazeera Sports, and
the other, also without sound, to a rerun of the popular Turkish telenovella *Noor*.

On a trip to the restroom on the ground floor, a glance over to the couple sitting near the stairs caught them kissing passionately. They remained the only downstairs customers. Our table afforded us a view out the window to the main street of Sainte-Thérèse below. A steady stream of passersby walked along the road, sometimes interrupting the flow of traffic to cross. Two blond women wearing business suits with skirts above their knees and pumps walked by quickly, followed by a shaykh in his robe and turban, a group of teenage boys eating sandwiches, a woman in Islamic dress holding a small child’s hand, and a young woman in a green sleeveless sundress carrying a book bag; this young woman turned into the café and joined the study group seated in front of us.

By 4:00 p.m. the younger single man, both couples, and the loud group of youths had left. We were joined on the upper level by another large group, possibly a family. Two men pushed several tables together to create a space large enough for themselves as well as the three women, two children, and two babies with them. As they ordered a lot of food, two other men joined the older argileh smoker who knew the waitstaff. We asked our waitress who that argileh smoker was, and she explained that he was the owner of the café. Three argileh-smoking guys who sat together also joined the upstairs crowd, along with a table of two twenty-something women—one in a T-shirt, and the other in a sleeveless blouse—a table of two women in Islamic dress with a baby, and a table with a teenage couple, the young woman dressed to the nines in tight pants, a revealing strappy top, stilettos, full makeup, and straightened hair. The couple chose a corner table and sat on the same side next to each other.

Another trip down the stairs revealed that the original young couple had departed. Two men sat at a table on one side eating, and a conservatively dressed young couple with their son also shared a meal. A woman in a clingy hot-pink dress and heels, a woman in a slinky tank top, and a man in jeans and a fitted T-shirt stood in the center of the room deciding where to sit, and eventually settled into the low couch area beside the stairs. A staffperson, who had been walking around with cleaning supplies since our arrival, was mopping the floor.

An hour later the ground floor was dominated by male customers, with the exceptions of our research assistant Douaa and the group by the stairs; the group appeared to be on its second round of coffee drinks with argileh. At one table, a group of three men smoked argileh and drank coffee. Two of them appeared to be in their forties, dressed in business attire and having a work-related conversation. The third was younger, and wore jeans, a fitted T-shirt that said “Toronto” on it, and a Nike cap. He had a large tattoo of some kind of animal on his arm and bandages on his nose indicating
recent cosmetic surgery. As two young women in knee-length dresses from the study group upstairs descended toward the exit and waited for a taxi, “Toronto” followed them with his eyes. Another young woman came down and walked into the restroom, and again he watched.

A man we had been introduced to as the manager arrived and greeted the table of three men on the ground floor. He is in his mid-forties, and on this occasion was wearing an off-white, button-down shirt with white collar and cuffs along with a shiny-pink necktie. One of the forty-something men took a call on his cell phone, speaking loudly in broken English, “We need sixty ton. . . . yeah. . . . No, you have to call him. . . . tell him you are from Monsieur Joseph [said with a French inflection]. . . . Yallah call him now.” The young man rested a pair of sunglasses that appeared out of nowhere on top of his cap before greeting a young woman who walked in and headed upstairs. Meanwhile, the argileh table was joined by a fourth man dressed in jeans and T-shirt.

By now the manager was greeting almost everyone who entered the café, often indicating familiarity with them: “How are you, mademoiselle?” “Where have you been? wayn hal ghaybeh” “Welcome.” The only people he didn’t greet were young women who headed directly upstairs without a glance at him, including a group of five in their late teens or early twenties. One of them was wearing a casual sleeveless top and jeans, and the others were in tight pants that in one case revealed the details of her thong, long-sleeve stretchy shirts, and matching headscarves. They were followed by a blond woman in a miniskirt who scanned the upstairs tables quickly before heading back down toward the exit. As she left, the manager asked, “What, you didn’t find them?” and she smiled and responded affirmatively as she walked out. A group of two fortyish couples entered and took a large, prominent table on the ground floor. The conservatively dressed man who had eaten on the ground floor previously with his wife and son returned with a much older couple—old enough to be his parents—and settled them into seats on the ground floor. He then walked over to chat with the table of two couples, and was joined there by the manager.

By 6:30 p.m., the upstairs was dominated by youths, with the exception of the owner, who still sat holding court with different passing male customers. The teenage couple left, after nursing their fruit juices for over two and a half hours. The study group was significantly reconfigured, with only one original member. There were also tables of five young women chatting and giggling loudly, a young man sitting alone who kept looking out the window, two young women with a young man, and a young woman in a rusty-orange, ribbed, low-cut tank top with two men of different ages. The latter table was within earshot, and we heard the woman
ordering coffees for herself and her companions as the younger one presented some kind of business deal having to do with the Arab Gulf to their older, white-haired companion. Downstairs people were mainly eating meals. The diners included the older couple, two forty-something men, a conservatively dressed couple with a teenage daughter with straightened hair, a black woman who did not wear a headscarf with a baby and a young preteen daughter who did, and a couple with two children who had their Sri Lankan domestic worker seated with them, and who the manager seemed to know quite well. Two couples with elegantly dressed, and subtly made-up women and men in business attire joined the table of two fortyish couples. A conservatively dressed young woman in a green headscarf walked in, and as she headed for the stairs, asked the manager if he had seen Sa’id. He replied that Sa’id was waiting for her upstairs. She joined the young man who had been looking out the window.

When the evening news came on Al-Manar, the manager turned up the volume on both televisions downstairs. The four couples had finished their food and ordered dessert, and were the only people paying attention to the news. The sound on the two televisions was not quite synchronized, so after a few minutes the manager turned the volume down on the television that was further from their table.

The downstairs crowd changed again around 8:00 p.m. to people who ordered mainly desserts and argileh. A mother and daughter sat underneath the stairs; the latter was wearing a fitted jogging suit and sneakers with straightened hair and flashy, long, silver earrings, and she was eating cake as her mother smoked argileh in a long, loose denim dress and a headscarf tied under her chin in a more “old-fashioned” style. When they walked over to the restroom together, the young woman asked her mom loudly in US-accented English, “Why does everyone stare?” One of those staring was a guy who appeared to be in his thirties sitting alone near the entrance, smoking argileh and texting on his phone constantly. About a half hour later, he was joined by a man who also ordered an argileh. Then another guy around the same age entered and greeted one of the waiters warmly, standing and chatting for a long time. A group of three men in their early thirties, one in jeans and pointy leather shoes, ordered only coffee.

Two women who appeared to be in their late twenties dressed in especially bright, tight, and revealing clothing, and speaking in Gulf Arab accents, walked into the café. This appeared to be their first visit to the place, because they looked around slowly and then walked down the stairs that led to the underground Turkish baths. As this was a men-only day for the baths, the manager ran down after them, smiling, and said, “Where are you going, mademoiselles? A little further and the alarm would have gone off! [He laughs]. Tjaddaluu, welcome; be seated,” he added, as he guided them...
back to the ground floor. As one of them chose a table and began pulling out a chair, the manager pointed up the stairs and said, smiling yet, “Tfaddalu, upstairs if you would like, tfaddalu,” so they sat upstairs instead.

Immediately afterward a woman in her forties entered with two teenage girls, three preteen girls, two preteen boys, and two girls under five. The manager led them all the way to a table on the ground floor, shaking hands with the boys. He took their order, and a few minutes later large bowls of fruit salad drenched in vanilla ice cream and whipped cream, then sprinkled with strawberry syrup, honey, pistachios, and almonds were delivered to their table. Another group, one guy and two women in their late teens or early twenties, entered and tried to walk downstairs. The manager stopped them and explained about the bath, before choosing a table for them on the ground floor. Another man, the first person we saw wearing shorts, took a seat by himself directly in front of Al-Manar, now showing Qur’anic recitation, and ordered dinner. Soon after the manager changed the channel on both televisions to O TV, the channel affiliated with political leader Michel Aoun. Two young women, in their late teens or early twenties, sat beneath the stairs. One had curly hair and wore a tight black dress with leggings and heels, and the other had straightened hair, wore a patterned red-and-green dress, and sported copious eye makeup. A young man joined them after a few minutes.

Meanwhile, it grew crowded upstairs, where the space continued to be dominated by youths. The owner left, and the manager walked through periodically chatting with customers. There was a waitress and a waiter up here, and both were flirting with many of the young customers of the opposite sex. After ordering coffees, the young woman in the orange tank top did not say another word; she just sat listening to her male companions. Other tables on this floor were occupied by a group of four young women in their early twenties dressed casually without headscarves, a casually dressed couple wearing jeans and pastel-colored T-shirts, two more couples, three groups of two young women each, four groups of two young men each, and two tables of mixed-gender groups of five to six people. There was a sense of constant turnaround as people left or were joined by new friends. At around 9:15 p.m., one of the young men said loudly, “Muhammad, put on Al-Manar, now the Sayyid will begin.” The waiter handed the guy the remote control, and he said “Merci” and changed the channel, turning his chair to face the screen. As he did so, he asked us, “Sorry, does this bother you?” to which we of course replied that it did not. Once Hizbullah’s secretary general Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah began speaking, many of the young men became attentive. The customer holding the remote control quickly flipped through all the other Lebanese channels to assess which ones were airing the speech before settling back on Al-Manar. About five minutes into the speech, two young women wearing headscarves
walked downstairs, stopping before they left to ask Douaa where she had bought her shoes. Two other young women continued to crack jokes and argue loudly about a fortune-teller. A few minutes later several groups of men, ranging in age from late teens to late thirties, walked upstairs, apparently here primarily to watch Nasrallah’s speech. It was 9:30 p.m.

