Far from being the tenuous and unmeaningful victory suggested by critical observers, the election of Richard M. Nixon as President of the United States in November, 1968, bespoke the end of the New Deal Democratic hegemony and the beginning of a new era in American politics. To begin with, Nixon was elected by a Republican Party much changed from that deposed in 1932; and such party metamorphosis has historically brought a fresh political cycle in its wake. Secondly, the vastness of the tide (57 per cent) which overwhelmed Democratic liberalism—George Wallace's support was clearly an even more vehement protest against the Democrats than was Nixon's vote—represented an epochal shifting of national gears from the 61 per cent of the country's ballots garnered in 1964 by Lyndon Johnson. This repudiation visited upon the Democratic Party for its ambitious social programming, and inability to handle the urban and Negro revolutions, was comparable in scope to that given conservative Republicanism in 1932 for its failure to cope with the economic crisis of the Depression. And ironically, the Democratic debacle of 1968 followed the Party's most smashing victory—that of 1964—just as the 1932 toppling of the Grand Old Party succeeded the great landslide of 1928. A comparison of the two reversals is apt:

The changed makeup and outlook of the GOP reflects its switchover, during the 1932–68 span of the New Deal era, from orientation towards the establishmentarian Northeast—especially the Yankee and indus-
Chapter I

trial bailiwicks of New England, upstate New York, Michigan and Pennsylvania—to representation of the rising insurgency of the South, the West, the New York City Irish and middle-class suburbia. At the same time, while the New Deal institutionalized into a nationally-dominant liberal Establishment, the Democratic power base shifted to the Northeast, historically the seat of America’s dominant economic, social, cultural and political elite. By 1964, the transition was reasonably obvious; whatever the strategic ineptitude of the Goldwater candidacy, it was not a geopolitical fluke. As Chart 2 shows, the Republican Party had been moving its reliance South and West since the beginning of the New Deal cycle in 1932. The 1968 election confirmed the general Southern and Western impetus of 1964—only the Deep South parochialism had been an aberration—and set a cyclical seal on the partisan re-alignment.

Maps 1–4 illustrate the regional tides at work and Chart 3 estimates the group voting currents of 1960–68. In 1968, only six states and the District of Columbia gave the Democratic presidential nominee a majority of the vote; seven other states produced Humphrey pluralities in the face of Nixon-Wallace majorities. In thirty-seven other states, Nixon-Wallace majorities di-
vided in such a way as to award victory to either the Republican candidate, who carried thirty-two states, or Wallace, who carried five. Most of the Democratic states were Northeastern—Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland (as well as the District of Columbia)—or (West Virginia excluded) they were states—Michigan, Minnesota, Washington and Hawaii—which had been heavily settled or influenced by Yankees or Scandinavians. In light of its concentration in an area which had been the prime sociological core of post-Civil War Republicanism, 1968 Democratic strength was peculiarly ironic.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1932</th>
<th>1936</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heartland and West</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heartland and West</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heartland and West</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heartland and West</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The regional figures represent the GOP share of the Republican-Democratic-Dixiecrat presidential total.
**The regional figures represent the GOP share of the Republican-Democratic vote only. (The Wallace vote has been excluded.)
Map 1. The Election by States, 1968

Map 2. The Extent of Wallace Support, 1968 (Generalized Contours)
Map 3. The 1960–68 Shift in Democratic Party Presidential Support (Generalized Contours)

Map 4. The Top Twenty Democratic States. Ranked by Humphrey share of the total vote for President

For general queries, contact webmaster@press.princeton.edu

**Vote by Groups in Presidential Elections (1952–1968)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Dem. %</th>
<th>Rep. %</th>
<th>Dem. %</th>
<th>Rep. %</th>
<th>Dem. %</th>
<th>Rep. %</th>
<th>Dem. %</th>
<th>Rep. %</th>
<th>Wallace %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>43.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>43.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Categories:**
- National
- Men
- Women
- White
- Non-White
- College
- High School
- Grade School
- Prof. & Bus.
- White Collar
- Manual
- Farmers
- Under 30
- 30–49 years
- 50 years & Older
- Protestant
- Catholic
1960–68 Trends (Chart 3)

Men showed a strong anti-Democrat trend between 1960 and 1968; women showed considerably less change. Historically, men have spearheaded political upheaval while women have given greater backing to status quo politics (since 1964, the Democratic Party).

