CHAPTER 1

Introduction

1.1. A Cyrenaic Parable: The Choice of Pleasure

If we are to believe Xenophon, Socrates did not entirely approve of Aristippus of Cyrene. Xenophon and Aristippus were both among the crowd of young men who passed their leisure time with Socrates. However, Xenophon felt that he and Socrates agreed on the importance of self-control, which was the foundation of responsible management of one's body, soul, household, relationships, and polis. By contrast, he narrates how Socrates “had noticed that one of his companions [i.e., Aristippus] was rather self-indulgent” with regard to food, drink, sex, sleep, cold, heat, and hard work (Mem. 2.1.1). So Socrates tries to show Aristippus the error of his ways. His admonishment concludes by recalling the wisdom of the poets Hesiod and Epicharmus, who concur that sweat and suffering are the price of all good things (2.1.20). He then paraphrases Prodicus's story about “the choice of Heracles,” in which the hero is confronted with two allegorical figures. The figure of Vice promises every sort of pleasure without effort, while Virtue reiterates that there is no happiness without exertion (2.1.21–34). Socrates does not tell us which choice Heracles made, but we all know he chose the path of suffering and glorious virtue. The question is, which choice did Aristippus make?

Xenophon’s way of presenting Aristippus leads most readers to conclude that he chose the path of easy pleasure. Of course, this is not a reliable account of the historical Aristippus’s thoughts. It is a fiction colored by Xenophon’s opinions of Aristippus and Socrates and his own conceptions of virtue, vice, pleasure, and happiness. But it is a useful parable for thinking about the impetus behind the philosophical movement Aristippus started. That movement is called “Cyrenaic” after Cyrene, the polis in North Africa where most of the movement’s participants were born. Although the Cyrenaics do not associate pleasure with vice, Xenophon is right to represent Cyrenaic philosophy as the choice of pleasure. The Cyrenaics reflectively affirm their intuitive attraction to pleasure and commit themselves to working through this decision’s life-shaping consequences. This is what I will mean in this book by calling the Cyrenaics philosophical hedonists.

There are two aspects of this hedonism I initially wish to highlight. First, many of the Cyrenaics’ fundamental beliefs and arguments revolve around
pleasure and pain. In particular, they all agree that either bodily or mental pleasure is the greatest and most certain intrinsic good. We might call this formal hedonism. Second, they actually indulge in all sorts of everyday pleasures such as food and sex. In other words, notwithstanding disagreements among members of the movement, in general it is not by sober parsimony or self-restraint that they attempt to live pleasantly. In this they differ (at least in degree) from many formal hedonists, including their competitors and eventual successors, the Epicureans. We might call this everyday hedonism.

In fact we can plausibly think of Cyrenaic philosophy as the first attempt in the European tradition to formalize everyday hedonism with increasingly systematic theories. The Cyrenaics were obviously not the first to claim that pleasure is a good thing; indeed, pleasure's supposedly universal appeal is the foundation of their reflective choice. Nor were they the first thinkers to grant pleasure an important theoretical position. It seems that Democritus, for example, gave both “pleasure” (hēdonē) and “delight” (terpsis) thematic prominence in his ethical writings. Moreover, among Aristippus’s approximate contemporaries were Eudoxus of Cnidus, who elaborated his hedonism within Plato’s Academy, and the lamentably shadowy Polyarchus, “The Voluptuary” of Syracuse. But the Cyrenaic tradition clearly involves a much more sustained investigation of hedonism than any of these.

It is thus with some justice that the Cyrenaics have sometimes been represented as the originators of the tradition of philosophical hedonism in Europe. For example, both Watson’s Hedonistic Theories from Aristippus to Spencer (1895) and Feldman’s Pleasure and the Good Life: Concerning the Nature, Varieties, and Plausibility of Hedonism (2004) begin by sketching ostensibly Cyrenaic theories, which they then proceed to demolish. Cyrenaicism is thus portrayed as an infantile stage in an evolving theoretical organism. Onfray gives the Cyrenaics an even more originary status in the resoundingly titled L’invention du plaisir: Fragments cyrénéens (The Invention of Pleasure: Cyrenaic Fragments; 2002), which until very recently was the only translation of the Cyrenaic evidence into a modern language. However, Onfray’s narrative is reactionary rather than progressivist: he sees Western civilization as a “historically sublimated neurosis,” the causes of which lie in Platonism and its monstrous offspring. The cure for this neurosis is re-engagement with our embodied experience, beginning with the rediscovery of the “philosophical Atlantis” of Cyrenaicism. There, at the historical foundation of the problem, we must reassemble Aristippus’s “anti-Platonic war machine” to undermine the corrupt fortress of our unhealthy ideologies.

