

# Introduction

THE TURKISH REPUBLIC has undergone recurrent political crises of internal and external origin since its establishment, but today it faces the greatest challenge.<sup>1</sup> “It is in the nature of politics,” John Dunn insists, “that new political challenges should arise all the time. But some such challenges are manifestly far more formidable than others.”<sup>2</sup> Because a political crisis is itself an important political phenomenon, it is pertinent to study its sources and potential consequences. To determine how far, and in what sense the Turkish Republic is today in crisis, it is necessary to consider whether the crisis comes principally from ideas or facts. This book will argue that its source is inherently intellectual.

The Republic was established following the Turkish Revolution of 1923. The postrevolutionary regime forged a new social and political order by breaking sharply with its recent historical past. Caught between the conflicting demands of order and change, innovation and stability, religious orthodoxy and laicity, national unity and ethnic diversity, the young Republic became an ideological battleground. Kemalism emerged as the victor and became the dominant state ideology, characterized by fundamental principles of nationalism, secularism, populism, statism, revolutionism, and Westernization. In 1931, with the incorporation of these principles into the Republican People’s Party program (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, CHP, founded by Mustafa Kemal in 1923) in the form of “six arrows” (*altı ok*), republicanism became a partisan engagement. Unlike its

1. E. F. Keyman and Banu Turnaoğlu, “Neo-Roma ve Neo-Atina Cumhuriyetçiliği: Cumhuriyetçilik, Demokratikleşme ve Türkiye,” *Doğu Batı*, 11 (2008): 37–65.

2. John Dunn, “Contemporary Crisis of the Nation State?,” in *The History of Political Theory and Other Essays* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 198.

French counterpart,<sup>3</sup> Turkish republicanism was championed and preserved by a particular formation of military, political, and intellectual elites, but failed to permeate wider society.

Over the course of its history, Kemalist republicanism has proven itself an inelastic ideology. To maintain national cohesion, republican governments have adopted authoritarian measures, excluding liberal, socialist, conservative, and Islamic challenges. This inflexibility has served to inhibit the development of a strong democratic culture and prevented the recognition of different minority groups and demands. Political opposition has at times been suppressed through the dissolution of political parties; military interventions in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997; and police violence, particularly against leftists in the 1970s.

In the late 1980s, the rise of political Islam in Turkish politics posed the greatest threat to date to Kemalist values, and particularly to that of laicity. It highlighted the governing authority's inability to renew its ideology to accommodate the demands of religious and traditionalist groups for political representation. The rise of the conservative Islamist Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP) in the new millennium, and its recent electoral victory in 2015, deepened the ideological crisis, pitting the Kemalists against the Islamists. The new government set out its own vision of democracy and republicanism. The former exists merely as an electoral process, a competition between parties, and gives its victors the absolute authority to govern by all means. The sovereignty of the nation is supplanted by a system of government by self-serving elites; instead of distancing religion from politics, the AKP actively uses religion to serve political goals; and in the place of democratic institutions, there exists only the power of the president, Tayyip Erdoğan. Being supremely confident in his power and in "the order of egoism,"<sup>4</sup> he protects the interests only of those who vote for the AKP, and of the media, press, and businesses, which side only with them. The current government has weakened both Kemalist opposition and the influence of the military in politics. It has used its leverage over the media to limit public debate about government actions, punished journalists and media owners who disputed government claims, curtailed individual liberties, exerted tight control over economic policy, policing, the media, and has been involved in bankruptcy

3. On the French republican tradition, see Sudhir Hazareesingh, *Political Traditions in Modern France* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 65–97.

4. I borrow this term from John Dunn. See John Dunn, *Setting the People Free: The Story of Democracy* (London: Atlantic Books, 2005), 156.

and bribery, all of which have deepened the country's political and social polarization. The sense of crisis thus incorporates and reflects a series of new and formidable challenges to the military, religion, democracy, and, most significantly, republicanism.