In the eight years, the Democrats lost heavily among white voters, but fashioned much increased support among non-whites. The new popular majority is white and conservative. Vocationally, the Democrats lost ground with almost every group, but their loss was greatest among farmers. On the plane of education, the Democrats scored a gain among the college-educated elite, but slipped badly among the country’s huge high-school-educated middle spectrum.

The relative age profiles of the two parties did not change much, although Wallace scored his greatest inroads among young people.

Between 1960 and 1968, Nixon lost a large bloc of Protestants—mostly Southerners, Borderers and other conservatives temporarily switching to Wallace. Nixon gained sharply among Catholics, many of whom are leaving the Democratic Party. These statistics indicate Nixon’s 1972 opportunity—acceleration of the Catholic GOP trend and recapture of the conservative Protestants who backed the Republicans in 1960 but bolted to Wallace in 1968.

The forces shaping this parochialism are clear enough; they explain why, even as 1968 saw the nation turning against the Democrats, a handful of the New England and above-mentioned states swam against the current and gave the Democrats a higher vote share than in 1960. First of all, no other part of the United States shares the historical penchant of the Northeast for supporting the politics and ideology of a hitherto nationally dominant, but fading, group of interests. The Jeffersonian, Jacksonian and New Deal upheavals all captured the White House against ballot opposition centered in the Northeast. And on top of growing national Democratic Party identification with Northeastern interests, another major fulcrum of 1968 upheaval was the erosion of Civil War political traditions which had been the...
source of American sectional politics and partisanship for a century. Because of loyalties formed in the crucible of slavery and civil war, Yankees and Scandinavians in New England, upstate New York, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Ohio, Minnesota, Iowa, Wisconsin and the Pacific Northwest were the driving force and numerical bulwark of a Republican Party they had principally created. But as a result of the social upheaval of the Nineteen-Sixties, these were the groups and states among whom and which the Democrats gained (or suffered only minimal losses) in 1968. In many of the same areas where the Civil War had ingrained the most intense Republicanism, Democratic identification with the Negro social and economic revolution precipitated that party’s best gains a century later.

On the other side of the coin, the conservative and Republican alliance of 1968 mobilized in areas with an insurgent record—the South, the West and the Irish sidewalks of New York (as well as the emerging tax-revolt centers of middle-class suburbia)—and a record of support for popular movements like those of Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, William Jennings Bryan and Franklin D. Roosevelt. These voting streams were inclined to move away from, rather than towards, the emerging Negro-Establishment entente; and harkening back to the Civil War, the new conservatism was generally taking shape (there were exceptions, of course) in areas where Civil War feeling had been secessionist, divided or ambiguous, as in the South, Heartland, West, Border and German-Irish urban centers. Persistent ethnic-cultural cleavages were prompting a turnabout of partisanship.

But at this point it is necessary to lay down a few caveats. Granted that the Democrats were making their greatest strides among silk-stocking voters and Yankees, the two groups remained (diminishingly) Republican;
and even though the Democrats were losing strength among Northern Catholics, the blue-collar Poles, Slavs, French-Canadians, Italians and Irish of industrial cities from Saco to Sault Ste. Marie (but excluding New York City) remained the bulwark of Northeastern Democratic hegemony. However much the trends of the Nineteen-Sixties foreshadowed the upcoming cycle, the raw statistics of group voting were a weakening link to the New Deal cycle. In the United States, political change is evolutionary rather than revolutionary.