The above vignette describes a typical weekday afternoon and evening in one of the new cafés in the southern suburb of Beirut or south Beirut, an area often maligned in the US press as “the Hizbullah stronghold” and known in Lebanon as Dahiya. The Bab al-Hara café exemplifies many of the shifting features of leisure in south Beirut, and highlights many of the new ideas and practices of morality as well as geography that have emerged in this Shi’i-majority area of the city over the past decade. The café is located at the eastern edge of the area, close to the Maronite-majority neighborhood of Hadath where the Free Patriotic Movement political party, led by Michel Aoun and allied with Hizbullah, dominates. Bab al-Hara’s architectural layout provides varying rooms and seating areas for different customers, with an eclectic décor that draws on at least two popular aesthetic styles, which we call contemporary and heritage. The menu offers a wide selection of food, beverages, and argileh flavors, but no alcohol, and wireless Internet access is available. The waitstaff and manager interact in familiar ways with a diverse, often carefully dressed customer base, and sometimes control patrons’ movements, all under the watchful eye of the café owner. Patrons include people of different ages, styles, dress, and behavior; they study, flirt, chat, make out, laugh, hold business meetings, show off their clothes and accessories, eat and drink, and check out the other customers.

These are activities typical of any café in Beirut, but Bab al-Hara is decidedly not part of the circuit of hip leisure places frequented by the cosmopolitan young jet set featured in New York Times travel section depictions of the city. If we were to ask a typical American University of Beirut student who grew up in Achrafieh or Verdun how they decide where to go out, they would probably list factors like who is going, what they’re in the mood for, where the place is located, what sort of transportation they have, what they can afford, and what the general atmosphere of a place is like. And chances are, they would not decide to spend their evening in Bab al-Hara, opting for a café or pub in Hamra or Gemmayze instead. So why is this café so popular? Who goes to Bab al-Hara, and why would they go to this café over another in Beirut when many Beirutis and Lebanese would scoff at such a choice?

To answer these questions, we need to first understand that many young residents of Dahiya are more or less pious Shi’i Muslims who would add a key idea to the list of factors affecting their decisions about where to go
out: the legitimacy or appropriateness of the café in question—terms encompassing ideas about the reputation and morality of places, activities, and people. Bab al-Hara is one of the new cafés that have filled a particular niche produced by people who understand, however implicitly, the relationship between morality and geography when it comes to leisure choices and activities. These new cafés in south Beirut are often described as sharʿi ("religiously legitimate"), muhafiz ("conservative"), or simply munasib ("appropriate") by both their clientele and owners. The term sharʿi here refers to legitimacy in relation to Islamic precepts, though the precise details of some of those precepts remain debatable. The exceptions are alcohol and non-halal meat, neither of which is available in any of Dahiya’s cafés. There is also debate as to whether it even makes sense to apply the term sharʿi to cafés, as some people believe that implies a formal religious approval that is beyond the bounds of jurisprudential purview. Conservative and appropriate refer to societal ideas about moral behavior, and the overlap and interchangeability among the three terms highlights the entanglement of social as well as religious ideas about what it means for a café to be a “good” or acceptable place. Also complicating this picture are the geographic and political aspects of “appropriate” cafés, as place has come to matter in crucial ways.

So what makes a café legitimate, conservative, or appropriate? There is little consensus on this question beyond the absence of alcohol and non-halal meat. Everyone ranging from religious authorities to devout Muslims to nonpious residents of Dahiya agrees on those two tenets, although few people actually remember the rule about meat unless they are reminded of it, which may also indicate that issues of halal versus nonhalal meat are taken for granted by many in ways that the absence of alcohol is not. Another essential element is the behavior of customers, but here again, where the lines are drawn varies widely, including among the pious. Most pious people agree that such cafés should not play loud music conducive to dancing nor tolerate overt physical contact between unrelated men and women, though again, which music is acceptable and how much physical contact is unacceptable are up for debate. More broadly, there is little agreement on what kind of behavior is appropriate, how people should dress, and where lines of absolute violation occur. Some of these moral boundaries are gendered, though not as strictly as they seem to be in contexts like Cairo (M. Peterson 2011). Complicating definitions of legitimacy further, a pious person may feel strongly that a legitimate café must not serve alcohol, but think that it is perfectly permissible to go to a café that does serve alcohol provided they themselves do not drink. For many people, figuring out whether a café is legitimate, conservative, or appropriate has to do with judgments about the “type” or “quality” of people who frequent it (nawʿ al-nas), encompassing a range of ideas about class, sect, piety, and politics.
Other potential customers assume that such cafés are only located in Hizbullah-friendly neighborhoods—an assumption they find comforting as it alleviates their fears of navigating hostile territory and fulfills their desires to frequent establishments that support the Resistance. Similar fears and desires lead some people to avoid businesses in Beirut neighborhoods that are viewed as “anti-Resistance” along with those associated with the United States, like McDonald’s. Finally, some people assess the appropriateness of a café based on its reputation and that of its owner. But just being legitimate, conservative, or appropriate is not enough to attract customers. These characteristics combine with others, including the location and “class” of the establishment; cost of its menu items; a potential patron’s class, tastes, religiosity, mood, politics, and ideas about morality; and factors like the time of year, with whom one is hanging out, access to transportation, the political situation, and ideas about the quality of particular cafés. Above all, people go out where they feel comfortable, as Hasan, a student in his early twenties put it, “Anywhere I am not comfortable is illegitimate.” And indeed, “comfort” and the ability to feel at ease were among the most cited reasons for patronizing businesses. People often described feeling most comfortable around others who seemed to be like them—a feeling related to shared sensibilities about appropriate morals and social behavior, perceptions of class congruity, a sense of security linked to safety from physical or verbal harassment, and territorial belonging. In this book, we unravel these ideas about what makes people comfortable in particular places, what they consider to be appropriate cafés and activities, and how leisure is related to their ideas about morality, geography, and status in the city.

A decade ago, places like Bab al-Hara were nonexistent in south Beirut, or elsewhere in the city for that matter. While doing fieldwork in Dahiya separately for our dissertations in the late 1990s and early years of this century, we were hard pressed to locate a public place where we could sit comfortably, pull out a laptop and take field notes, or just sip a cup of coffee and wait in between interviews. The few Internet cafés that existed in this part of the city catered to young men playing computer games, and neither of us was brave enough to venture into those smoky masculine rooms. There were also a few informal coffee places—usually just a few plastic chairs set up outside a storefront—that were equally gender exclusive, with older men drinking Arabic coffee or tea and playing backgammon. Our field notes back then were typed on laptops at home or in cafés in Ras Beirut, near the American University of Beirut. By 2007, we were struck by the fact that not only were there now many places in Dahiya where we felt comfortable sitting, chilling, and working over coffee or fresh fruit cocktails but that we actually had myriad options too! Our summer 2008 walking survey of the southern suburb revealed that there were
at least seventy-five cafés and restaurants in the area that had opened since 2000, and most of them had opened after the devastating 2006 war. While the project that has resulted in this book began as a broader exploration of the Islamic milieu that we describe in the following chapter, it has narrowed to focus on this specific aspect of that milieu: the newly vibrant leisure sector in south Beirut, complete with a plethora of innovative cafés and restaurants that cater to a predominantly young, fashionable, middle-class, and more or less pious clientele.

This relatively new leisure landscape has responded to, accompanied, and prompted desires for new forms of leisure. In recent years, debates about what kinds of leisure activities and places are appropriate have become quite common. We suggest that these cafés provide new spaces for leisure that are promoting flexibility in moral norms. The circumstances that both new spaces and desires for leisure provoke (for example, whether or not to hang out with a cousin who is drinking a beer) highlight tensions between religious and social notions about what is moral. A complex moral landscape emerges, facilitated by the existence of multiple religious authorities, a fraught sectarian political context, class mobility, and a generation that takes religion for granted but wants to have fun. We then argue that these negotiations of morality are crucial in influencing how people conceive and experience the city, especially when it comes to leisure. The key here is that morality and geography are dialectically interdependent and shape one another; neither can be understood fully in isolation. As people experiment with new ways of practicing and experiencing the city through leisure sites, their understandings of both geography and morality are reshaped.