### *Revival of Turkish Interest in Republicanism*

The current crisis has led to a resurgence of debates on republicanism in Turkish academia. The terms “republican” and “republicanism” have had a high valence in Turkish politics, but their meaning remains ambiguous. In Turkish political thought, the word *cumhuriyet* (“republic”) retains a powerful emotive significance, but it carries no singular connotation of what the Republic was or how it came into existence. In one sense, the term “republic” merely evokes images of a fatherland at risk of partitioning, rescued by General Mustafa Kemal and his followers from the “traitor” Sultan Vahdettin (r. 1918–22) and its Western enemies. In another sense, the word's meaning is purely institutional, and in contrast with its antonym “Ottoman monarchy,” “Turkish Republic” has been understood as the highest and most civilized form of government.

A particularly prominent misconception has been the equation of republicanism with Kemalism. Numerous studies of the foundations of Turkish republican thought stress the personal ability and commanding force of Mustafa Kemal. Their narrative promulgates the idea that the Republic and its doctrines emerged abruptly in 1923 without an intellectually substantial foundation.<sup>5</sup> This orthodox interpretation persists even in the most recent scholarship on the subject, and continues to have serious ramifications in contemporary politics. Yet this orthodoxy is historically and intellectually incoherent. In the history of political thought, “no such moment of sudden transition can be observed.”<sup>6</sup> The main purpose of the present book is to uncover the origins of republican thinking and conceptions of the state in Turkey, and situate their development within the prerepublican intellectual and political context of the Ottoman Empire.

5. See Enver Ziya Karal, *Atatürk'ten Düşünceler* (Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1969), 832–45; “Atatürk ve Cumhuriyetin Duyurulması,” *Türk Dili ve Edebiyatı Dergisi*, no. 278 (1978); *Atatürk ve Devrim: Konferanslar ve Makaleler, 1935–1978* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1980).

6. Quentin Skinner, *Visions of Politics, Vol. 2, Renaissance Virtues* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 2.

## *Republicanism as a Political Tradition*

To gain a better grasp of Turkish republicanism, it is necessary to understand what “republicanism” means. There has been extensive Western academic debate over republicanism’s historical identity, intellectual content, and trajectory through time and space. Many adjectives—neo-Roman, neo-Athenian, perfectionist, civic, liberal, communitarian—have been employed to qualify it,<sup>7</sup> but there is no consensus on how to define these categories best, or distinguish it from competing political doctrines like liberalism, communitarianism, or socialism. There is strong disagreement about its core conceptions. Many authors have emphasized the importance of freedom as its core value,<sup>8</sup> while others prioritize the role of civic virtues,<sup>9</sup> the community,<sup>10</sup> or the struggle against domination.<sup>11</sup>

It is most illuminating to see it as a historical tradition, a train of thought with aims and objectives defined anew in each generation, but transmitted across generations. It comes in a variety of shapes, and the principal challenge for its analysis is to trace areas of continuity and discontinuity and identify how it changes and adapts over time while retaining its central tenets of liberty, the common good, political participation, and virtue.<sup>12</sup> Classical and modern republicanism have in common a deep concern with the design of durable political institutions for allocat-

7. For the neo-Roman and neo-Athenian debate, see Banu Turnaoğlu, “An Inquiry into Civic Republicanism: Neo-Roman and Neo-Athenian Conceptions of Liberty as Justifications” (MSc Thesis, Oxford University, 2008).

8. See Quentin Skinner, “The Idea of Negative Liberty: Philosophical and Historical Perspectives,” in *Philosophy in History*, ed. R. Rorty, J. B. Scheewind, and Q. Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); “The Republican Ideal of Political Liberty,” in *Machiavelli and Republicanism*, ed. Gisela Bock, Quentin Skinner, and Maurizio Viroli (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

9. Richard Dagger, *Civic Virtues: Rights, Citizenship and Republican Liberalism* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013); *On Revolution* (London: Penguin, 1965).

