INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME II

The writings that have been collected in this volume are closely related to Wilhelm Dilthey’s efforts to complete the second volume of the *Introduction to the Human Sciences*. Dilthey himself published the first volume (Books One and Two) of his *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften* in 1883. He never completed Books Three to Six. Drafts for Books Four to Six did exist, but were only published posthumously and not until 1982. Our English edition of the *Introduction*\(^1\) includes almost all of these drafts.

The essays in this volume deal with some of the important background issues that needed to be resolved in order to complete the *Introduction*. In these writings from the 1890s, Dilthey contributes to a theory of the human sciences by addressing the epistemological and psychological crises of his day. Although they do not yet arrive at the overall position that Dilthey developed in the first decade of the twentieth century,\(^2\) they provide a richness of detail that adds much to an understanding of the human world.

Near the end of his life, Dilthey agreed to write a preface for most of the essays that make up this volume. In this brief preface he reiterates his allegiance to the empirical principle that limits human knowledge to what is capable of being experienced. This principle, which Kant had applied to the natural sciences, must also be extended to the human sciences. But for this extension to be successful, the Kantian assumption that all experience is phenomenal needs to be questioned. To consider human historical life an appearance is a contradiction in terms according to Dilthey. “Within the course of life itself—in what develops from the past and stretches into the future—lie the realities that constitute the productive nexus and the value of our life” (3). Historical life can be experienced and shown to be what is *functionally real* in the things we perceive.


How do we access this functional reality? In his “Inaugural Speech to the Prussian Academy,” Dilthey stresses that “this reality is not seen, but given in lived experience” (6). The traditional epistemology that represents the world primarily in terms of cognitive perceptual phenomena must be supplemented with a more broadly based approach that takes account of the fact that we are “willing-feeling-cognizing” (6) beings. This claim refers back to the innovative “Breslau Draft” for the second volume of the *Introduction to the Human Sciences*, where Dilthey had introduced a reflexive mode of awareness (*Innewerden*) to capture how reality is given in lived experience. In this “Breslau Draft,” which was made available as Section 1 of Book Four in our translation of the *Introduction*, Dilthey provided an extended contrast between reflexive awareness and representational awareness. Whereas representational awareness places its content before itself as an appearance, reflexive awareness presents the inherent feltness of this content. Accordingly, Dilthey wrote: “Wherever a reflexive awareness of the process involved in the perceptual act is added to the consciousness of the object, consciousness possesses its content.” Reflexive awareness assimilates the reality of what is presented to it through feeling and is thus at least initially pre-reflective.

In the remaining four essays of this volume—which are also the most important ones—Dilthey goes on to develop more reflective ways of engaging the reality of the human world. These essays can be seen as working out Sections 2 and 3 of Book Four of the *Introduction to the Human Sciences* that had already made it clear that what is needed for understanding the human world is something more than an epistemology, namely, a kind of “self-reflection” that can provide the framework “not only for thought and cognition, but also for action.”

In all these essays Dilthey maintains that we encounter the human world through acts of will as well as acts of perception, and that we respond to it affectively as well as intellectually. “The Origin of Our Belief in the Reality of the External World and Its Justification” of 1890 focuses on the volitional nexus that leads us to acknowledge the reality of the external world. The essay corresponds in some ways to Section 2 of Book Four of the *Introduction*, which is about

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3 Dilthey, SW 1, 247–50.
4 Dilthey, SW 1, 257.
5 Dilthey, SW 1, 278.
perception and its correlate, the real world. There, Dilthey argued that if perception were simply representational, it would be a placing-before-me in ideal visual space. But the perceiver acknowledges the givenness of something real only though the “reflexive awareness of an influence that resists it.”6 It is resistance to the will through touch that “guarantees thinghood (reality, materiality).”7 In the Origin essay, Dilthey develops a much more detailed and global account of how we come to believe in the independent reality of the external world. Our relation to the world is mediated through voluntary movements that take place in a volitional nexus. Our drives generate intentions that insert themselves into the world and run into resisting pressures. But the reflexive awareness of pressure sensations as resistance (Widerstand) does not become a disclosure of the reality of something independent until the resistance is reflexively acknowledged as a restraint (Hemmung) of the original intention. So it is from within ourselves and our lived bodies that we experience the real gap between an intention and its frustration. These two volitional states prepare the way not only for objects that passively stand in our way but also for persons who can more actively constrain our intentions.