Back in 1960, Richard Nixon had run for President as the candidate of a Republican Party still at least partly controlled, as Henry Cabot Lodge’s vice-presidential nomination bore witness, by its traditional Yankee bastion. By 1968, however, things had changed. Not only had the civil rights revolution cut the South adrift from its Democratic moorings and drawn the Northeast towards the Democrats, but it had increased the Southern and Western bias of the GOP to a point—the 1964 Goldwater nomination—where the party had decided to break with its formative antecedents and make an ideological bid for the anti-civil rights South. Goldwater’s extraordinary Deep South success, together with the unprecedented party defeat in Yankee and silk-stocking areas, speeded re-alignment already on its way. By dint of the 1964 election, the Republican Party shed the dominion of its Yankee and Northeastern Establishment creators, while the Democrats, having linked themselves to the Negro socioeconomic revolution and to an increasingly liberal Northeastern Establishment shaped by the success of the New Deal, sank the foundations of their future into the Northeast.

As of 1968, the Democratic and liberal record was one of failure—in global diplomacy, Asian warfare, domestic economics, social and welfare policy, and law enforcement—and the Republicans, together with third-
party presidential candidate George Wallace, rode a wave of popular desire for change. The GOP swept the Farm Belt and Rocky Mountains; more narrowly carried the Great Lakes, Pacific and Border states; split the South with George Wallace; and lost only the Northeast. With a united rather than Civil War-divided conservative power base, centered in the great interior Heartland and peripheral South, a new political alignment and cycle began.

Despite George Wallace’s grandiose dreams of achieving an ideologically compelling balance of power between the two major parties, he proved unable to reach beyond the electoral votes of the Deep South. More important, his popular support beyond Dixie followed contours of conservative Southern Democratic tradition (Delaware Bay to Nevada), William Jennings Bryan-era Democratic populism (the Plains and Rockies) or urban Catholic upheaval (cities where Negroes or other minority groups are taking over the Democratic Party). Where these trends were not present, Wallace showed negligible strength in either heavily unionized areas—Scranton, Fall River or Duluth—or among poverty-stricken whites (West Virginia). Some of Wallace’s support came from aroused conservative Republicans, but most of it represented Democratic voting streams quitting their party. Among major Democratic electoral groups, only those already in revolt backed Wallace. The Alabaman tapped rather than shaped a protest; his party represents an electorate in motion between major parties rather than a new, permanent entrant into the national presidential arena.

Presumably Wallace’s realization of this failure underlay his post-election comment—recognition of the GOP future was implicit—that he had swung the Republican Party to the right and simultaneously diverted enough votes to make Nixon’s victory possible. But
whatever Wallace’s ideological influence, his vote di-
versions certainly did not help Richard Nixon. On the con-
trary, Wallace split the conservative electorate, siphoned
off a flow of ballots that otherwise would have gone
heavily for Nixon, and garnered many of his backers—
Northern or Southern, blue-collar or white-collar—
from the ranks of supporters of 1964 GOP presidential
nominee Barry Goldwater.

As Chart 4 shows, Wallace’s strength proved to be
negligible—and he diverted few votes—in the states
which found the national Democratic Party most ap-
pealing. Of the Alabaman’s nine worst showings, six
came in the nine best Humphrey states (including the
District of Columbia, where Wallace was not even on
the ballot). The best Wallace vote came in states where
conservatism was powerfully emergent; states where
Wallace lured unhappy Republicans or tapped a trend
which otherwise would have aided the GOP. Even in
liberal states like New York, the Wallace vote was drawn
from a usually Republican—given a conservative nomi-
ninee—electorate. Four of the five states backing Wallace
had been among the six to back Barry Goldwater in

---

**Chart 4. The Inverse Relationship of Democratic Strength and
Wallace Support, 1968**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nine Top Democratic States</th>
<th>Nine Worst Wallace States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>District of Columbia (82%)</td>
<td>District of Columbia (0%)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Island (65%)</td>
<td>Hawaii (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts (63%)</td>
<td>Maine (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii (60%)</td>
<td>Vermont (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine (55%)</td>
<td>New Hampshire (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota (54%)</td>
<td>Rhode Island (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York (50%)</td>
<td>Minnesota (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Virginia (50%)</td>
<td>Massachusetts (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut (50%)</td>
<td>New York (5%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Humphrey and Wallace shares of the three-party vote.
**Wallace was not on the ballot in the District of Columbia.
1964, and all across the nation, most Wallace supporters would have chosen Nixon in 1968 over Democratic nominee Hubert H. Humphrey. The probable inability of the Wallaceites to take the field in 1972, given the parochialism of their 1968 popular and electoral vote pattern and their vulnerability to a relatively conservative 1968–72 Republican administration, should add an important national bloc of popular votes and a key Deep Southern group of electoral votes to the barebones Republican triumph of 1968.