10. Michael J. Sandel, “The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self,” *Political Theory* (1984): 81–96; *Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998); Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998); “What Is Wrong with Negative Liberty?” in *The Liberty Reader*, ed. David Miller (Edinburgh: Paradigm Publishers, 2006).

11. Philip Pettit, *Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

12. Sudhir Hazareesingh and Karma Nabulsi, “Using Archival Sources to Theorize about Politics,” in *Political Theory: Methods and Approaches*, ed. David Leopold and Marc Stears (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 153–55.

ing power among different social groupings and channeling its exercise to maintain a lasting public good.<sup>13</sup>

Republicanism had its origins in Roman political thought. Ancient Roman republicanism was concerned essentially with the special value of a nonhereditary and nonmonarchical government. Liberty was its central tenet, as manifest in the notion of “living freely in a free state.”<sup>14</sup> A free person was the antonym of a slave, defined in the *Digest* as “someone who, contrary to nature, is made into the property of someone else.”<sup>15</sup> A free state, for its part, was a political entity in which citizens were not subjected to the arbitrary power of a ruler, a monarch, and that was not dominated by a foreign power.<sup>16</sup>

After the fall of imperial Rome, republicanism was overshadowed for centuries by Christian monarchism, but it revived in the late medieval Italian city-states, which prepared the ground for classical republicanism. As Quentin Skinner has shown, the Italian republicans drew on their own political experience and on a series of Roman sources, particularly the works of Cicero, Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus, to elaborate and understand the principles of political organization and secure a free way of life.<sup>17</sup> Liberty was contrasted with slavery and seen as the source of virtue, which encouraged *iustitia*, cultivated *commune bonum*, produced *concordia* and *pax*, and enabled the state to seek *gloria*.<sup>18</sup>

Drawing from the experience of these self-governing, prehumanist Italian city-states, Machiavelli and his contemporary Renaissance republicans reworked this vision of a free political life, and turned to Roman historians and moralists in search of the conditions through which the Republic could be secured, and for a formulation of *vivere libero* to engender *grandezza*.<sup>19</sup> In his *Discorsi*, Machiavelli argued that the free way of life required political participation as a necessary condition to protect political institutions from corruption and stagnation, motivate citizens to

13. John Dunn, “The Identity of the Bourgeois Liberal Republic,” in *The Invention of the Modern Republic*, ed. Biancamaria Fontana (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 217.

14. Quentin Skinner, *Liberty before Liberalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 39.

15. *Ibid.*

16. *Ibid.*, 38.

17. *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Vol. I, The Renaissance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978); “Machiavelli’s *Discorsi* and the Pre-Humanist Origins of Republican Ideas”; *Visions of Politics*.

18. Eric Nelson, *The Greek Tradition in Republican Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 9.

19. Skinner, “The Idea of Negative Liberty: Philosophical and Historical Perspectives.”

commit themselves to the common good, and display a high degree of civic virtue.<sup>20</sup>

Following the demise of the Renaissance city-states, republican theory took fresh political life as a challenge to absolutist monarchies throughout Europe. The Dutch overthrew their monarch Philip II in 1581,<sup>21</sup> and successfully established a federated republic, while the English executed their king, Charles I, in 1649 during the Civil War, and set up “a Commonwealth and Free State.”<sup>22</sup> English republican theorists Marchamont Nedham, John Milton, and James Harrington also consulted Roman sources for inspiration and preserved or adapted elements of Italian Renaissance humanism. Their usage of the terms “republic” and “commonwealth,” nonetheless, was not quite like the classical use of these concepts as antonyms of monarchy. It signified a representative government, held in check by a mixed constitution to secure liberty and limit the arbitrary will of the king or the House of Lords.<sup>23</sup>

Although the distinctive appeal of republican government remained a vivid presence in the intellectual history of Western Europe, for a long time it had limited political effect. By the middle of the eighteenth century, none of the most dynamic and militarily powerful states of Europe was still a republic. But the dawn of the nineteenth century witnessed a pronounced shift in favor of republicanism. Still rare in Western Europe itself, this system of governance gained momentum among populations on the eastern seaboard of North America.<sup>24</sup> Inspired by a rich corpus of Enlightenment thinking and practice, republicans in America had since the eighteenth century challenged the British theory of “virtual representation,” and in 1776 they declared their independence from Britain in the name of greater political freedom and civic equality. Their revolution showed clearly and in the end conclusively that instead of being the preserve of

20. “[I]t is easy to understand the affection that people feel for living liberty, for experience shows that no cities have ever grown in power or wealth except those which have established as free states.” Quoted in “The Republican Ideal of Political Liberty,” 301.