The chapters that follow explore the relationships between morality, geography, and leisure in the politicized context of contemporary Lebanon. How do people negotiate morality in relation to different kinds of places, and geography in relation to morality? How do ideas about being moral shape people’s spatial practices and urban experiences? How is the city navigated and inhabited according to varying moral conceptions? How does leisure reconfigure both moral understandings and urban geographies?

In chapter 1, we paint a rich picture of south Beirut and its Islamic milieu, which includes Hizbullah cultural sites as well as the cafés and restaurants that are our focus. We explain why there is a new emphasis on leisure for the Lebanese Shi’i community in the twenty-first century, elucidating the political, economic, religious, social, and urban changes that have taken place since 2000. Chapter 2 turns to the production of leisure by local entrepreneurs, and the efforts of both Hizbullah and religious authorities to control that production. These attempts to conceive and control leisure create a context where there are multiple authoritative defi-
nitions of what makes a place, behavior, or activity moral—a context that contributes to moral and geographic complexity in people’s lives. Chapter 3 brings us into the new cafés that are the site for much of this moral and geographic complexity, mapping the cafés in Dahiya and describing their stylistic eclecticism.

The following two chapters are devoted to illustrating and analyzing how people negotiate leisure in relation to both morality and geography. Chapter 4 is an ethnographic exploration of moral complexity, focusing on the ways that more or less pious Shiʿi Muslims employ moral flexibility in relation to specific leisure activities, including listening to songs, being around alcohol, attending weddings, and dating. We also examine how ideas about flexible morality are deeply gendered, and discuss discourses about “respect” in social interaction along with ideas about flirtation in new leisure sites. While chapter 4 concentrates on how leisure activities are negotiated, chapter 5 takes up the ways that pious Shiʿi Muslims navigate and inhabit moral leisure places in different parts of the city. Different conceptions of moral and spatial orders yield a variety of spatial practices. These range from privileging staying within south Beirut to expanding one’s urban experiences outside the area. We also look at how leisure facilitates these new subjective experiences of urban life, and how these experiences in turn simultaneously consolidate and challenge dominant power configurations. The final chapter turns to a discussion of taste in relation to class, sect, morality, and geography, before concluding by addressing some of the potential impacts of these new leisure practices. The remaining pages of this introduction set the stage for this exploration by providing some background on café culture in Lebanon and leisure in relation to Islam, laying the groundwork for our conversations about morality and geography, and introducing our methodology and interlocutors.

CAFÉS, LEISURE, AND ISLAM

Cafés are not new to Lebanon. Bab al-Hara and the other cafés in south Beirut represent both a continuation of and departure from the long-standing café culture in many parts of the Middle East. Ottoman records indicate that coffeehouses were introduced to Istanbul by two Syrian men around 1555 and spread throughout the empire (Hattox 1985). During Ottoman times, there were two types of coffee places: small local shops and grand coffeehouses. The latter were luxurious places that were known, especially in Syria and Iraq, for their gardenlike atmospheres that aimed to transport customers out of their urban and desert environments (ibid.). These were widely patronized by people of different classes, and were
places for socializing, playing chess, backgammon, and other games, listening to storytellers, and sometimes consuming other drugs (hash and opium). By the mid-sixteenth century, such coffeehouses were common throughout the Ottoman Empire (Kirli 2004).7

Cafés were an integral part of downtown Beirut as it became increasingly urbanized and populated at the turn of the twentieth century. In this context, men who met to play cards or backgammon were the predominant patrons of the maqha or qabwa (or colloquially, ahweh).8 These cafés were considered shaʿbi—which translates literally as “popular” in a Marxist sense, and here means public or working-class—spaces, generally found in the squares and narrow alleyways of pre-civil war downtown Beirut as well as in residential neighborhoods and by the beach (Douaihy 2005).9 The maqha served many social functions. It operated as a transitional space between rural and urban life, providing a conduit for migrants coming to work in the city to find jobs and meet one another, and serving as a “post office” for their families in the village (ibid.).10 It also had a political function, serving as the place where leaders met with their client base.

Downtown Beirut’s coffee shops became increasingly mixed gender beginning in the 1940s, reflecting the modernization of public spaces in the city center and influence of the French mandate (1920–43), during which the idea of eating out in restaurants and cafés became acceptable (Salamandra 2004). Two decades later, the practice of café leisure, and the gender and social mix of customers, changed significantly once again. The establishment of new commercial centers in the rapidly developing neighborhood of Hamra, the expansion of television, and the opening of movie theaters across the city drastically altered people’s relationship to public space (Douaihy 2005). Ras Beirut became the capital’s leisure center, especially its multisectarian, mixed-class Hamra neighborhood, where people went en masse seeking novel urban lifestyles.11 A new type of café emerged, modeled on the Parisian café trottoir. This was the period during which Lebanon’s reputation as a playground for Arabs and Europeans alike soared; its coastline was lauded as an “Arab Riviera” and its capital as the “Paris of the Middle East.” Hamra’s cafés were “modern public spaces” that “hosted different cultural and social activities and were open to all,” including men and women of different religious groups (Sawalha 2010, 92). Their patrons were people who were comfortable crossing social boundaries and could afford to buy a relatively expensive espresso, although Arabic coffee remained a common option. Working-class men instead frequented the older form of coffeehouses, and working-class women tended to socialize in one another’s homes (ibid.). Hamra was renowned for its café culture at this time, with places like Modca, Café de Paris, Horseshoe, Wimpy, and Dolce Vita gaining reputations as gathering spots for intellectuals and political activists.
The 1975–90 Lebanese civil war marked a major break in the leisure landscape of Beirut. All the downtown coffee shops closed. Neighborhood and beach cafés remained open, but with financial difficulties and a significant shift in customers. Older men spent time in spaces that became increasingly shabby. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Chawqi Douaihy (2005) counted about 50 remaining coffee shops, including the café trottoirs in Hamra—less than half the approximately 120 that existed prior to the war. Many of Hamra’s older cafés lost their hip aura during the war and were unable to make ends meet. Along with the neighborhood’s cinemas, the cafés were gradually replaced by clothing stores, chains, discount shops, snack bars, and local fast-food places. A few local cafés persevered, including Café Younes, which adapted by opening a newer space, and a few new cafés opened, including Ristretto, which drew business from student residents of the apartments above it. Starbucks opened a plush two-story branch on Hamra in 2000, adding to the financial strain on local businesses. Modca closed its doors in 2003. Café de Paris, the last holdout from Hamra’s prewar cafés, remained open through 2008, but was replaced in February 2009 by Crepaway, a local chain restaurant that continues to attract some of the older male Café de Paris crowd in the mornings.

Following the assassination of former prime minister Rafic Hariri in 2005 and the resulting political tensions in the country, security concerns affected people’s mobility, and many confined their movements to their own neighborhoods. This led to the commercial revitalization of Hamra and several other neighborhoods, including Gemmayze, a residential area north of downtown that was gentrified and—to the dismay of many of its older residents—became a hip nightlife center. A plethora of new cafés and pubs (and in Gemmayze, clubs) opened. Hamra became the café epicenter of the city once again, with new places opening regularly, ranging from transnational corporate chains like Gloria Jeans (2009), Caribou (2010), and Coffee Bean and Tea Leaf (2011), to local businesses like Ka3kaya (sic) (2006), Laziz (2009), and Hamra Café (2010). The establishment of the cafés and restaurants in south Beirut that are our focus in this book—cafés like Bab al-Hara—reached its peak at around the same time as the Hamra and Gemmayze revitalizations.

What all these cafés have in common—Modca, Starbucks, and Bab al-Hara—is an emphasis on consumption as part of leisure or participation in commercial leisure—purchasing coffee, food, or argileh in order to spend time in a place as opposed to spending time in a public park (though those are scarce in Beirut) or visiting people in their homes. It is today taken as a given that consumption, and specifically globalized forms and patterns of consumption, have permeated nearly everywhere on the planet, including the Muslim world. Critical scholarship on consumption has put to rest assumptions that this reflects the “McDonaldization” of the world, or
blind embrace of ideas and products. Instead, the global and the local come together to create conditions for consumption such that its meanings change in each context (Miller 1995; Pink 2009). Among these meanings are the construction and expression of identity, status, or affiliation, frequently in relation to politics, religion, and/or class. Meanings and practices of consumption—generally discussed in the literature as the consumption of products, whether international like Coca-Cola, or local and identity infused like Mecca Cola—are less clear when it comes to consuming leisure. In this book, we look at how consuming leisure is related to morality, identity, politics, and status in Beirut.