Despite his skimpy electoral vote, George Wallace had come tantalizingly close to holding the 1968 balance of power. Throughout election night, an apprehensive nation watched and listened to reports that perhaps neither candidate could command the clear electoral vote majority needed to win the presidency. What only a few weeks earlier had looked to be a Nixon landslide tightened into a close race, as once-dissident liberals rallied behind Humphrey and Democratic union leaders whipped their pro-Wallace rank and file back to the party line. If Humphrey had proved just a little stronger, the election might have been stalemated as the Wallace forces had hoped.

On the other hand, Wallace’s vote would probably have dipped much lower had Richard Nixon chosen to rally aberrant multitudes of 1964 Goldwater backers by sounding the anti-Great Society clarion which had so successfully served as a fulcrum of realignment in the 1966 off-year elections. But, reflecting his confidence and a desire to avoid divisiveness, the Republican candidate maintained a mild campaign stance. Nixon, however, cannot be too easily faulted for the course he successfully steered between the Scylla of losing too many moderates to Hubert Humphrey and the Charybdis of leaving too many conservatives in the camp of George Wallace. He won enough moderates to overcome the
division in his conservative support base, even as he
took a sufficiently conservative stance to minimize the
Wallace vote and undermine the third party’s future.
Under these circumstances, the vast significance of his
victory lay in its occurrence and not in its magnitude.
Observations that Nixon won no mandate were at odds
with the verdict rendered on the Democratic adminis-
tration by 57 per cent of the nation’s voters—an obvi-
ous inchoate Nixon constituency.

Little credence can be
given to the allegation that the
Republican failure to make large gains in Congress be-
spoke public confidence in national Democratic Party
programs and policy; nor did these results indicate con-
tinuation of the New Deal cycle in the face of a mere
fluke on the presidential level. The ideological reaction
against Democratic liberalism had come in 1966, so
that there were not many Northern constituencies left
for the Republicans to gain in 1968. But much more
important was the fact that Congress already had a con-
servative majority—Republicans from all corners of the
country and traditional Democrats from the South and
Border. All fourteen Southern and Border states—Vir-
ginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Flor-
ida, Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee, Louisiana, Arkan-
sas, Texas, Oklahoma, Kentucky and Missouri—cast a
majority of their vote against the national Democratic
Party’s presidential candidate but elected a vast prepon-
derance of conservative Democrats at traditionalist
odds with the ideological stance of the national party.
Only by this anomaly of nomenclature, which cannot
long survive the evolution of the national Democrats
into the party of the Establishmentarian Northeast and
Negro South, did the Great Society maintain the image
of public support. The presidential election of 1968
marked a historic first occasion—the Negrophobe Deep
South and modern Outer South simultaneously aban-
doned the Democratic Party. And before long, the conservative cycle thus begun ought to witness movement of congressional, state and local Southern Democrats into the ascending Republican Party.