The next essay, “Life and Cognition” (1892), was never published by Dilthey and can be seen as following up on the draft of Section 4 of Book Five of the Introduction, which explored the categories whereby we organize our experience of life.8 The essay is an extended examination of the “processes which we observe in ourselves and that make themselves known to us in distinguishing, connecting, relating and ordering” (59) and what these processes are about, namely, a given. But “no matter how hard I struggle to obtain the pure experience of the given,” writes Dilthey, “there is no such thing. The given lies beyond my direct experience” (60). The given is not to be found as a distinct component of either perceptual experience or inner experience. There is nothing in either inner or outer experience that is directly given and immune from deception. The given is always a given for interpretation.

The given that Dilthey is concerned with is life itself. “All reflection, inquiry and thought arises from this inscrutable [source].” We cannot go behind life but we can categorize it. The most fundamental

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6 Dilthey, SW 1, 356.
7 Dilthey, SW 1, 356.
8 See Dilthey, SW 1, 414–18.
ways in which we relate to the givenness of life are explicated as categories. The three categories of life that Dilthey expounds here are real and not mere concepts of the intellect (Verstand); they are structural schema that articulate the givenness of life and provide the basis for the understanding (Verstehen) of reality. These real categories are selfsameness, doing and undergoing, and finally, essentiality.

Selfsameness as a category of life articulates a life-nexus as the basic givenness of reality. Selfsameness is a real category that underlies the intellectual categories of subject and substance. The selfsameness of a living self precedes the formal identity that the intellect assigns to both a conscious subject and an object of thought. Selfsameness “holds together everything that is differentiable and changeable in a life-unit” (88). It provides “unity that can only be experienced, not expressed through a concept” (88). Selfsameness is a “togetherness” that “persists through time” and constitutes a holistic unity. Dilthey writes:

Selfsameness is the most intimate experience that human beings have of themselves. That we feel ourselves to be a person, to possess character, and that we can think and act consistently is rooted in this selfsameness. But it does not at all entail that something self-identical persists in all the changes. (88)

The persistence of selfsameness is that of a living nexus and is more like the unity of a melody than of a thing. As such, selfsameness is not attached to any fixed place and allows what is given successively and perceived as “juxtaposed” (Nebeneinander) to attain “a convergence” (Ineinander) (91). And because the convergence of a life-nexus is inherently context related, it can also be extended to what is presented as other. Thus the experienced reality of our own life-nexus provides a schema for assessing the reality of another life-nexus. “The self and the other, the I and the world, are there for each other . . . in this nexus” and not solely “in a purely intellectual subject-object relationship” (75).

The second real categorial relation is that of doing and undergoing and provides the basis for the formal category of causality. Doing and undergoing are given to the life-unit as constitutive of its life-nexus. “There is a reciprocal relation by which something exerting an influence experiences a reaction” (95). Whereas the formal, more derivative category of causality is conceived sequentially and imposed by the intellect on a representational world, the original categorial relation of doing and undergoing again involves a convergence. But this convergence highlights the efficacy of the life-unit in
its worldly life-nexus. At this basic level, the self relates to the world as a participant rather than as a mere observer.

The third real category is that of essentiality and focuses on what is central in the structure of life. As Dilthey puts it, “Life itself forces us to distinguish between what matters, what is decisive and primordially powerful in life, and what can be dispensed with without loss to our present fullness of life—short of being relieved of inevitable burdens. We carry within us a way of living our life whose fulfillment would leave us wishing for nothing more” (101–102). This core of fulfillment involves an immanent purposiveness that relates our overarching life-concerns. Accordingly, “we say that the meaning and sense of life inheres in what is essential” (102). This life-category differentiates what is essential from what is inessential and becomes the basis for the main categories of the human sciences, namely, value and purpose, sense and meaning.9

What is distinctive about Dilthey’s conception of the real categories of life is that they orient us to the overall givenness of the life-world. They articulate the basic convergences of the life-nexus that are accessible to our lived experience (Erlebnis) before our intellect can explicate or make sense of them. If the original sense of self-sameness constitutes a convergent reality, then we can elaborate and say that doing and undergoing involve a convergence of efficacy, and that essentiality brings out a convergence between certain core moments of life and its overall meaning.