Leisure itself works as a marker of class status both in its display of the fact that one has free time to “spend” in leisurely pursuits and in relation to consumption. Thorston Veblen’s ([1899] 1994) classic conceptualization of leisure highlighted this idea as “waste,” arguing that the ability to waste time and money is the way in which a person demonstrates their wealth publicly, and thus establishes themselves as part of the wealthy class. Although the Qurʾan and hadith present “an essentially positive view of leisure and recreation” (Martin and Mason 2004, 5), the notion of waste seems at first glance to conflict with Islamic values of modesty. Indeed, it does conflict with those contemporary interpretations and manifestations of Islamism that contend that fun is threatening to moral as well as political power regimes. Authorities actively shun fun in such contexts as potentially subversive. This is Asef Bayat’s (2007) diagnosis, and it rings true for the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia—in other words, for states where the dominant legal order is based on a strict interpretation of Islam. But this diagnosis does not apply to Lebanon, where there are myriad possibilities for Islam and leisure to come together, including the happy coexistence of fun and piety in the Shiʿi community about which we write. Over the years we have heard some pious Muslims complain about waste in their community, most often in relation to youths wasting time playing video games or sitting in cafés smoking argileh. These critics view consumption, leisure, and displays of wealth or excess time warily, and see the spread of café culture in their community as a problem. This is a minority view, however, espoused by the few who believe that to truly be pious, one must always put community before oneself. We have heard far more arguments from pious individuals that stress the value of being able to breathe freely, relax, and enjoy oneself and one’s time, sometimes suggesting that leisure is necessary to one’s personal well-being and therefore a part of Islam.

Similarly, religious and political officials in the Shiʿi Lebanese community find no fault with the display of wealth. For example, a representative of the late prominent Lebanese jurisprudent Fadallah explained to us, “It is not asked of humans to live poorly. . . . This is a personal choice. . . .
There are no taboos that prevent people from buying and wearing the most luxurious clothes, having the most luxurious cars, and living in luxurious houses, and so on. Why not? When we pressed a Hizbullah official on the issue of whether material consumption, including leisure, is contrary to the party’s Islamic values, he likewise corrected us:

I think those are Catholic values, modesty and not showing wealth . . . as if we have to hide it. In the Shi‘i ideology, it is not like that. Modesty has something to do with personal behavior, not material objects. Even the third Imam, Imam Hasan, some people said to him that his clothes were fancy. He said, “Yes that’s right,” and he opened his robe and showed them very shabby clothing underneath. He said to them, “These clothes are for me, and the others are for people.” The shabby clothes were for him. And the outside ones were for other people . . . Imam Ali said, “Ascetism is not that you do not own anything but that nothing owns you.”

This party official embraces material consumption, but highlights that modesty in relation to personal behavior remains an important religious value. That said, what constitutes behavioral modesty is itself up for debate. People do not simply “follow the rules” when it comes to leisure practices and choices. They sometimes not only ignore particular tenets but also disagree on what those tenets are in the first place. Dahiya’s new commercial leisure sites—the new cafés and restaurants that today fill its streets—have catalyzed debate among the area’s Shi‘i residents, especially youths, about what it means to have fun in morally acceptable ways. To understand how Bab al-Hara and other cafés in the area differ from those in other Beirut neighborhoods, we need to understand morality and geography in Lebanon. We begin with the former.

**MORALITY**

One of the key concepts we draw on to illustrate youths’ negotiations of leisure sites and practices is morality. While the ethnography that follows will paint the moral topography of leisure more colorfully, here we lay out the ways that we are using the concept of morality, the relationship between piety and morality, and what we mean by the phrase *multiple moral rubrics*. Both the terms morality and ethics convey a sense of right and wrong, or behavior understood as good or bad. Despite historical differences in scholars’ use of the terms, much of the literature treats them as synonymous, at least implicitly. One of the definitions we have found most useful for morality is “the forms and acts by which commitments are engaged and virtue accomplished—the practical judgments people make...
about how to live their lives wisely and well and, in the course of making them, do live their lives, albeit in the face of numerous constraints” (Lambek 2000, 315). Building on this definition, we use the term morality in this book to underscore the idea of consciously trying to live a good life based on a code of conduct—a standard by which behavior is assessed to be good or bad. We prefer the term morality for our case because of its greater emphasis on socially constructed and determined values that are broadly applicable. For example, in common usage in the contemporary United States, an act like cheating on one's spouse is more likely to be described as immoral, as a violation of a generally accepted code of conduct for good behavior in society, whereas a doctor breaching confidentiality is more likely to be described as unethical, as a violation of a specific code of conduct for a specific set of people in society. In addition, the term morality is the better translation of *akhlaq*, the Arabic word most commonly used by our interlocutors to convey a sense of right and wrong.

The literature on morality within anthropology is simultaneously vast and narrow: vast in its origins in writing on social values (Durkheim 1965; Dumont 1977), and narrow in its recent configuration in studies of ethical self-formation (Mahmood 2005; Hirschkind 2006). This recent configuration uses the language of ethics rather than morals to describe its object, as a legacy of the Aristotelian thinking on virtue ethics that it takes as foundational. Perhaps the best-known work that takes this approach is Saba Mahmood’s (2005) *Politics of Piety*. Mahmood argues that women in the piety movement in Egypt actively cultivate virtuous dispositions through embodied practice. For instance, by vigilantly being aware of virtue in daily life, one may cultivate the desire to pray—a pious or ethical disposition. Mahmood’s analysis describes a community for whom agency entails submission, and piety—or the attainment of greater piety—appears to be the ultimate desire. She provides a powerful and important critique of liberal assumptions about feminist agency and the universality of desires for “liberation.” At the same time, this privileging of piety as a primary motivator, practice, and desire has a problematic effect. As Samuli Schielke (2009b) has noted, Mahmood’s assertion promotes a desire for virtue over everyday life’s competing motivations, including desires for other “good” or moral qualities not based on religious tenets. Schielke’s (ibid., S26) critique continues: “There is a risk—especially when morality and piety come together—of favouring the complete, the consistent, and the perfect in a way that does not do justice to the complex and often contradictory nature of everyday experience.” Privileging piety and the cultivation of virtuous selves ignores the complexities of the social context in which such selves may be cultivated. When piety is taken up as the scaffolding for a more general claim about “Muslim ways of being,” or moral and ethical behavior, our understandings of both morality and life in Muslim societies
are oversimplified, and the complexities of daily negotiations of moral practice—including those of our interlocutors—are flattened.

This emphasis on contextual morality is not mutually exclusive from Mahmood’s depiction of a moral subject who understands themselves to be in a process of becoming a better person. A person might not focus on self-improvement but still understand their morality as located on an axis of progress, even if active cultivation is not an immediate goal at the time. Many of our interlocutors fit this model, demonstrating “ethical subjectivity that is based on a coexistence of various motivations, aims and identity that can and often do conflict but do not constitute exclusive opposites” (ibid., S29) alongside a general sense—fluctuating in its prevalence at any given moment—that moral progress is possible as well as desirable. In other words, we are not suggesting that becoming a more pious person is not important to Shiʿi youths but rather that it is one goal among many, and not necessarily the dominant one at any given time. In this book, we seek to add to a growing corpus of ethnographic work that indicates that piety and religiosity must be located in complex social fields.18

Schielke’s work on Muslim youths in Egypt has provided a useful alternate analysis of how young Muslims negotiate complex and competing sets of moral norms. He highlights perspectives that discuss experiences of ambivalence and temporal specificity in relation to religion as well as the contradictory values that youth hold for their lives.19 Yet in his analyses, young people maintain an “understanding of religion as a clear, exact set of commandments and prohibitions that leave little or no space for different interpretations or negotiation,” even though they are not always working toward the perfect attainment of a moral self according to this criteria (ibid., S30). In other words, religious morals remain nonnegotiable, but other morals and values compete with religious ones for youths’ attention and adherence.

In contrast, many pious Lebanese Shiʿi youths think that despite the unchanging perfection of religious principles, human fallibility means that it is impossible to accurately understand those principles. Jurisprudents work to interpret them for daily life, but fallibility persists, complicated further by the mutability of everyday contexts. This means that interpretation is necessarily a continuous process, ever adapting to changing life conditions. Flexibility is built into the system. While some people take a particular jurisprudent’s fatwas as fixed and stable rules through which a layperson can orient their own efforts to live morally, those fatwas can and do change, and others, especially youths, pick and choose the ones that fit their notions of what is going on rather than treating them as a rigid guide. The presence of multiple formal jurisprudents in the Shiʿi community and their differing opinions facilitates flexibility in ways that may not exist in the Salafi Sunni context about which Schielke writes.20 We do get a glimpse
of this sort of flexibility, albeit more circumscribed than what we see in Lebanon, in Mahmood’s (2005, 85) description of a religious lesson provided by one of her interlocutors, Hajja Faiza, in which she gives her students the interpretations of a number of jurists on any issue, teaching them “a mode of interpretative practice that foreground the importance of individual choice and the right of the Muslim to exercise this choice.” Here we see a relationship between religious knowledge and moral practice much closer to that espoused by the Shiʿi Muslims with whom we have spoken over the past decade. Mahmood attributes this stress on individual choice to a combination of liberal humanism and juristic tradition that teaches choice as a means to greater piety. In the Lebanese context, we also see the profound influence of the teachings of Fadlallah, a preeminent jurisprudent who emphasized individual responsibility for moral action as well as a long-standing consumerist sensibility that valorizes individual choice.