Considerable historical and theoretical evidence supports the thesis that a liberal Democratic era has ended and that a new era of consolidationist Republicanism has begun. To begin with, the 1932–68 Democratic reign spanned thirty-six years and a social revolution. History indicates that this is the usual longevity of an American political cycle. For example, the modern American political system dates from the election of Andrew Jackson in 1828, which precipitated a Democratic predominance lasting until Lincoln’s triumph in 1860. Contrary to general legend, the Civil War did not seat the Republicans firmly in the national saddle, however effectively it unseated the hitherto predominant Democrats. As a matter of fact, once the Southern states had returned to the Union, things settled into something of a stalemate. No president elected between 1876 and 1892 won a majority of the popular vote. Finally, in 1896, the Bryan-McKinley contest tarred the Democrats with the brush of agrarianism and revivalism, thus cementing Republican rule based on the populous, industrial Northeast and Great Lakes. Thereafter, except for the eight-year Wilson Administration, the GOP held national sway until the advent of the Great Depression and the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932. Actually, the coming of age of urban America had begun to swing the pendulum towards the Democrats even before the Depression, as witness Al Smith’s 1928 breakthroughs in the Northeast; however, many Republicans blamed Franklin Roosevelt’s personal popularity and refused to face the socioeconomic fact that a new Democratic majority had come into being. Thirty-six years later, it too gave way to change.
To structure a mathematical perspective reaching back to 1828, political history divides into four cycles: 1828–60, 1860–96, 1896–1932 and 1932–68. All four cycles lasted thirty-two or thirty-six years, and all four included steady rule by one party, with an interregnum of just eight years when the lesser party held power. The interregnums were: (1) the tenures of Whig generals Harrison and Taylor amidst the otherwise Democratic span of 1828–60; (2) the two Grover Cleveland administrations in the 1860–96 post-Civil War era; (3) the two Woodrow Wilson administrations amidst the 1896–1932 rule of industrial Republicanism; and (4) the Eisenhower years in the middle of the 1932–68 New Deal Democratic cycle. The Nixon administration seems destined by precedent to be the beginning of a new Republican era.

Another bulwark of cyclical change is the obsolescence of the prevailing ideology or impetus of the dominant party. The principal force which broke up the Democratic (New Deal) coalition is the Negro socioeconomic revolution and liberal Democratic ideological inability to cope with it. Democratic “Great Society” programs aligned that party with many Negro demands, but the party was unable to defuse the racial tension sundering the nation. The South, the West and the Catholic sidewalks of New York were the focal points of conservative opposition to the welfare liberalism of the federal government; however, the general opposition which deposed the Democratic Party came in large part from prospering Democrats who objected to Washington dissipating their tax dollars on programs which did them no good. The Democratic Party fell victim to the ideological impetus of a liberalism which had carried it beyond programs taxing the few for the benefit of the many (the New Deal) to programs taxing the many on behalf of the few (the Great Society).
Back in 1932, the Democratic Party took office with a popular mandate to develop a new governmental approach to the problems of economic and social welfare which the Depression had brought into painful focus. Basically, Roosevelt’s New Deal liberalism invoked government action to deal with situations from which the government had hitherto remained aloof; i.e., the malpractice of corporations, unemployment, malnutrition, lack of rural electricity, collapsed farm prices and managerial intolerance of organized labor. But in the years since 1932, federal interventionism has slowly changed from an innovative policy into an institutionalized reflex. Great Society liberalism propounded federally controlled categorical grant-in-aid programs and bureaucratic social engineering as the answer to crises big and little just as inevitably as Calvin ("The business of America is business") Coolidge sermonized laissez faire economics during the formative period of the Depression. And just as the political inability of laissez faire Republicanism to handle the post-1929 economic crisis signaled the end of one cycle and the beginning of another, so did the breakdown of New Deal liberalism in the face of a social and urban crisis which clearly demands its own ideological innovation. In all likelihood, 1968 marks the beginning of an era of decentralizing government, whereby Washington can regain the public confidence necessary to mobilize the inchoate American commitment to housing, education and employment opportunity.

Gone are the days when a conservative Establishment—Wall Street, the Episcopal Church, the great metropolitan newspapers, the U.S. Supreme Court and Manhattan’s East Side—harassed Franklin D. Roosevelt and his fledgling New Deal. Today, these same institutions, now liberal, vent their spleen on populist conservatism. The contemporary Establishment reflects the
institutionalization of the innovative political impetus of thirty years ago: the middle-aged influence and affluence of the New Deal. This is a good sign of change. By the time a once-popular political upheaval has become institutionalized in the partners’ rooms of Wall Street and the salons of Fifth Avenue, a counter-movement has invariably taken hold in the ordinary (now middle-class) hinterlands of the nation.