The next essay, “Ideas for a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology” (1894), more clearly examines the convergent structures established by our lived experience of the world. This well-known treatise can be regarded as working out the initial parts of Section 3 of Book Four of the Introduction that deal with inner perception and our experiences of psychic life.10 Similarly, the last essay, “Contributions to the Study of Individuality” (1895/96), can be seen as elaborating the final part of Section 3, titled “On the Connection of Outer and Inner Perception and the Recognition and Understanding of Other Persons.”11

We already have an elementary understanding of others through real categories of life, such as doing and undergoing. Thus we immediately know how others respond to us in the interactions of

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9 These are then further developed in the Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences, see SW 3, 248–64.
10 Dilthey, SW 1, 360ff.
11 Dilthey, SW 1, 388ff.
everyday life. But in order to develop a higher, more mediated, cognitive understanding of others, it is also necessary to establish a human science of psychology.\(^\text{12}\) In the *Ideas* proposing such a new psychology, Dilthey takes on the task of showing how the indeterminate but real life-nexus that connects us to the world can be specified as a psychic nexus. By focusing on how inner experience places everything in a temporal continuum that we can follow out, describe, and analyze, he saw the opportunity to establish a structural psychology that could be of great use to the human sciences in general. Instead of basing our understanding of self and others on assumptions about shared mental contents, this new psychology focuses on the common structural patterns of experience that relate human beings.

Dilthey begins the *Ideas* with a discussion of traditional psychologies, most of which are explanatory and hypothetical in nature. They have applied the mechanistic assumptions of the natural sciences to the domain of psychic life where they are not needed. Associationist psychologies have attempted to construct the life of the human soul from artificial elements like sensations and mental representations. But our lived experience of the world is holistic in nature. Most processes of psychic life can be understood by describing the temporal continuum of consciousness and analyzing those constituents that are most directly relevant to the issue at hand. It is in this context that Dilthey formulates one of his most cited but also most misinterpreted mottos:

> We explain through purely intellectual processes, but we understand through the cooperation of all the powers of the mind activated by apprehension. In understanding we proceed from the context of the whole that is vividly given to us to then make the particular intelligible to ourselves. (147)

Before explicating the significance of this statement, we should note that it does not entail the total exclusion of explanation from the human sciences or the irrationality of understanding. First of all, understanding does not call up all our powers in order to stifle the intellect—it aims to supplement rational processes. Secondly, the human sciences do not need explanatory hypotheses as their foundation, but hypotheses may very well be brought to bear on complexities of our experience where self-awareness did not take place. When practical preoccupations interfere with self-awareness,

\(^{12}\) For more clarification about Dilthey’s distinction between elementary and higher understanding, see SW 3, 228–34.
psychological description must obviously be supplemented with explanation.

Dilthey’s main concern is to describe and articulate the pervasive structures of our psychic life. A psychology concerned with overall understanding is also characterized by its ability to analyze various structural strata in the continuum of consciousness. Dilthey writes: “When I compare . . . momentary states of consciousness, I arrive at the result that almost every one of them can be shown to simultaneously contain some kind of representing, feeling, and willing” (173). Even a cognitive representation of an object will have some aspect of feeling and willing attached to it. Indeed, based on our categorial responsiveness to the world at large, many impressions prove to be relatively inessential and can be filtered out. What we selectively represent for ourselves in our field of vision will be a function of the value that our feeling attaches to it and the interest that our will takes in attending to it. The attentiveness needed to cognize things is a function of will as well as of intellect. Thus after a brief glance into a room we are more likely to remember details about the people in it than about the furniture—assuming that the former are more germane to our values and purposes.