21. See Martin Van Gelderen, *The Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt 1555–1590* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

22. Blair Worden, “English Republicanism,” in *The Cambridge History of Political Thought 1450–1700*, ed. James Henderson Burns and Mark Goldie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 444.

23. In his republican utopia *Oceana*, James Harrington asserted that this government would represent “the empire of laws and not of men” under which citizens are free not “from the law but by the law.” See James Harrington, *The Commonwealth of Oceana and a System of Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 8.

24. John Dunn, “Conclusion,” in *Democracy: The Unfinished Journey, 508 BC to AD 1993*, ed. John Dunn (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1992), 245.

small city-states, republican institutions and the mechanisms of limited government could be combined to guarantee the prosperity and security of a larger national territory.<sup>25</sup>

The burgeoning impetus for republicanism soon returned to European shores, and most prominently and significantly to France. The sudden collapse of the French monarchy paved the way for a republican solution that only a few years earlier would have appeared utopian. Radically different from the classical republican tradition, the new “bourgeois liberal republican model” combined the principles of the separation of powers and the representation of popular sovereignty.<sup>26</sup> Departing from classical republicanism’s emphasis on expansive military power and the quest for *grandezza*, this new model proclaimed a vision of a peaceful world, in which all nations would be bound together by commerce and through the universal values of liberty, equality, and fraternity.<sup>27</sup> The French Revolution set in motion further republican revolutionary events, on the Continent and beyond, spreading to the Caribbean and Latin America in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, inflaming Polish insurrections and the Spring of Nations in 1848, and contributing to the Turkish Revolutions of 1908 and 1923. This broad array of republican movements had a profound influence on the way republican traditions cohered and evolved worldwide.

The bourgeois liberal republican model has become the most common form of government in today’s world, but, as Dunn has contended, its endurance is a measure of the failure of alternatives in the twentieth century with the collapse of numerous monarchies after World War I, and of Marxism in the 1990s, far more than an indication of the model’s own decisive practical success.<sup>28</sup> As there exists today more than one type of

25. Bernard Manin, *The Principles of Representative Government* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 102–31; “Checks, Balances and Boundaries: The Separation of Powers in the Constitutional Debate of 1787,” in *The Invention of the Modern Republic*, ed. Biancamaria Fontana (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

26. Pasquale Pasquino, “The Constitutional Republicanism of Emmanuel Sieyès,” in *The Invention of the Modern Republic*, ed. Biancamaria Fontana (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2007), 107–8.

27. Keith Michael Baker, “Political Languages of the French Revolution,” in *The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Political Thought*, ed. Mark Goldie and Robert Wokler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Biancamaria Fontana, “The Thermidorian Republic and Its Principles,” in *The Invention of the Modern Republic*, ed. Biancamaria Fontana (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Jeremy Jennings, *Revolution and the Republic: A History of Political Thought in France since the Eighteenth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

28. Dunn, “The Identity of the Bourgeois Liberal Republic,” 206–7, 212.

republic, there are many conceptions of republicanism, with unique histories that developed and evolved in different contexts. Despite this variety, studies of republicanism have been limited largely to the Anglophone world, and typically present it merely as a European and American phenomenon. In the extensive works of J.G.A. Pocock on Anglophone republicanism,<sup>29</sup> and in the multivolume analysis of European republicanism edited by Quentin Skinner and others,<sup>30</sup> there is virtually no mention of republicanism elsewhere. The role played by republics and republican values in the formation of the modern state has been discussed only within the confines of Europe, and the histories of non-Western republican states and their own traditions have not so far not been studied systematically and carefully.