A fourth and last theory on which a new political cycle can be predicated rests on the post-1945 migration of many white Americans (including many of the traditionally Democratic white ethnic groups) to suburbia and the Sun Belt states of Florida, Texas, Arizona and California. This trend parallels, and is partially a result of, concurrent Southern Negro migration to the principal cities of the North. The Negro problem, having become a national rather than a local one, is the principal cause of the breakup of the New Deal coalition.

Previous American population shifts have generally triggered major political changes: (1) The rise of the trans-Appalachian “New West” in the early Nineteenth Century overpowered the conservatism of the Eastern Seaboard and provided the base of Jacksonian democracy. (2) The admission of California, Oregon and the Yankee-settled Farm states to the Union tipped the balance against the South and subsequently buoyed the Republicans throughout the post-Civil War era. (3) The expansion of the United States across the plains and Rocky Mountains added new Republican states to the Union, while the vast influx of European immigrants whose sweat ran the mills and factories of the Northeast laid down a vital foundation for the 1896–1932 era of industrial Republicanism. And (4) the coming of age of urban and immigrant America, rendered more painful by the Depression, established a national Democratic hegemony rooted in the cities which lasted from 1932
to 1968. Today, the interrelated Negro, suburban and Sun Belt migrations have all but destroyed the old New Deal coalition. Chart 142 vividly illustrates the declining population and power of the big cities. Some Northern cities are nearly half Negro, and new suburbia is turning into a bastion of white conservatism; moreover, growing Northern-based Negro political influence has prompted not only civil rights measures obnoxious to the South but social legislation and programs anathema to the sons and daughters of Northern immigrants. As in the past, changing population patterns have set the scene for a new political alignment.

American voting patterns are a kaleidoscope of sociology, history, geography and economics. Of course, the threads are very tangled and complex, but they can be pulled apart. The “science” in political science is not entirely a misnomer; voting patterns can be structured and analyzed in such a way as to show an extraordinary amount of social and economic behaviorism at work. Once the correct framework has been erected, national voting patterns can be structured, explained, correlated and predicted to a surprising degree. The trick is to build the framework.

For a century, the prevailing cleavages in American voting behavior have been ethnic and cultural. Politically, at least, the United States has not been a very effective melting pot. In practically every state and region, ethnic and cultural animosities and divisions exceed all other factors in explaining party choice and identification. From New York City, where income level has only minimally influenced the mutual hostility of Jews and Irish Catholics; to Wisconsin, where voting analysis requires an ethnic map of the state’s Welsh, Belgian, French, Swiss, Finnish, Polish, Dutch, German, Danish, Swedish, Norwegian and Yankee populations; to Missouri, where partisanship has long pivoted on Virginian,
New England, hillbilly and German settlement patterns and ensuing Civil War sympathies—everywhere ethnic, regional and cultural loyalties constitute the principal dynamics of American voting. Inasmuch as most of the Catholic ethnic groups live in Northern states where the rural Protestant population—their obvious political opposition—has been Republican, they have generally voted Democratic. Today these loyalties are ebbing along with the Republicanism of the Yankee countryside.

Beneath the checkerboard of ethnic settlement which extends from Maine’s French Catholic Aroostook Valley to the Norwegian fishing villages of Alaska’s Inland Passage—the South, except for its Negroes and Latin fringe, is largely Anglo-Saxon—the basic roots of American voting patterns have long rested in the regionalism of Civil War loyalties. And these in turn have reflected patterns of Yankee, Middle Atlantic and Southern settlement. During the hundred years after the founding of the Republican Party in 1854, GOP strength was principally rooted in Yankee New England and its outliers from upstate New York to Oregon. Democratic voting, based on Southern antecedents and Civil War sentiment, prevailed from Delaware west through Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma and the Southwest, as well as the eleven states of the old Confederacy. The two cultures met in the Missouri, Mississippi and Ohio valleys, though the “border” was irregular and outposts of one group sometimes pushed into the general territory of the other. For example, Virginian settlements were made in north-central Ohio and New England-planted towns can be found in northern Missouri.