At every moment our experience of the world is a nexus of cognitive, evaluative, and volitional responses. The basic continuum of psychological life is a nexus of lived experiences that traces these modes of response to reality. Analysis can then account for the fact that we often distinguish states of mind as being representational, evaluative, or volitional. Partly this is determined by which mode of consciousness predominates. As Dilthey writes: “The inner relation among these various aspects . . . the structure that connects these threads is not the same in the affective state as in the volitional, which is again not the same as in the representational attitude” (175). These three aspects of our experience do not come separately, but on the basis of a functional distinction it makes sense to focus on representational states of mind and relate them into a structural cognitive system whose function is to inform us what the world is like. Within this cognitive system it is possible to relate the perceptual and conceptual aspects of experience and to examine how memory and imagination allow us to represent things. The felt and evaluative aspects of experience can similarly be related to form a second structural system, which allows us to coordinate the value of things. Finally, Dilthey speaks of a volitional system that generates the overriding purposes in life. Here it becomes necessary not only to rank values but also to provide the
basis for estimating which ones might be worth acting on through an analysis of means-ends relations.

It is thus only in functional terms that we can distinguish the three main divisions of psychic life that have commonly been accepted since Kant. There are no separate faculties of cognition, feeling, and willing that operate independently. More than anything else Dilthey stresses the interdependence of what goes on in human consciousness. Developmentally, this means that it is impossible for the same representation to recur. The second time I visit a museum and observe a painting will make for a different experience because I will be in a different state of mind. Also, I will probably remember having seen it before, which imparts a resonance and depth to the new experience.

To account for this increasing richness of experience, Dilthey moves beyond the general structures that we all share to the historically distinct psychic structure that each of us develops over the course of our lives. This is the acquired psychic nexus that accumulates over time and serves as the apperceptive framework for understanding what individuates our experience. The acquired nexus sums up what we have experienced like our memory. However, it is more than a storage capacity—it functions selectively to weed out what is inessential for our life. The acquired psychic nexus influences our subsequent experience based on the overall evaluations and goals that we have established for ourselves over time. Of course, given the reciprocity of our life-relations, some experiences can lead us to revise our assessments. Usually, it is not until late in life that our acquired psychic nexus becomes fixed as a final Gestalt.

All these aspects of psychological understanding are treated in greater detail in the concluding three chapters of the Ideas. At the beginning of chapter 7 on the structure of psychological life, Dilthey considers how the self experiences its relation to the world as an ongoing continuum of doing and undergoing that is then articulated into the cross-sectional structural strata discussed previously. Chapter 8 on the development of psychological life explicates the dynamism of the psychic nexus as exhibiting an immanent subjective-purposiveness. He characterizes it as a process of “differentiation and the production of higher-level connections” (186). Each stage of development is marked by its own inner organization and independent value.

Development consists of simple states of life, each of which aims to achieve and maintain for itself a distinctive life-value.
Pitiable is the childhood that has been sacrificed to adulthood. It is a great foolishness to calculate so with life, to ceaselessly press on and make the earlier merely a means to the later. Nothing can be more erroneous than viewing maturity as the goal of the development that constitutes life and thus transforming the early years into mere means. How could those years serve as means to a goal that in each case is so uncertain? Instead, it is part of the nature of life to strive to fill each moment with a richness of value. (189)

The concluding ninth chapter takes stock of the ways in which psychological life is articulated in particular human beings and contributes to individuality. Dilthey refuses to define individuality by means of special qualities possessed by some and not others. Even if we posit the same qualities in all human beings, we can differentiate them quantitatively in terms of their intensity. We first characterize people by the qualities that manifest themselves most strongly. An irritable person often discloses anger, impatience, and so on. But even the most sanguine can have their patience tried and become angry, which indicates that they, too, have a threshold of irritability that manifests itself more rarely.

Obviously it would be inadequate to define individuality merely on the basis of quantitative difference, that is, degrees of intensity. Because our attributes are part of a structural nexus, Dilthey points to a certain amount of interdependence among them. The development of the prominence of one attribute, such as ambition, will require a person to also develop other attributes, such as assertiveness and courage, and to downgrade others, such as concern for others. There seem to be no rules governing compatibility and incompatibility among attributes. Dilthey points out that we tend to think of pious people as also being honest, but this is not always the case. This makes the understanding of individuality a problem of structural articulation, that is, of discerning “what proportional relationships exist in the structure of psychic life among the different constituent parts” (203). Since each person develops a distinct structural articulation or proportion, for one to understand another requires an internal transformation of self-understanding. Subsequently, Dilthey made the claim that “transposition is transformation”13 an

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important part of his hermeneutics. To understand someone else involves a transposition that expands one’s own horizon of understanding. The acquired psychic nexus constitutes the context of our selfsameness, which the understanding of others can transform into a recognition of our own distinctive identity.