Watson, Onfray, and Feldman remind us in their different ways that the search for origins—in this case the origin of philosophical hedonism—often comes bundled with trans-historical explanatory and critical agendas. Insofar as those explanations or critiques invoke the chronological primacy of Cyrenaicism, they rely on the historical accuracy of their presentations of this early movement. Yet hitherto there has been no systematic reconstruction of Cyrenaic ethics within
its own historical contexts. The most recent monograph, by Guirand, focuses on Aristippus and his reception in European (especially Francophone) literature.\(^8\) Two other monographs, by Antoniadis and Döring,\(^9\) have primarily been concerned with stipulating who thought what and when. The collections of the Cyrenaic fragments and testimonia, by Giannantoni and Mannebach respectively,\(^10\) have furthered this biographical and doxographical work, corroborated it with source criticism, and added essays on many items of philosophical interest. Scattered chapters and articles have addressed Socrates’ influence on Aristippus and later Cyrenaicism,\(^11\) Aristippus’s relationships with and influence on Xenophon and Plato,\(^12\) the Cyrenaics’ putative rejection of “eudaimonism,”\(^13\) the historiography of the schismatic Cyrenaics,\(^14\) and a number of other topics.\(^15\) But none of these attempts to convey an appreciation of Cyrenaic ethics in the round by exploring the developmental history of the movement and the manner in which theories arose from and found expression in principled lifestyles. Moreover, few of these works are in English, and many are hard to come by.

This volume therefore aims to be a complement to Voula Tsouna’s monograph on *Cyrenaic Epistemology*, which is the most thorough investigation of Cyrenaic skepticism,\(^16\) and to help make a fuller appreciation of this “original hedonism” available to classicists, philosophers, and cultural historians.\(^17\)

1.2. Methodology

In order to accomplish this project it is necessary to find a method that respects the limitations in the evidence yet still permits us to produce new historical, literary, and philosophical insights. The first challenge is the diversity of our sources, which include hundreds of testimonia from dozens of authors over more than a thousand years. Dealing with these sources has become somewhat easier since Giannantoni’s multi-volume *Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae* (1990) assembled the ancient testimony for all the so-called “minor Socratic” philosophers. Nevertheless, a great deal of research is necessary to assess the knowledge, generic aims, personal agendas, and lines of transmission of the authors and texts involved. Since the painstaking philology involved in this task would frequently interrupt the flow of my arguments, and some readers may want to skip it entirely, I have relegated much of it to footnotes and appendixes 1 and 2.

The second challenge for the interpreter of Cyrenaicism is to say something philosophically interesting despite the fragmentary nature of these testimonia. It is partly for this reason that I will not restrict myself to tracing the development and relations of beliefs and arguments. Of course I will try to present these ratiocinative structures in the clearest and most accessible fashion possible. But if I were to exclude their practical and cultural contexts, not only would I increase the danger of misunderstanding the evidence, I would also find it impossible to reconstruct what it would be like to mentally inhabit this sort of ethical system.
I have chosen the phrase “mentally inhabit” because its resonances are simultaneously intellectual, practical, and existential. I intend to suggest that we can profitably think of Cyrenaic ethics as involving much more than the theories on which previous scholars have generally focused. This is true of most post-Socratic Greek philosophical ethics, as Anthony Long has expressed in speaking of “philosophical power”:

Try to imagine a single affiliation incorporating your political party, religion, form of therapy, cosmology, psychology, and fundamental values, an affiliation which unified all that might be involved in being, for instance, a Christian, Jungian, socialist, utilitarian, and believer in evolution and the Big Bang. Then you have a loose analogy to one of the leading Hellenistic schools in their most challenging phase and a reason for thinking of them as experiments in philosophical power.18

Long is speaking about the schools that succeeded Cyrenaicism, but his lesson applies to the Cyrenaics as well. Here he emphasizes not only the reach of these schools’ doctrines, but also their “power” to give shape to entire ways of being in the world. The point is that this kind of philosophy does not simply develop arguments about, for example, the truthfulness of Christian theology or Jungian psychology. It aims to incorporate those truths into its practitioners’ attitudes and behavior, for which it requires something loosely analogous to Christian ritual or Jungian therapy.