Like young Egyptian Muslims, our interlocutors understand both piety and the attainment of moral behavior as processes, locating themselves somewhere within them, and frequently, though not always, hoping to improve along these axes of valuation. But they also understand many of the rules of the moral systems in which they live, including—with key exceptions like drinking alcohol—those based on religious values, as flexible and open to interpretation. The grounds on which the various competing registers for living a moral life are based are themselves in flux. Many youths are “preoccupied with conducting themselves in the ‘right way,’” where “being in ‘the right way’ is less a matter of adhering to principle than an ability to elaborate a narrative that holds together multiple discrepancies and contradictions in a clear sense of how one is situated in relationship to the lives of others” (Simone 2010, 145). Not only are youths in Dahiya living complex lives that require negotiating different and often competing sets of morals, they sometimes question and reinterpret the morality of various practices themselves as they stitch these personal narratives together. Rather than an increasingly moral subject defined according to the cultivation or attainment of virtues based on a religiously determined set of dispositions, here we see a moral subject constantly redefined in relation to multiple moral rubrics.

**Multiple Moral Rubrics**

With the phrase moral rubrics, we bring Schielke’s notion of “moral registers” together with an emphasis on “values” as described by Joel Robbins. The term registers conveys “modalities of moral speech and action,” and highlights “the performative, situational, and playful . . . character of norms” (Schielle 2009a, 166). Within each register of moral discussion and action, certain values emerge as primary. The term rubrics allows us to
convey a stronger sense of a categorical guide or source of guidance dominated by the particular values that emerge as primary within each register. Here we adapt Robbins’s (2007, 295–96) “theory of value”—a theory he puts forth to explain “why cultures allow choice in particular domains or situations, and how such choices are felt to be moral ones by cultural actors.” Applied to the Urapmin context where he works, this theory suggests that multiple cultural logics, each with a different key value, lead to social change and prompt people to “experience life as a continual process of choosing between the conflicting values that structure [them]” (ibid., 307). We appreciate the notion of multiple cultural logics with different key values, but are hesitant about the idea that a single fundamental value may underlie a cultural system. For this reason, we choose to use the term rubrics to simultaneously convey the constructed and always potentially malleable nature of all these sets of moral ideas, discourses, norms, and practices along with their normativity, as they frequently involve ideas that people generally agree on, most of the time.

Moral rubrics, then, are the different sets of ideals and values that are revealed as well as produced through discourses and actions in each of the major registers, including the religious, social, and political-sectarian. In some cases they take the form of prohibitions, and in other cases the form of what one “ought” to do. We identify three sets of moral rubrics. The social rubric is based on values of social obligation, propriety, hierarchy, manners, and reciprocity—values shared across Lebanese society. The political-sectarian rubric reflects the conflation of sectarian identity and political allegiance in Lebanon as well as ideas about the differential morality of Lebanon’s political-sectarian communities. Differential morality here encompasses understandings about difference in moral norms (e.g., Christians drink alcohol) and judgments about “other” groups that are related to politics (e.g., not supporting the Resistance is morally wrong). For our interlocutors, allegiance to the Resistance and to the political alliance led by Hizbullah is a moral norm based on the political-sectarian rubric. Finally, the religious rubric is related to ideas about piety and religious commitment, or iltizam, and forms the dominant rubric at work for pious Shi’i Lebanese. It is based on a set of values that emerge from histories of interpretations of religious texts, with continual temporal manifestations through jurisprudents and innovations related to individual judgment and responsibility.

To take just the religious rubric here, praying, fasting, and giving alms to charity are taken as “given” qualities of religious commitment that are not worth mentioning because everyone agrees they are important. Unrelated to leisure, many people say that the hijab (headscarf) is part of iltizam for women. When it comes to leisure activities and socializing, the one tenet on which everyone we have spoken with agrees is that a multazim/a (religion-
giously committed or pious person) cannot drink alcohol. A close second was a vague statement about maintaining “boundaries” in interactions between unrelated men and women. There remained many gray areas of uncertainty within this rubric. Can a multazim/a dance the dabkeb, a traditional Lebanese folk dance thought to be more acceptable provided that men and women do not dance hand in hand, at a wedding? Can they dance to pop music in single-sex environments? Can they listen to pop songs? Can an unrelated man and woman shake hands? Can a multazim/a hang out at a place where other people are dancing if there is no alcohol? Can they hang out in a place with alcohol without drinking?

Uncertainty also exists as to the relationship of external appearance to assessments of morality according to religious rubric, though the majority of youths felt strongly that one could not judge people based on outward appearances. These youths’ discussions usually centered on “hijab hypocrisy,” but extended to men’s clothing and facial hair as well. The younger the person, the more likely they were to suggest that appearance and religiosity do not necessarily line up; older individuals felt more strongly both that they do and they should. Batoul, a twenty-one-year-old college student, countered an older person in her group interview when the latter claimed that you could assess a person’s morality based on dress by interjecting:

I want to say something about that. Clothes don’t reflect the person’s personality. The way we think, we judge people based on their appearance. This is not right. I know people who don’t wear hijab, and regardless if this is correct or not, they have morals, and their behavior is much much better than some people who wear hijab. . . . So let us not judge by appearance.

The vast majority of our interlocutors understood morality based on the religious rubric as a necessarily incomplete process, mirroring understandings of piety as a similar process where the end goal is ultimately unattainable. There was a perceptible tension between the idea, on the one hand, that religious commitment was a conscious process of coming to authenticated Islam and understanding why you do what you do (Deeb 2006), and on the other hand, the sense that a person could live within these processes of becoming a certain sort of person whether or not they spent much time thinking about it. The way this tension manifested for youths differently than an earlier generation was marked by young people’s tendency to emphasize the significance of personal choice in behavior. That generational difference is taken up further in chapter 2 and informs the rest of this book. The idea that piety and morality were processes offered a space of imperfection, where contradictory impulses could be reconciled and ambivalence about rules of behavior could be cultivated. Perfection was both a passive
goal and a murky one. Contradiction and ambivalence within the religious rubric in particular were facilitated by the focus on individual interpretation, the availability of multiple religious opinions in a marketplace of sorts, and the sheer diversity of Lebanon’s small population.

Of course, the religious, the social, and the political-sectarian are not natural categories. They are, however, categories used by many of our interlocutors. We also find them a useful heuristic for teasing apart this moral landscape. On the one hand, these categories are coconstructed and overlap. One can argue that social obligation is also based on ideas of maintaining positive social relationships that can be traced to religion, or that political allegiance is deeply related to social obligation. Youth, for example, frequently contend that maintaining good social relations is part of mu'amat and a value within the Islamic discursive tradition.27

On the other hand, clear distinctions between religious and social rubrics of morality in particular are seen in admonishments when people violate norms: a transgression within the religious rubric (say, drinking alcohol) is described as haram, using the normative theological value reference, while a transgression within the social rubric (say, failing to attend a relative’s funeral) is described as ‘ayb, a commonly invoked word that means “shameful” and can be used to refer to a wide range of inappropriate behavior. What is ‘ayb is not necessarily haram and vice versa, as the former indicates a violation affecting one's relationship with other people, and the latter a violation affecting one's relationship with God. The concept of ‘ayb also captures the way that social rules for moral behavior are often implicit, unarticulated, assumed, and more difficult to unravel, as social norms or social taboos generally are. In contrast, religious rules usually have clear fatwas, and even when there is disagreement on the content of those fatwas or when fatwas clash, the disagreement is stated explicitly, making it possible to argue about the rules and take explicit stances on them more readily.

Many of the behaviors considered ‘ayb involve failing to participate properly in reciprocal social relations, like failing to visit a neighbor who is ill, attend a relative’s wedding, or reciprocate or accept (depending on whose “turn” it is) a dinner invitation. In such cases, ‘ayb is invoked in gender-neutral ways. There is another dimension to the concept that specifically refers to gendered behavior that is considered shameful either because it marks women as sexually available or “loose” (faltaneh), or because it marks men as incapable. Here ‘ayb includes acts like a woman kissing her boyfriend in public, women smoking in public, and a man borrowing money from a woman. Gender difference also inflects the weighing of social obligations (wajbat) versus social propriety, where both men and women face social obligations, but women tend to feel the burdens of social propriety more intensely.
The fatwas of one religious authority in particular, Fadlallah, often highlight the tensions between the religious and social moral rubrics. For instance, he gave a fatwa that states that a mature young woman, even if she is a virgin, does not need the permission of her father or any guardian in her personal affairs, including marriage. He then noted that the woman herself could in fact determine her maturity. This opinion clearly contradicted norms of social propriety in Lebanon, and Fadlallah’s office received numerous complaints from outraged parents as a result. In response to this social upheaval, he moderated the statement, and in the email response to our question on the matter in 2010, his juristic office noted, “It is preferable (though not required) for a virgin young woman, even if she is mature, to ask the permission of her father, for the purpose of taking advice from her parents, and from their experience and desire for her best interests.” Fadlallah was well aware of this discord between religion and social norms, or between moral rubrics, and felt that societal problems could be alleviated by society “catching up to” religion in terms of allotting sexual and other rights for women, because with social acceptance came social regulation.