It is in the next essay, “Contributions to the Study of Individuality,” that the distinct Gestaltungen of human life are analyzed. But the transition from the Ideas to the Contributions manifests certain obstacles that need to be clarified. The Ideas are followed by “Some Remarks in Response to Ebbinghaus” in which Dilthey defends himself against a polemical review by a defender of explanatory psychology. Hermann Ebbinghaus attacked the Ideas for misrepresenting explanatory psychology. He also claimed that Dilthey’s psychic nexus is itself hypothetical. Ebbinghaus was especially critical of Dilthey’s claim that the interaction between individuals and their milieu based on the stimulus-reaction relationship found in all animal life can be immediately experienced. Concerning this, Dilthey had said “the structure of psychic life that links stimulus and response has its mediating center in a bundle of instincts, drives and feelings on the basis of which the life-value of the changes in our environment are estimated and our responses to them initiated” (181). In the dispute about what here is immediate experience and what merely an explanatory hypothesis, many contemporaries lost sight of the core contribution of Dilthey’s approach, namely, his description of the psychic structural nexus. Subsequently, Husserl acknowledged with regret that due to Ebbinghaus’s criticism he decided it was unnecessary to read Dilthey’s Ideas. When he did finally read it, Husserl called it a “genial” work.14

The Contributions were published in 1896 as a shortened version of what Dilthey had already sent to press as a treatise on comparative psychology in 1895. Because of the Ebbinghaus controversy, Dilthey decided to delay publication of the treatise and delete some sections on psychology and on the comparative human sciences. He also did not publish his opening response to the Neo-Kantian Wilhelm Windelband, who had questioned Dilthey’s way of distinguishing the natural and the human sciences on the basis of outer and inner experience. Our edition preserves all these parts of the text and allows us to see that the way Dilthey aligns

the human sciences with inner experience involves creating a context for understanding the meaning of the human world. Inner experiences do not exhaust this meaning-context however. They must be supplemented with reflection in order to expand our scope of reference to include the representation of objects that play an essential role in our understanding of the human world. He cites Kant in opposition to his Neo-Kantian critic: “Kant was the first to create a special name for these discursive thought processes that integrate the images of objects given in outer perception into the nexus of our facts of consciousness. He called this type of investigation *transcendental*” (216). To do full justice to the human sciences, a third kind of experience is needed, namely, a transcendental or reflective experience (see 217) of spiritual-cultural contents. This opens up lived experience and understanding to the possibility for interpretation that will become especially important in the last decade of Dilthey’s life.

In opposition to Dilthey, Windelband proposed a nomothetic-idiographic distinction between the natural and the cultural sciences, according to which the natural sciences aim at lawful uniformities and the cultural sciences describe unique historical patterns. Dilthey objects in turn that the human sciences do more than describe the singularity of human accomplishments. Many human sciences have systematic and structural aims that combine the study of uniformities with the examination of individuation. This is exactly what is involved in the comparative psychology that Dilthey was proposing.

The essay as Dilthey published it in 1896 begins with a discussion of another dimension of the human sciences, namely, the fact that for them theoretical and practical considerations are inseparable. No presentation of historical facts is separable from the normative issue of what is categorically essential in human life. Thus Dilthey writes: “even history will always combine description, causal cognition, and judgment: to be sure, not exclusively moral judgments but judgments that spring from the value-determinations and norms of all human life activities” (236).

The comparative method that Dilthey pursues in this essay on individuality assumes that human beings share many basic similarities

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within which typical variations tend to recur. Types are formed in which “several characteristics, parts, or functions are regularly connected” (238). This kind of typification already marks organic life and is something that we share with animals. In human individuation, however, the determination of what is essential for the evaluation of life takes over. That is why for our understanding of the human-historical world, it is also important to consider the contributions of the arts. The arts serve to expand the horizon of our own life-experience and play a central role in refining our sense of what is essential in life. Thus Dilthey claims that a full understanding of human individuation can only be attained through the cooperation of life-experience, the arts, and the sciences. The longest section of the essay is titled “Art as the First Representation of the Human-Historical World in Its Individuation.”