The scholar who has done the most to chart the analogues for these elements in ancient philosophy is Pierre Hadot. In his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France he said,

Each school, then, represents a form of life defined by an ideal of wisdom. The result is that each one has its corresponding fundamental inner attitude—for example, tension for the Stoics or relaxation for the Epicureans—and its own manner of speaking, such as the Stoic use of percussive dialectic or the abundant rhetoric of the Academicians. But above all every school practices exercises designed to ensure spiritual progress toward the ideal state of wisdom . . .19

In other words, ancient philosophical schools are not simply defined by their doctrines; they are defined by the combination of systematized beliefs, formalized modes of inference, informal ways of speaking and thinking (including patterns of imagery), intentional and affective attitudes, characteristic interpersonal relationships, and the exercises by which members of the school attempt to unify all of these components and channel them into personal transformation. It is this multifaceted breadth that allows these philosophies to pervade their followers’ entire ways of being.

My first response to the fragmentariness of our evidence is therefore to spread my investigative and interpretive nets more widely. On the one hand this will
give me a more versatile toolkit for working through the evidence on which previous scholars have already focused. On the other, it will allow me to make use of testimony that has hitherto seemed “sub-philosophical” or trivial. While these additional facets of Cyrenaic philosophy are even less well-documented than Cyrenaic theory, every piece of information we glean contributes to understanding the philosophy as a whole. For example, I have just mentioned the practical or “spiritual” exercises through which ancient philosophers attempted to bridge the gap between an understanding of principles and the consistent enactment of those principles throughout life’s manifold circumstances. Such exercises in other schools include (to name just a few) the memorization of key sayings and rules of thumb, examination and criticism of each day’s actions, meditation on mortality and other perspective-altering topics, self-testing through hardship and temptation, cooperative critical inquiry, and exegesis of canonical texts.20

Acknowledging that some of our testimony may pertain more to spiritual exercises than to theory is just one of the specific ways in which this approach to ancient philosophy will alter my handling of the evidence. The general effect of this approach will be to make me cautious about separating doctrinal assertions and their justifications from their contexts within the larger enterprise of philosophizing. I will instead attempt to think of theory as being in dynamic interaction with pre-philosophical intuitions and the rewarding or disappointing experience of putting doctrines into practice. This begins when a potential philosopher approaches a teacher. As Hadot writes,

At least since the time of Socrates, the choice of a way of life has not been located at the end of the process of philosophical activity, like a kind of accessory or appendix. On the contrary, it stands at the beginning, in a complex interrelation with critical reaction to other existential attitudes, with global vision of a certain way of living and seeing the world, and with voluntary decision itself. . . . Philosophical discourse, then, originates in a choice of life and an existential option—not vice versa.21

This does not mean that philosophical discourse is merely a rationalization of what its practitioners are already inclined to do. It means that, faced with an array of possible teachers, potential philosophers’ initial choices depend more on their reactions to individual personalities and the “existential options” adumbrated by each than on the cogency of their arguments.22

Consider, for example, a more sympathetic depiction than Xenophon’s of the inaugural scene of Cyrenaic philosophy. Here Plutarch (perhaps relying on Aeschines of Sphettus, another of Socrates’ followers23) permits us to imagine how Aristippus arrived at what I called the “choice of pleasure”:

When Aristippus met Ischomachus at the Olympics, he asked him what sort of things Socrates used to talk about in order to have such an effect on young men. When he’d heard just a few starting points and indications
of Socrates’ words, he was so profoundly affected he swooned. He became totally pale and weak until, filled with burning thirst, he sailed to Athens, drew from the spring, and investigated the man, his words, and his philosophy. (Plut. Mor. 516c = SSR 4A.2)

Note that Aristippus had only heard a few “starting points and indications” of Socrates’ beliefs and arguments before being filled with impassioned desire. Something in Socrates’ words touched Aristippus’s own inchoate aspirations and kindled a “burning thirst” to articulate and fulfill them. At this point he turned to rational inquiry, which is what makes this conversion *philosophical*. Aristippus “investigated the man, his words, and his philosophy,” and elaborated whatever he took from Socrates as seemed best to him. It has been suggested, for example, that one source of Aristippus’s hedonism was the Socratic imperative to critically inspect his beliefs, actions, and character. This inspection led him to harmonize his beliefs and consistently orient his actions toward pleasure and the avoidance of pain. This orientation would then be tested in the laboratory of daily experience, with the expectation that it would slake the “thirst” and ease the “burning” which led him to philosophy in the first place.