Such conflation or overlap between spheres is by no means unique to Lebanon. A similar example of the tension between the religious and social is seen in the depiction by Anne Meneley of Zabid’s younger women, who are expected by their elders to take an active role in hospitality work during social events held at their homes. Meneley (1996) was surprised to find, on her return visit to Zabid after nine years, that these women prioritized a seminar on religious norms over their hospitality duties. When women who adhered to the hospitality norms criticized this, they framed their critique as one where the “Islamists” who promoted these new social norms were “lacking manners (adab), a term that connotes religious piety as well as social propriety” (ibid., 232). Here, as in the case we describe, the conflict was not only over religious versus social norms; it also was over what constituted religious norms in the first place, as visiting at key moments in life and being generous to guests were considered part of one’s pious duty, and understood as social values rooted in religion. Put simply, “Islamist” values were coming into conflict with what were understood as “Islamic” values (ibid., 233).

It is also important to remember that particular moral “rules” may shift rubric over time. In the 1970s and 1980s, wearing the headscarf was understood in Dahiya as a religious prescription, both a manifestation and marker of women’s piety. By the turn of the twentieth century, the headscarf had become part of normative female dress in the community. Young women today may wear it to express or enact their piety (or both), but they also may wear it simply because it is a fundamental element of clothing for women over a certain age in their community. What was once a clear
marker of exceptional piety has become a form of normative dress, or a social norm to which women are expected to conform, in relation to assumptions about faith, but one that is also understood as not necessarily connected to faith.

What this all boils down to is that in many situations, there are multiple paths available through which one can make a moral choice—a choice understood to be good by accepted standards of behavior. Sometimes those paths converge, and sometimes they conflict. The social and religious converge when the notion that a woman should not smoke argileh in public because it represents “loose” sexual behavior complements ideas about maintaining one’s health as well as Fadlallah’s fatwa prohibiting all forms of smoking for everyone. They clash when Fadlallah’s fatwa about an independent woman having the right to make her own decisions about temporary marriage contradicts the norm of social propriety that insists that a woman must be a virgin for her first regular marriage.

The political-sectarian rubric should not be discounted, especially in relation to the social. Because political-sectarianism is overlaid onto neighborhoods in the city, mobility is impacted by moral concerns about where one can and cannot go. Being a good Hizbullah supporter means privileging certain areas and avoiding others, and political values carry moral worth and potential judgment. The political and social may clash if a friend or colleague lives in an “enemy” neighborhood. One may face the choice between either spending time in that neighborhood and violating the political-sectarian rubric for morality, or offending a childhood friend or a newly made acquaintance, thereby violating the social rubric. When different tenets for moral behavior based on different rubrics clash with one another, those caught in the complex moral web that results often express feeling conflicted about their choices, experiencing guilt, or otherwise making a concerted effort to figure out the best way to navigate this terrain.

From this context of multiple moral rubrics, we argue that youth practices and discourses of morality are multiple as well as flexible, perhaps especially when it comes to ideas about leisure. This interpretive flexibility is also redefining ideas about leisure within these moral rubrics. Youths may even generate norms within the religious rubric by putting themselves into situations that necessitate regulation or insisting on reformulating prior regulations to facilitate their desires for a particular lifestyle. Thus we always mean flexible in this dual sense of the term: negotiations within clear-cut rules (e.g., I believe it is immoral and haram to sit in a pub, but I will go anyway without drinking), and negotiations of the rules themselves (e.g., I do not believe that sitting in a pub is immoral or haram). This does not mean that youths never have strong convictions about what is right or wrong but instead that those convictions sometimes change, and that their source is rarely a single authority. Most commonly, convictions about
moral norms in all the rubrics are influenced by a combination of authoritative knowledge, habit, people in one’s social worlds, and experiences. By no means is this a simple moral landscape; rather, these are constellations of ideas about what constitutes good versus bad behavior rife with contradiction and confusion. One key element through which these constellations of ideas and rubrics are materialized and inscribed is the city’s geography.

GEOGRAPHY

Beirut is notorious as a sectarian city geographically divided into territorial enclaves affiliated with sectarian groups and their respective political movements. During the Lebanese civil war, space, sect, and politics came together as massive population displacements homogenized neighborhoods. These sectarian politics have had a critical effect on the city’s leisure geographies.

When residents of Beirut decide where to spend their free time, ideas about the relationship between sect, politics, and space are often crucial factors. Dwellers recognize and classify spatial and visual cues associated with political-sectarian geographies, and navigate these politicized sectarian maps of urban neighborhoods with more or less ease, privileging certain places and avoiding others. The political-sectarian rubric for assessing morality is laid firmly on to ideas about place: “my” Muslim (or Christian) neighborhood is better, “cleaner,” and more comfortable than “other” Christian (or Muslim) neighborhoods, which are bad, “dirty,” and therefore threatening.

Following the civil war, city spaces gradually became less polarized. The famed “Green Line” that bifurcated the capital, separating Muslim west Beirut (Gharbiyyeh) from Christian east Beirut (Sharqiyyeh), became a major urban artery, crossed on a daily basis by many for work, study, or leisure. People ventured more easily into “other” neighborhoods. The few west Beirut neighborhoods that had retained some of their sectarian mix—especially the middle- and high-income areas of Ras el-Nabeh, Badaro, and Ras Beirut—became symbols of a postwar era of coexistence. The new Beirut Central District (BCD), including the rebuilt “downtown,” also projected that possibility, albeit through capital and consumption. Overall, between 1991 and 2005, political-sectarian geographies became less blatant and salient to residents. Despite this shift, place remained linked to political-sectarianism for several reasons. Beirut’s small size, its residents’ long-standing attachments to specific neighborhoods, its history of violence, and postwar reconstruction policies precluded radical shifts in the spatial order.
Throughout this history, moral assessments about place impacted and were complicated by the relationship between Dahiya and Beirut. Until the post-Liberation apex of Hizbullah’s popularity in 2000, Dahiya was stigmatized by Beirut dwellers of all religious groups (including some wealthy Shi‘i Muslim residents) as an Islamist ghetto of poor rural migrants who are ignorant about urban life, and as a space of anarchy, chaos, and illegality. This relationship varied with the political shifts we detail in the next chapter.

The period of political tension—and specifically new Sunni-Shi‘i politi-
cized sectarian conflict—that followed the assassination of Hariri in 2005 led to the sudden, violent resurfacing of both old and novel boundary lines between and within Beirut’s neighborhoods. Escalating insecurity led to the militarization of many areas of the city, with an increasing number of streets and neighborhoods closed off to protect politicians and government officials as well as high-end retail and business activities. Residents learned to navigate a new “city of security,” using different competences and adding new variables onto their personal navigation maps.

The Beirut-Dahiya boundary was solidified as specifically Sunni-Shi‘i during this time, and the relationship of place to the political-sectarian moral rubric was reinforced. Despite the imperfect alignment of sect, politics, and place, ideas about morality in relation to place became a critical component of people’s spatial practices and everyday lives. People increasingly differentiated others by sect, according to stereotypical interpretations of dress and other bodily signifiers. For instance, pious Shi‘i women were believed to wear their hijab in a specific way and dress either in dark or bright (frequently described as garish) colors, especially green, while pious Shi‘i men were believed to have a particular style that included collared shirts without neckties and large rings carved in silver with semiprecious or precious colored stones. Shi‘i people were also assumed to speak in an accent related to their rural origins and be monoglot such that their speech was not sprinkled with English and especially French, with the latter associated closely with the Christian bourgeoisie. Similarly, Shi‘i places were associated with a specific aesthetics. Of course, Shi‘i individuals also classified others, especially Sunni Muslims, through stereotypical signifiers, including hijab style, other dress features, and accent.

The severity of this polarization erased other political possibilities as well as the fact that there were significant Christian partisans on both sides. Those who did not fit within the bifurcated lines of Sunni-Shi‘i and Beirut-Dahiya were often silenced, to the extent that it frequently appeared that the entire country had chosen one side or the other. These divisions extended beyond the Beirut-Dahiya border and into Beirut’s other neighborhoods, as partisans of the two groups generated spatial divisions wherever they were situated.
This overlap between political-sectarian moral judgments and place has had a significant impact on the leisure geography of the city. For pious people who want to enjoy their free time according to moral norms, navigating the city’s possibilities for leisure is further complicated by the imperfect alignment of social and religious moral norms with moral space understood in political-sectarian terms. All three rubrics of morality—religious, social, and political-sectarian—are most easily maintained within Dahiya, where one can most readily assume that others’ morality resembles one’s own. Nevertheless, quite a few people perceive this choice as confinement and choose to venture outside their territory, inhabiting other spaces in the city that they view as abiding by at least some shared moral norms (for example, a café in “enemy territory” that does not serve alcohol).