This study of the evolution of the Turkish republican tradition from its Ottoman intellectual foundations seeks to transcend the conventional geographical boundaries between Western and non-Western political thought by illustrating the striking and highly consequential exchange of ideas between these spheres. Studying political history in this way helps us to rethink republicanism, and understand political thinking as an interaction between ideas from different settings across the world. It undertakes to recognize political thinking in its full plurality, trace the complex process involved in the formulation of ideas, and widen the scope of Western history of political thought, which is “still very far from enjoying such a cosmopolitan vision.”<sup>31</sup>

This book uncovers the rich intellectual heritage of Turkish republican thinking and the resources through which the change from the monarchy to the Republic came about, and elucidates how and why this change occurred. The works of Feroz Ahmad, Bernard Lewis, Şerif Mardin, Stanford Shaw, and Tarık Zafer Tunaya<sup>32</sup> have acknowledged the debt of the eigh-

29. J.G.A. Pocock, *Politics, Language, and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History* (London: University of Chicago Press, 1971); *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009); John Greville Agard Pocock, *Political Thought and History: Essays on Theory and Method* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

30. Martin Van Gelderen and Quentin Skinner, *Republicanism: Volume 1, Republicanism and Constitutionalism in Early Modern Europe: A Shared European Heritage* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

31. John Dunn, *The History of Political Theory and Other Essays* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 14.

32. Feroz Ahmad, *Turkey: The Quest for Identity* (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2003); Kemal Karpat, *İslam'ın Siyasallaşması: Osmanlı Devleti'nin Son Döneminde Kimlik, Devlet, İnanç ve Cemaatin Yeniden Yapılandırılması* (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2004); Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (New York:

teenth- and nineteenth-century reforms, the political thinking of the Young Ottomans and Young Turks, and intellectual developments in the Second Constitutional period (1908–18), which Tunaya saw as the “laboratory of the republic.”<sup>33</sup> These works, nevertheless, remain limited by their singular focus on Westernization as a response to external pressure, and fail to appreciate the full intellectual richness and originality of Ottoman thinkers. Erik Zürcher and Zafer Toprak have illuminated the institutional links between the Empire and the Republic, but neglect the latter’s intellectual foundations.<sup>34</sup> Niyazi Berkes’s account, on the other hand, maps the process of modernization and secularization from the eighteenth century that generated the Republic. His narrative, unlike these other treatments, proceeds through a range of categories, but ultimately presents a teleological account of a procession of social changes that reached their apotheosis with the Kemalist Republic.

It is a mistake to understand Turkish republicanism exclusively in Kemalist terms as a force for modernization and secularization, and see its history as a linear, progressive evolution. Turkish republicanism is not a rigid ideological construct. Its real essence lies in its capacity to accommodate different republican conceptions. This book argues that modern-day Turkish republicanism represents the outcome of centuries of intellectual disputes between Islamic, liberal, and radical conceptions of republicanism. It is this battle for ideas that makes the study of Turkish republicanism a unique and interesting case. To grasp republican tradition accurately and understand how it came about, it is necessary to analyze how intellectuals, groups, and decision-makers evaluated and imagined politics, society, morality, and economics during distinct time periods; how they employed categories like freedom, society, religion, justice, and citizenship; and how these categories changed in meaning over time.

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Oxford University Press, 2002); Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962); *Continuity and Change in the Ideas of the Young Turks* (Ankara: School of Business Administration and Economics, Robert College, 1969); Stanford J. Shaw, *From Empire to Republic: The Turkish War of National Liberation, 1918–1923, Volume 2, A Documentary Study* (Ankara: Turkish Historical Society, 2001); Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Volume 2, Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey 1808–1975* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).

33. Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler: İkinci Meşrutiyet Dönemi 1908–1918*, vol. 1 (Istanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı, 1984), 21.