Disappointing feedback from experience could therefore provoke changes in theory or even holistic changes in scholastic allegiance. A radical example of this principle is provided by the defection of Dionysius of Heraclea from the earliest Stoics to the latest Cyrenaics. In Lucian’s comic dialogue *Twice Indicted*, Dionysius’s defection is described like this:

> Until he got sick, [Dionysius] hoped that he would get some benefit from his discourses on fortitude. But when his body hurt, he felt ill, and he really began to suffer, then he observed that his body was philosophizing against the Stoa and holding opposite doctrines. So he trusted it rather than them! (section 21; cf. D.L. 7.166, Cicero *On Ends* 5.94, *Tusculan Disputations* 2.60)

In less humorous terms, Dionysius found a discrepancy between his rational evaluation of his situation, which was based on Stoic doctrine, and his intuitive reaction. As a Stoic, Dionysius knew a battery of arguments demonstrating that pain and suffering were indifferent. His acute illness should not therefore have affected his judgment of his own well-being. But at the level Lucian describes as his “bodily philosophizing,” he was profoundly certain that his situation was very unsatisfying indeed. Thus he decided that there was an irreconcilable conflict between his doctrines and the intuitions those doctrines were supposed to clarify and organize. His response was not merely to adjust his belief about pain, but to adopt an entirely new philosophy. As a character in Athenaeus’s *Sophists at Dinner* puts it, “He took off the frock of virtue and put on flowery garments” (7.281d).

The interaction of arguments with pre-philosophical intuitions and feedback from experience leads me to two final methodological rules of thumb.

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First and most important, we should be extremely skeptical that any Cyrenaic ever adheres to a significant ethical position because of the force of reasoning alone. The core positions of each school frame an existential option which is chosen for its positive features, i.e., the satisfying fit between the world it discloses and the inarticulate aspirations of its followers. It is particularly important to keep this in mind whenever an important doctrine seems, at first glance, to be grounded in feeble arguments or simply unlivable. Our initial assumption should always be that those who commit to Cyrenaicism find something compelling even in its apparently weak positions, and something appealing in its seemingly unpalatable ones. Part of my task in this book is to explore what the power and appeal of such positions might be.

My second rule of thumb is that ambient culture will sometimes help to illuminate this power and appeal. One of the striking features of most Greek philosophy is its aspiration to rebuild its practitioners from the “bare self” up—to determine what is universally good and desirable, and to reorganize life and society based on this determination. But modern philosophers have rightly argued that the bare self is a fantasy; selfhood is largely constituted by libidinal, evaluative, and narrative orientations, which can only be altered gradually and piecemeal. Part of this constitutive orientation is historically specific. For example, one complex of values that will prove illuminating in this study revolves around masculine competition and honor. This complex finds its most influential expression in Homer, whose epics *The Iliad* and *The Odyssey* precede Cyrenaicism by several hundred years. Homer’s enormous influence on subsequent Greek culture is well indicated by the claim in Plato’s *Republic* that “this poet educated Greece” (606e). The capacity of so-called “heroic values” to shed light on classical Greek culture has recently been demonstrated in studies of both Socratic philosophy and Athenian legal procedure. Closely related to this are other features of Homeric ethics and its descendants in lyric and tragic poetry, which will help to fill in the background behind otherwise puzzling Cyrenaic beliefs or behavior.

In the foregoing I have sketched some considerations that will help me to offer a robust and historically sensitive interpretation of Cyrenaic ethics as it functioned in ancient Greece. Building up this historicized interpretation will occupy me for most of this book. But my final methodological suggestion is that we should also take a broader view of Cyrenaic ethics, not as a set of beliefs and practices confined to a particular time and place, but as a framework for thinking and acting that can be filled out in different ways in different times and places. The gaps in our evidence mean that we will never reconstruct all the key arguments, spiritual exercises, and other important elements of ancient Cyrenaicism. However, at least one author has already undertaken the feat of imaginative sympathy necessary to flesh out these doxographical bones and knit together these anecdotal tissues. I am thinking of the Victorian cultural critic and novelist Walter Pater. Despite the fact that one chapter of his *Marius the Epicurean* is entitled “A New Cyrenaicism,” the erudition and profundity of
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Pater’s engagement with Cyrenaic doxography appears never to have been recognized. In fact almost the entirety of Marius can usefully be read as a critical appropriation of Cyrenaic philosophy, which clarifies the meaning and practical consequences of several of the Cyrenaics’ important and otherwise enigmatic doctrines. I will therefore conclude this book with a chapter on Pater’s “new Cyrenaicism.” I wish to emphasize that my purpose in doing so is not to trace the influence of ancient Cyrenaicism on later thought, which would require a survey of how Cyrenaic ideas—generally in superficial forms—have appeared in the works of diverse authors over the last 2,400 years. Rather, I will focus on this single point of reception because in some ways it communicates what “Cyrenaic ethics” could mean today with greater vivacity than our ancient sources. This sort of reception study should therefore not be an afterthought to historicist interpretation, but a complement to it.27