The arts are important in that they introduce a kind of typification that differs from that already referred to earlier when discussing organic life. Those organic types can be called morphological, but the “typical seeing” that Dilthey attributes to artists could be called hermeneutical. Artists have the capacity to find in particular beings and situations something that makes them representative of some more general context. An artistic type is like a norm that hovers between extremes. It draws on our imagination and allows us to find a pregnance in the particular features of others that might otherwise leave us cold. Thus a successful portrait artist has the ability to locate a point of impression in a face on which other features converge, as it were. The typical seeing furthered by the arts is a great boon for human understanding and allows us to discern differences as well as “family resemblances” (249).

On the one hand, we understand others on the basis of structural similarities with our own lived experience. To this extent, understanding is like an inference by analogy. But this model of understanding would allow us to remove the other from his or her own context and to reduce the process to a mere logical operation. On the other hand, understanding involves a kind of transposition that demands that we expand the horizon of our consciousness. To transpose ourselves into another context from which both the other and the self can be reevaluated is the true challenge of understanding for which the arts can be especially useful. The essay as published in 1896 concludes with an interesting discussion of the ways in which first the Greeks, then Renaissance writers like Shakespeare and Marlowe, the Bildungsromane of Goethe, the historical dramas
of Schiller, and the societal novels of Dickens, Balzac, and Zola have helped to shape our appreciation of individuation.

The original essay as fully translated here concludes with an examination of the comparative method as it was first developed in the natural sciences and then in the human sciences. Scientists can inquire into the uniformities of a domain and ignore the differences among the particulars that they apply to. Or they can consider the differences among individuals, their gradations, and the resulting affinities by which individuals can be ordered into groups, and the causal relations that account for them. This second mode of inquiry is comparative in nature. This procedure unites all the sciences that describe the earth, its flora, all animal and human life, human languages, myths, and laws.

Dilthey completes his survey of the genesis of the comparative method with an analysis of the three epochs of biological efforts to systematically order life-forms. The first epoch ends with Carl von Linné and is marked by a binary nomenclature and classification based on reproductive organs. The second epoch starts with the French naturalist Comte de Buffon and goes up to Charles Darwin. It is morphological in nature and considers the ways the parts of the animal body are united to serve an overall function that is adapted to its milieu. The third epoch of the comparative study of living beings that is directed at the problem of individuation begins when the geological work of Charles Lyell made it possible to use the study of fossils to compare species that did not survive the process of adapting to their environment with those that have survived. The idea of natural selection led to new theories of evolution and of cell development that Dilthey saw as still very much in flux. The essay breaks off with the assertion that these comparative procedures must be examined for the extent of their applicability to the human sciences. Although he proposes that these methods will need to be supplemented with insights derived from psychology, Dilthey allows for a methodological continuity that many have found troubling.

Dilthey’s own philosophical friend, Count Yorck von Wartenburg, commented on this in their correspondence. He objected that “the generic differences between the ontical and the historical”—that is, between nature and human existence—could not be sufficiently stressed by means of the comparative method. Heidegger used this formulation to claim that Yorck was really more radical than Dilthey. In section 77 of Being and Time this difference between Dilthey and Yorck is overdrawn, and this led Heidegger to
cool his earlier enthusiasm for Dilthey. It should not be forgotten, however, that in the same letter from which Heidegger quotes, Yorck had said the following about the concept of type that Dilthey developed in the *Contributions*: “It constitutes a life-measure, a historical category, just as a logical category relates to the ontical.” Although Yorck was suspicious of the comparative method, he recognized that Dilthey used types to appropriately draw out the “nexus of forces” that pervade historical life.

The main emphasis in the *Contributions* was not on comparative types but on typification as a dynamic process in which the relation of individuals to their context becomes discernible. In the case of artistic portrayal this reciprocity is mainly suggestive. In the case of Dilthey’s project of characterizing the human sciences and their aim to further the understanding of the human world, what is most important are his efforts, starting with the *Reality* essay and *Life and Cognition* to delineate the life-nexus that orients us to the world. The categorial relations that locate us in the world are then further explicated as experienceable with the aid of Dilthey’s structural psychology in ways that rival some of the insights of phenomenology. What is most significant here is that the categorial structures that engage us with the world are not artificially imposed or deduced, but educed from the givenness of life. These structures are basically reciprocal in nature and capable of making sense of historical development.

R.A.M.
F.R.