SPACE, PLACE, AND MORALITY

The morality of ordinary people’s everyday practices is inscribed in space. Simultaneously, space reconfigures ideas about (im)moral practices and people in relation to all three moral rubrics. Our discussion of moral rubrics and geography is built on this dialectical understanding of space, anchored in a Lefebvrian analysis. It is also in conversation with scholarship that investigates space as reproduced through the power of moral authorities. Space is constituted through and constitutive of social relations and material social practices. It defines categories of people and practices, generating systems of exclusion and inclusion related to classifications of good and bad behavior. The term space refers to multiple sets of intertwined social spaces, and must be understood through these interrelations, temporalities, and scalar connections (Keith and Pile 1993; Massey 1993a). In other words, space is not a passive flat surface for social, economic, and political action; it is dynamically and dialectically linked with people, places, objects, and events.

In this book, we use the term space to refer to the abstract space of the city, and the term place to refer to practiced or social space. The leisure places we discuss—cafés and restaurants—are physical, mental, and social spaces. According to Henri Lefebvre’s triadic model for understanding space, these cafés are conceived spaces because they are planned, designed, and managed by different groups of people, including political parties, religious organizations, and private entrepreneurs. They are also perceived spaces, because they are geographically located and distributed, and have specific forms. And they are lived spaces, because they are socially experienced by people, and generate informal collective practices and congeniality among customers.
This triadic model of space informs our discussion of moral leisure. We analyze conceived space by unraveling the political and economic forces that led different stakeholders to establish new cafés along with other leisure sites in Dahiya. We reveal perceived space by mapping café locations and spatial characteristics, and exploring the social and spatial practices of their patrons. And we look at lived space through the cafés' aesthetic styles and café goers' experiences. We are keenly aware of the inherent politics incorporated within these sociospatial dialectics. Social spaces are conceived, perceived, and lived as (im)moral in relation to power structures that influence their (re)production, including political allegiances and conflicts.

Our analysis privileges lived space, highlighting the everyday ways that people experience the city through leisure. Through “communication components such as humor, noise, wit, amusement, play, sociability, solidarity, power, subversion, body language, behavioral arrangements, gossip and rumour,” cafés provide a specific conviviality that people seek and enjoy (Graiouid 2007, 533). Cafés also blur the borderline between public and private spheres by domesticating public space, at times converting it into family space, a refuge, or a space that facilitates various acts of reciprocity. At the same time, they maintain a dynamic engagement with ideas of privacy, so that individuals maintain their voice within the collective arena of the café.

New forms of moral leisure in Dahiya highlight the area as a casually lived urban space as opposed to its all-too-common sensationalized image as a “Hizbullah stronghold.” Looking at moral leisure places and practices also allows us to illuminate the class dimensions of the area along with its strong links to the neoliberal postwar city that privileges capital circulation, accumulation, and consumerism. In this way, we show how Dahiya—as south Beirut—is participating in the spatial production of the city through classed moral geographies that consolidate sectarian spatial fragmentation. Yet the area also provides possibilities for change through pious youths’ contestations of these established boundaries. Dahiya’s cafés operate as places that are simultaneously experienced through social interactions and controlled (with varying efficacy) by the dominant order. They are places where social space has the potential to be dynamically expressed, reinterpreted, and reinvented, if only for fleeting moments.

It is critical to consider sociospatial dialectics in order to account for the significance of moral rubrics in shaping the city’s space. Morality must be added to the now-classic variables of gender, class, age, ethnicity, sect, and politics that govern spatial production in Beirut. The city is a rich urban laboratory that reveals how ideas about morality and geography operate in relation to one another. We argue that this productive relationship between
morality and geography moves in both directions, and works to shape both sets of ideas and practices. Ideas about religious, social, and political-sectarian moral rubrics significantly shape and are shaped by conceptions, perceptions, and experiences of space.

RESEARCHING LEISURE IN DAHIYA

This book is based primarily on collaborative fieldwork conducted between 2007–9, including participant observation, surveys, and semistructured group and individual interviews. We also draw freely on each of our long-term research experience in Dahiya (Lara’s since 1998, and Mona’s since 1996) along with many conversations and informal interviews with long-standing interlocutors and friends in the area. Mona’s teaching at the American University of Beirut has also informed our work through students’ projects and thought-provoking class discussions. As a first for both of us, we completed some of the research for this book with the help of a wonderful team of assistants, who not only transcribed recorded interviews and scanned documents from libraries but also carried out our surveys of cafés and customers, and conducted a number of recorded group interviews.

Our participant observation took us to at least twenty cafés in Dahiya, many of them multiple times, and we draw on our field notes from those visits as well as the notes of our research assistants, who conducted participant observation in seven of these cafés at different times of day during varying days of the week. We chose those seven based on a survey of thirty-six cafés (approximately half the cafés in Dahiya at the time) conducted in July 2008 by Douaa Sheet and Fatima Koumeyha, who recorded information ranging from how many people the café held to who owned it to the price of an argileh. Data from that café survey also informed this book’s four analytic maps, which were conceptualized and designed by Ahmad Gharbieh with the assistance of Wissam Bou-Assi. Douaa also conducted a photographic survey of the interiors of our seven focus cafés to assist us in remembering the details of their styles and décor during our writing (though we do not have photographs that include customers, out of respect for people’s privacy and in keeping with owners’ requests to avoid photographing people). Douaa and Fatima conducted a second survey of 405 customers across six cafés in Dahiya, collecting demographic data as well as information about how often they visited that particular café, how they originally learned about it, and how they rated its offerings, services, cost, and ambiance. With assistance from our quantitatively inclined spouses and Hazar Al-Asadi, we analyzed that survey data using SPSS statistical software (also a first for both of us). In addition, we draw
on archival data collected by Diala Dagher, including fatwas on leisure-related activities and sites, newspaper articles, and magazine articles from *Baqiyyat Allah*, a magazine published in Lebanon that espouses Sayyid Khamenei’s perspectives, and consistently includes a number of articles about youths and youth issues.

We conducted semistructured interviews with six café owners, four café managers, the representatives of two jurisprudents (Fadlallah and Khomeini), a major Hizbullah-affiliated entrepreneur, and several party officials and politicians, including a mayor, two members of Parliament, and various media office representatives. Diala and Douaa assisted us with additional interviews with a third jurisprudent’s representative (Sistani) and three land brokers (*semsar*). We also formally interviewed several young women, and had numerous informal conversations about new leisure places and activities in the area with many women as well as some men in their thirties, forties, and fifties who we have known for years. Finally, with our research assistants, we conducted semistructured group interviews with fifty-two youths (age eighteen to twenty-nine; thirty women and twenty-two men) and eleven adults (age thirty-two to forty-nine; two women and nine men). These group interviews were essentially directed conversations that included various combinations of two to four people, who may or may not have known each other previously.

A NOTE ABOUT OUR INTERLOCUTORS

Interviewing young people made especial sense to us as our survey of café customers indicated that the vast majority of café goers in Dahiya are between eighteen and thirty-five years of age (over 80 percent). We found that group interviews were an excellent way to get a sense of how people talk about leisure in front of others. This was particularly important because our focus is primarily on what young people say that they do, which of course may or may not reflect what they in fact do. In this sense, our claims are about the ways they articulate decisions and ideas about leisure as much as, if not more than, about their actual leisure practices. We find their public declarations about moral behavior and spatial practices striking in their deviation from official discourses about morality in this community, and take it as quite significant that, as we will see, people are willing to publicly admit to many behaviors that are viewed as inappropriate or immoral. Indeed, we take this as an indicator of social, political, and spatial change. We are also interested in the ways in which people are intentionally grappling with the binds in which they find themselves, and see interpretive flexibility at work in these conscious articulations of different ideas of morality and space.
This interpretive flexibility is emerging in a space where over the past several decades, as we describe in chapter 1 and have detailed elsewhere (Deeb 2006; Harb 2010a), particular ideas and practices of piety have come to dominate public life plus take deep hold within personal life trajectories. Our customer survey found that almost all the patrons of cafés in Dahiya live in the area, suggesting that considerations of geography as well as the dominant ideas about morality in the southern suburb are important to the success of this leisure sector. As scholars, we are interested in understanding ideas about morality, geography, and leisure among Shiʿi Muslims in Lebanese for whom faith is crucial, and who are centered as a community in south Beirut. We are not implying that all Shiʿi Muslims or Lebanese agree with these ideas but rather that these ideas have become common in this part of the city.