I acknowledge that parts of the methodology I have just outlined will be controversial. My objective here has been to introduce and explain them, not to defend them against their critics. That would require the sort of extended arguments elaborated by the authors I have cited in the footnotes. However, I hope that the following chapters’ results will display the merits of this approach, and perhaps even inspire its application to other little-studied and poorly documented Greek philosophies.

1.3. Overview of the Book

This book might have been organized in two ways. One possibility was to proceed chronologically, devoting a chapter to each of the major figures or stages in the movement. However, there were two main obstacles to this organizational strategy. The first is that we do not know enough about most figures in the Cyrenaic movement to sketch their philosophy in the round. The second is that, as I argue at length in appendix 2, the mainstream doxography at D.L. 2.86–93 has been interpolated with Annicerean elements. It is sometimes impossible to ascertain whether a particular doctrine is mainstream, Annicerean, or both. I have therefore adopted what is primarily a thematic organization. This not only avoids the obstacles of the diachronic approach, it also permits me to combine the evidence on each theme from various Cyrenaics. What is lost in exactitude is more than offset by gains in the evidentiary basis for analysis, which has resulted in more substantial and philosophically interesting interpretations. Moreover, it has still been possible to handle the chronological development of themes wherever the evidence has been strong enough to support it.

I therefore begin with a biographical survey of the movement in chapter 2, which introduces what we know about all the named Cyrenaics. I also say a few words there about the culture of ancient Cyrene more generally.

In chapter 3 I address the theoretical foundations of Cyrenaicism, which are the positive valuation of pleasure, the negative valuation of pain, and the impossibility of discerning any value independent of pleasure or pain. This is
a good example of a topic where chronological analysis descends almost immediately into pure speculation: it is best to treat Cyrenaic epistemology as the shared intellectual property of almost all the philosophers we will be studying.

In chapter 4 I turn from theoretical foundations to ideals of happiness. First I focus on what Aristippus, the mainstream Cyrenaics, and Annicerians say about education, virtue, and happiness. This permits me to show how their foundational beliefs support a vision of what it means to have a successful life. I then address their formulations of the ethical end, where Anniceris appears to have introduced a position that is strikingly unusual in ancient Greek ethics. Happiness is not the end, he says, nor is there any single end for the whole of life. Rather, each action has its own particular end. I attempt a sympathetic interpretation of this innovation, yet acknowledge the problems it creates for other areas of Cyrenaic theory.

In chapter 5 I address the greatest controversy in existing scholarship on Cyrenaic ethics, which is the school’s “anti-eudaimonism.” On the basis of Anniceris’s formulation of the end many scholars have asserted that Cyrenaics are not “eudaimonists,” meaning their ethics does not center on the pursuit of happiness through cultivation of the virtues. In the light of chapter 4 I will suggest that this is incorrect for most Cyrenaics, and misleading even for Anniceris. However, it has led to philosophically interesting speculation about why the Cyrenaics would reject eudaimonism. Explanations have focused on personal identity, the subjectivity of value, and prudential reasoning. I try to show that each of these explanations relies on unsustainable interpretations of particular pieces of evidence. However, I introduce Rorty’s distinction between “historical reconstruction” and “rational reconstruction” in order to suggest that these are outstanding cases of the latter: a historically indefensible interpretation has permitted the Cyrenaics to become interlocutors in modern debates. I therefore propose that we think of this as an interesting episode in the reception of Cyrenaic philosophy rather than a plausible interpretation of what ancient Cyrenaics actually believed.

In chapter 6 I address Cyrenaic positions on personal and civic relationships, beginning with a short overview of assumptions about positive and negative reciprocity in ancient Greek culture (friendship and enmity, benefaction and injury, intra-polis solidarity and inter-polis war, etc.). I then look at the tension between involvement in these cultural institutions and withdrawal into self-sufficiency, which develops from Aristippus through mainstream Cyrenaicism. This tension is abolished by Hegesias and Theodorus, who repudiate all of the relationships involved and embrace what we might call ethical solipsism. Finally, I analyze how Anniceris opposes Hegesias by reappraising the importance of friendship, filial piety, and civic participation for effective hedonism.