34. Zafer Toprak, *Türkiye’de Popülizm 1908–1923* (Istanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2013); Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (London, New York: I. B. Tauris, 2004); *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: From the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk’s Turkey* (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2014).

Ottoman political thinking was profoundly embedded in historical, institutional, and social contexts, and in contingencies of space and time. Context is not mere historical background, but an active, dynamic force that defines the visions of intellectuals, and decisively shapes the use of political concepts and language.<sup>35</sup> Political texts, including advice literature, newspapers, documents, declarations, pamphlets, speeches, and books are understood in historical terms, and seen as the products of intellectual and political engagement with other texts originating locally and across Europe.

Against the insistence on seeing the Turkish Republic merely as an emotive term, or the “highest” form of government, this book will argue that the term encompasses a complex set of political values, a sequence of thought, and a way of political life. The complexity of Turkish republicanism is best understood through a detailed investigation of its historical developments. This account begins by examining the foundations of Islamic, liberal, and radical republican conceptions. The Islamic conception of republicanism took its inspiration from the Islamic state in the period of the four caliphates and medieval Islamic thought, the latter of which profoundly shaped the Ottoman political thought of the Classical Age and was revived in the intellectual debates of the 1860s and 1870s. In the republican debates of the 1920s, a group of *ulema* and political conservatives believed that the most suitable type of regime for the new Turkey was an Islamic Republic, because the indigenous Islamic state exhibited elements of direct democracy and republic, and monarchy was a deviation from it.

The roots of liberal republicanism lie in French republican traditions. In the nineteenth century, Ottoman intellectuals articulated a political philosophy designed to challenge bureaucratic and sultanic authoritarianism. Following the French republican model, the Young Ottomans’ political thought stressed that modern freedom required material and social equality as a precondition for the regulation of social and political life. They introduced a Montesquieuan model of constitutionalism, and a strict separation of powers to limit the arbitrary will of rulers and to secure liberties and life. Their intellectual successors, the Young Turks, laid the foundations for a republican conception of Ottoman society, and adopted a Comtean approach to attaining universal peace. They valued republicanism for its ideas, rather than its institutions. Like their French counterparts, they believed that an ideal state must provide formal legal liberty and equality, and must embody both justice and fraternity. The Young

35. Hazareesingh and Nabulsi, “Using Archival Sources to Theorize about Politics,” 154.

Turk Revolution of 1908 brought these universal republican principles to Ottoman society with a transformative power.

Radical republicanism, too, was rooted in the political thought of the Young Ottomans in the 1860s and was inspired by French republicanism. Despite sharing many core ideas with liberal republicans, like liberty, sovereignty, and constitutionalism, the meanings attached to those concepts were dramatically different. Radical republicans were inherently revolutionists and activists, who placed popular sovereignty and liberty at the heart of their ideology. Radical republicanism, however, failed to become established throughout the nineteenth century.

The eve of World War I witnessed the rise of Darwinism, nationalism, and militarism in Young Turk political thought, which challenged the liberal republican ideas of the Revolution of 1908. German militarism and nationalism, the idea that every nation should have its own state and every state should be a single nation, was adopted effectively by the Turkish authorities in their pursuit of Balkan War and World War I military campaigns. Although there was nothing inherently republican in German militarism, it strongly shaped contemporary Turkish conceptions of the state, society, and nation. The great geographical shift of World War I extended the nation-state as a political format, and the War of Independence (1919–22) reinforced it as an ideological option and witnessed the revival of radical republicanism, attaching World War I ideas of nationalism, militarism, and statism.

The escape of the monarch from the country in 1922 rapidly ushered in the Republic. In the formative period of the new state, radical republicans crushed all contesting and rival political viewpoints. The new state's foundational ideology was the sole victor among competing conceptions of Islamic and liberal republicanism. The genealogy of the Turkish republicanism presents a striking new narrative and an analysis of an immensely important historical process. This can help us understand Turkish politics today and cast more light on what in the long run its future is likely to prove.