Given the extent to which Civil War loyalties underlay the Republican-Democratic party alignment until the end of the New Deal era, the contemporary ebb of Republicanism in its bailiwick of Yankee tradition and the more striking disintegration of the Democratic Party
in its former Southern and Border fiefs suggests that a full-scale delineation of the scope and spread of both behavioral streams can shed real light on the forces and prospects of the emerging conservative and Republican majority. To a degree little appreciated by most Americans, the cultural patterns of the Northeast and the coastal South traveled due west across the pre-Civil War Mississippi Valley so that the county-by-county partisanship of, say, Indiana, can be largely explained in terms of Yankee, Middle Atlantic or Southern settlement. A number of pre-Civil War travelers and observers discussed this phenomenon, and one of the best descriptions is that written in 1834 by a contemporary emigration counselor named Baird:

The emigration to the Valley of the Mississippi seems to have gone in columns, moving from the East almost due west, from the respective states... From New England, the emigrant column advanced through New York, peopling the middle and western parts of that state in its progress; but still continuing, it reached the northern part of Ohio, then Indiana and finally Illinois. A part of the same column... is diverging into Michigan... The Pennsylvania and New Jersey column advanced within the parallels of latitude of those states in west Pennsylvania, and still continuing, advanced into the middle and southern parts of Ohio, and extended even into the middle parts of Indiana and Illinois. The Virginia column advanced first into the western part of the state and Kentucky—which was long a constituent part of it—thence into the southern parts of Indiana and Illinois, until it had spread over almost
the whole of Missouri. The North Carolina column advanced into East Tennessee, thence into West Tennessee, and also into Missouri. And the South Carolina and Georgia column has moved upon the extensive and fertile lands of Alabama (and Mississippi) . . . In Arkansas, the emigrating columns of Kentucky and Tennessee predominate.

The above mentioned fact furnishes a better key than any other that I know of, to furnish a correct knowledge of the diversity of customs and manners which prevail in the Valley of the Mississippi. For if one knows what are the peculiarities of the several states east of the Allegheny mountains, he may expect them, with some shades of difference occasioned by local circumstances, in the corresponding parallels of the West. Slavery keeps nearly within the same parallels and so does nearly every other peculiarity.1

Thus, what seems like uselessly remote historical data—the details of the peopling of the United States—is actually quite vital to understanding the dynamics of the upcoming political cycle. On the one hand, the Democrats are scoring gains in Yankee and Scandinavian areas of Civil War-era Republican tradition; yet on the other hand, they are suffering a much greater loss in Southern-oriented territory reaching beyond Dixie to Delaware Bay, the Ohio and Missouri valleys and the far Southwest. Map 3 shows the geographic scope of both (1960–68) trends. Not only is the Democratic Party’s loss more extensive than its gain, but the loss is oc-

curring in those sections of the nation—Florida, the Gulf Coast, Texas, Arizona and Southern California—where population growth is centered. The Yankee countryside and the old Northeastern cities are losing both people and political power. A century ago, for example, Maine had more congressmen than Texas; Rhode Island more than Florida. The 1970 Census is expected to award Texas and Florida thirty-nine to Maine and Rhode Island’s collective four.

The best structural approach to the changing alignment of American voters is a region-by-region analysis designed to unfold the multiple sectional conflicts and group animosities in a logical progression. The key region—in past years it has been the seat of the prevailing national establishment and thus the provocateur of resentment elsewhere—is the Northeast. Next in order is the South, historically the leading political rival of the Northeast. The American interior or “Heartland,” settled by the westward movement of both Northerners and Southerners, reflects the voting patterns of its two parent regions and as a result has historically divided along a trans-Appalachian extension of the Mason-Dixon line. The last region, of course, is the Pacific, which combines the people and traditions of all three regions in a fast-growing—California is the pacesetter—and decreasingly ethnic-minded middle-class tomorrowland. As for sequence, the best procedure is to begin where the United States first took (Anglo-Saxon) shape and Democratic liberalism is presently strongest—in the Northeast—and swing south and west with history, population migration and the coming conservative cycle of American politics.