In chapter 7 I focus on the enigma of Hegesias’s pessimism. First I summarize and criticize the interpretation of Wallace Matson, according to whom Hegesias’s pessimism is the result of his “ruthless deduction” of the consequences of basic Cyrenaic principles. Pessimism is therefore a “gloomy” corner
into which Hegesias finds himself coerced by reasoning. After refuting Mat- 
son’s interpretation of the evidence I develop an alternative, beginning by em- 
phasizing the thematic importance of “indifference” throughout our Hegesiac 
evidence. Comparison with Pyrrho shows how an attitude of indifference can 
be valued by Hegesias’s philosophical contemporaries. In fact it has heroic or 
semi-divine resonances, which leads me to propose that several other aspects of 
Hegesiac ethics lend themselves to analysis as a sort of philosophical heroism. I 
am therefore able to interpret the bizarre combination of radical self-sufficiency 
and pessimism as an ideal to which Hegesias and his followers positively aspire.

In chapter 8 I turn to the other provocateur from the final generations of the 
Cyrenaic movement, Theodorus “the Godless.” Previous scholars have noted 
the profound break Theodorus makes from Cyrenaic tradition, since he de- 
clares bodily pain and pleasure “intermediate” between goodness and badness. 
In order to understand Theodorus I suggest we pay attention to two points: first, 
the intermediate status of pain and pleasure is closely related to Theodorus’s at- 
tested attitude of “indifference,” which should be interpreted as an evolution 
from Hegesias’s indifference; second, this evolution necessitates a new basis for 
the joy which Theodorus makes his ethical end. This illuminates the new prom- 
inence Theodorus assigns to the virtues, which I suggest are the primary source 
of his joy. His ideal philosopher lives joyfully because he knows that everything 
he does is just and wise, and everything other than justice and wisdom is indif- 
f erent. But Theodorean virtue cannot be systematized, which is why most of 
Theodorus’s recorded arguments are critical rather than constructive. The main 
task of his philosophy is to clear away conventional and dogmatic impediments 
to the sage’s extemporaneous moral perception, not to elaborate principles and 
rules. His so-called “atheism” is one of several cases in point.

With these eight chapters I will have completed my interpretation of the an-
cient Cyrenaic movement. Before gathering my concluding thoughts, I append 
a chapter on the only significant re-appropriation of mainstream Cyrenaic 
ethics (of which I know): Walter Pater’s “new Cyrenaicism.” In particular, I 
suggest that Pater casts light on four elements that remain obscure in ancient 
Cyrenaic doxography: “unitemporal pleasure,” the relation of hedonism to tra- 
ditional virtues, the “economy” of pleasures and pains, and the Cyrenaic argu- 
ment against the fear of death. I also argue that the narrative framework of 
Pater’s novel communicates how and why Cyrenaicism could attract someone 
better than arid doxography ever could.

1.4. A Note on Conventions

In formulating my references to ancient texts I have kept in mind the needs of 
both specialists and readers from other fields. I have therefore assumed that 
every reader will have at hand (or be able to get hold of) an edition or trans- 
lation of Diogenes Laertius’s Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers,
which is by far our most important source. Thus I always cite Diogenes directly, abbreviating his name to “D.L.” I have also assumed access to A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley’s *The Hellenistic Philosophers* (1986), which I abbreviate “LS.” Most of our other texts are assembled in Giannantoni 1990, which I abbreviate SSR. However, since SSR is only of use to those with strong Latin and Greek reading skills, in every case I also cite the author and work. Where this has made citations lengthy and cumbersome, I have removed them from the main text to footnotes. My abbreviations are listed at the front of this book.

Except where otherwise indicated I follow the textual readings of Giannantoni. All translations are my own except where otherwise indicated.

For the sake of Greekless readers I have transliterated Greek words and phrases in the main text, except where I have found it advisable to quote Greek passages at length (more than five words).

I have adopted the ending -ean for “Aristippean,” “Annicerean,” and other adjectives whose Greek stems end in epsilon-iota. In this I follow the convention of “Epicurean” and “Pyrrhonean.” Other scholars sometimes write “Annicerian,” Theodorian,” and so on. I have also adopted endings in -ic for “Megaric,” “Hegesiac,” and other Greek stems ending in iota-kappa. In this I follow the convention of “Peripatetic,” “Academic,” and so on. Other scholars sometimes write ”Megarian,” “Hegesian,” and so on.