As such, the majority of our interlocutors are Shiʿi Muslims who both identify as such within the sectarian polity of Lebanon and view themselves as relatively pious people, though what this indicates varies widely. For the most part this means that they pray and fast, or try to, on a regular basis. Most—yet not all—women wore the hijab, although as we saw above, the extent to which that indicates piety is debated and debatable. Some people conformed to other indicators of piety, like not shaking hands with members of the opposite sex in greeting, and others ignored these tenets or disagreed with their validity in the first place. Few were in any way “evangelical” about their religious belief or practice; few cited verses from the Qurʾan or tried to convince others (whether another participant in a group interview or one of us) of proper virtues and correct behaviors. Almost all the young men and many of the young women in our interviews have online lives, using the Internet to chat, maintain active Facebook pages, and otherwise engage in social networking. Most people were what they described as ‘ʿadi or “normal,” meaning that they neither refuse to socialize with the nonpious nor go out drinking and clubbing on a regular basis. But this definition of ‘ʿadi would certainly not be viewed as normal in Ras Beirut or Gemmayze, other neighborhoods in the city. Instead, it reflects the face of normativity in Dahiya in the wake of a Shiʿi Islamic revival that we discuss in the next chapter. It is also a normativity that cannot be understood outside the context of sectarianism and ideas about resistance in Lebanon, as it includes a sense of opposition to and distinction from other Lebanese.

While the majority of Dahiya residents today conform to the basic outlines of political-sectarian, social, and religious morality that have emerged as hegemonic in the area over the past few decades, there are certainly many exceptions. The voices of only a few of those who do not fit in are included in this book, with the acknowledgment that there are many more,
and that many of them find the practices and ideas of morality and social space that we depict here to be oppressive. A few of the nonconformists are loud and public, such as Lokman Slim, who owns the Hangar, an exhibition space in Dahiya, and who publicly critiques the hegemony of Hizbullah and the Islamic milieu in the area. Most are not so vocal. Several are queer young people who have found communities and spaces where they feel comfortable in Ras Beirut, away from the questions and censure of their natal neighborhoods. A few are upper-middle-class youths who were raised in Dahiya, but sent to elite private high schools near the American University of Beirut and then to that university, so both their friends and favorite places are centered outside south Beirut. One of these young men explained to us that he spent his high school years deflecting “weird responses” from his classmates when they learned that he lived in Dahiya, but that he also never fit in there.

So there is Soha, a young woman we met during our search for a research assistant, who was quite religious as a child and teenager, but underwent a radical change in lifestyle during college, thereby instigating serious conflict with her religiously and politically connected Dahiya family, and prompting her to spend more and more time outside the neighborhood. There is Aziza, who Lara has known for years, who has remained a part of Dahiya’s social fabric while building a life that extends outside it as much as possible. She tends to avoid many of the cafés we write about simply because when she goes out, she prefers to choose her companions, and can’t escape running into extended family members and neighbors in Dahiya’s new cafés. And there is Tala, Aziza’s twenty-four-year-old assistant, whose family forced her to conform to a pious lifestyle as a child and wear a headscarf, and who today exemplifies “emo hijabi” style—a sort of Muslim goth meets Flashdance aesthetic. Tala walks a careful moral line in relation to both others’ perceptions of her and her own understandings of as well as desires for her morality. Their voices may be quieter, but they remain in our minds as we write.

REGIONAL COMPARISONS

Lebanon is neither Egypt nor Iran. This seems like an obvious statement—something that should go without saying. But it is a statement that we feel the need to write, because so frequently they are the lenses through which work on Lebanon is viewed and the contexts for much of the secondary source literature we cite. And with good reason: both Egypt and Iran are much bigger and more important places, geopolitically and within scholarly communities. There are closer parallels between Lebanon and Tur-
key——another context for many of the secondary source comparisons on which we draw. These comparisons and contrasts are most striking in relation to three key topics: youths, café cultures, and of course, the so-called Arab Spring.

The chapters that follow provide a rather different picture than that depicted by recent work on Iranian youths (Khosravi 2008; Mahdavi 2009; Bayat 2007). The focus of these scholars on youths as transgressive has everything to do with the specificity of a context where Islamists in authority are “distinctly apprehensive of the expression of ‘fun’” (Bayat 2007, 433). While moral norms do exist in Dahiya, as they do everywhere, they are asserted through social pressures rather than an apparatus of the state. Indeed, the lack of a state or party authority enforcing moral codes and norms has allowed a space to emerge where people—young and old alike—can fulfill simultaneous and noncontradictory desires for morality and fun. In his later work, Bayat (2010a, 18; 2010b) underscores these differences more clearly, noting that “the intensity of youths’ activism depends, first, on the degree of social control imposed on them by the moral and political authorities.” The contrast between the Iranian and Lebanese contexts is one where in the former, the state regime legislates moral issues and youths resist, and in the latter, there is little formal regulation of morality, multiple sectarian authorities compete, and youths instead are policing themselves for moral behavior. Bayat’s (2010b, 46) description of Egyptian youths is closer to what we see among our interlocutors, as they draw on what he called “accommodating innovation” as “a strategy that redefined and reinvented prevailing norms and traditional means to accommodate their youthful claims.” But in this depiction, the youths’ practices are bifurcated, such that they enjoy fun and also pray and fast. This seems to fit with Schielke’s (2009a, 2009b) portrayals of situational morality among Egyptian youths as well. A similar scenario exists in Niger for young Muslims, who separate religious practices from other behavior (Masquelier 2010). In these contexts, there is a time and place for piety, and a time and place for other things. In Dahiya, we instead see a generation of youths who don’t view their lives as necessarily bifurcated in this way, yet are striving to bring fun and faith together in ways they feel are more compatible—striving for a greater level of consistency in their lives across these dimensions. Understanding these youths’ desires means viewing youths as “savvy cultural actors” who want to understand themselves as authentic selves.44 For our interlocutors, that quest required engaging with ideas about morality as they navigated the complex urban spaces of Beirut.

The cafés we describe are a new component of that terrain. They are linked to both a long-standing café culture in Beirut more broadly and
recent transnational café trends. But the new Dahiya cafés do not resemble the male-dominated coffee shops that have been part of many Beirut neighborhoods as well as urban neighborhoods across the region for centuries, and continue to play a major role in public life in many parts of the Middle East. Nor do they resemble the cafés of the intelligentsia in Hamra; nor are they franchises or imitations of transnational chain coffee shops priced too high for the majority of the population. They are more affordable than Cairo’s new coffee shops and instead seem to share many of the stylistic elements of those in Istanbul. South Beirut’s cafés have become part of Lebanon’s open-market souq, adding new moral and geographic options to it. One of their striking features is the relatively equal presence of men and women—a significant change from the exclusively male informal street hangouts and Internet gaming shops that previously dominated public leisure places in this part of the city. This is also different from the gendered world of coffee shops in Cairo, where men of all classes frequent “traditional ahwehs” to drink tea, smoke argileh, and play backgammon in a public space conducive to the construction of masculinity, while elite women and sometimes elite men spend time in new “feminized coffee shops” (M. Peterson 2011). This difference may also be related to the striking lack of gender segregation in public spaces in Lebanon (with the exception of places of worship) as compared with Egypt. There is no enforced segregation between family and shabab sections of most restaurants and cafés in Dahiya, nor is there a “morality police” like those in Saudi Arabia or Iran. In Lebanon, mixed-gender socializing is neither unusual nor the exclusive domain of the elite, cosmopolitan, or Westernized.

Finally, regional comparisons also stop short of Lebanon when it comes to the effects of the Arab Spring on both our interlocutors and the country more broadly. Life in Lebanon goes on within an already-existing working democracy, albeit a severely flawed sectarian one. Not only is there no dictator against whom to revolt; divisions among Lebanon’s political communities have been so deeply established over the course of the nation-state’s modern history so as to preclude the stuff of united televised protests, most of the time. The country is also exceptionally tiny, highlighting the way that distances are as much political as they are physical. Politics in this small space are at once complex and mundane, and frequently seem utterly irrelevant to the massive social, political, and economic changes being wrought by people across the region in the face of violent repression by their governments as well as the ongoing US occupation of Iraq and Israeli occupation of Palestine. Sadly, many Lebanese are not particularly engaged in what is going on beyond their borders, aside from the occasional Facebook posts or solidarity demonstration. In Dahiya, most people, including youths, maintain their support for the Resistance against
Israeli aggression—a support that extends in spirit yet generally not in practice to solidarity with Palestine. They also seemed for the most part to support all the recent revolutions until Syria.

Initial apprehensions about the uprising next door have given way to skepticism and fear. Quite a few of our Shi‘i interlocutors accept the official Hizbullah position supporting the Syrian regime, which the party has consistently presented as an ally against Israel and the United States. Even when they hesitate to buy the Hizbullah line, peoples’ other concerns prevent solidarity with Lebanon’s neighboring population, including fears of spillover violence, sectarian politics gone bad, and “Shi‘a-hating Salafis.” Indeed, as this book goes to press, regular armed clashes between supporters and opponents of the Syrian regime have escalated in north Lebanon. Less frequent incidents of violence have occurred in Beirut, Saida, and other areas of the country. Thus far, these events have not significantly disrupted daily life for most Lebanese. Leisure in particular continues to be lived at full force. Keeping this specificity of locale in mind, while remaining attuned to the patterns and connections that may emerge across the region, we turn now to chapter 1, where we present the context within which new leisure geographies have emerged in south Beirut, and describe how an Islamic milieu, the making of Dahiya, and a new generation of pious Shi‘i Muslims have come together to produce an environment ripe for moral leisure.