



## Introduction

### I

Although the term *pragmatism* is frequently used to characterize some or other highly specific thesis or program, pragmatism is not and never was a school of thought unified around a distinctive doctrine. In fact, the first pragmatists—Charles Peirce, William James, and John Dewey—were divided over what, precisely, pragmatism is. Peirce first proposed the “pragmatic maxim” as a tool for dispensing with metaphysical nonsense; for him, pragmatism was strictly a “method of ascertaining the meanings of hard words and abstract concepts” (CP5.464).<sup>1</sup> The core of this method is the idea that,

To develop [a thought’s] meaning, we have simply to determine what habits it produces, for what a thing means is simply what habits it involves. (CP5.400)

Hence the pragmatic maxim:

Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object. (CP5.402)

For Peirce, pragmatism was a way to clear away philosophical error and start upon the path of properly conducted philosophy. Peirce thought that by analyzing words and statements in terms of “what is tangible and conceivably practical” (CP5.400), one could “dismiss make-believes” (CP5.416) and free philosophy of “senseless jargon” (CP5.401).

Although pragmatism is the beginning of Peirce’s philosophy, it is not the whole of Peirce’s philosophy. As is well known, Peirce went on to develop original (some might say idiosyncratic) views concerning topics ranging from philosophy of mathematics, logic, and science to phenomenology, semiotics, and aesthetics.

Some twenty years after Peirce introduced the pragmatic maxim, James confessed to being dissatisfied with the narrowness of Peirce’s formulation; he proposed a broader application according to which the point of pragmatism is not to detect nonsense, as Peirce had alleged, but rather to settle metaphysical disputes. James proposed that one should include among the “practical effects” of a statement the psychological effects of *believing* it. Thus, whereas Peirce argued that pragmatism renders the doctrine of transubstantiation meaningless, James argued that pragmatism afforded a decisive case in favor of it. James contends that the idea that in the Mass one

“feed[s] upon the very substance of divinity” has “tremendous effect” and thus is the “only pragmatic application” of the idea of a substance (WWJ, 392).<sup>2</sup>

Though profoundly influenced by them both, Dewey rejected the views of Peirce and James. According to Dewey, pragmatism was in the business of neither separating out meaningful statements from nonsense nor settling traditional metaphysical disputes. With Peirce, Dewey sought a way of doing philosophy that was unhindered by the traditional puzzles and problematics. But he resisted the Peircean strategy of proposing a test of meaning. Instead, he *socialized* the problems of philosophy, arguing that the traditional philosophical problems naturally arose out of the social and intellectual conditions of a pre-Darwinian age. Dewey contended that, because these conditions no longer obtain, the traditional philosophical problems should be simply abandoned, replaced by new difficulties arising from Darwinian science. He was especially concerned to address the difficulties involved in giving an account of value—moral, aesthetic, epistemic, political—that is consistent with experimental natural science.

In the end, then, Dewey’s project owes something to James as well. After all, it was James, not Peirce, who really felt the pinch between the scientific and the normative, between the position of the psychological researcher working in his lab and that of the living human being convinced that the universe was too wild, wondrous, and unruly ever to be brought under the rigid discipline of a scientific theory. However, whereas James endorsed a metaphysical pluralism and an epistemic anti-evidentialism specially designed to leave room for the unruly, the inexplicable, and even the mystical, Dewey, by contrast, proposed a philosophy aimed at fostering equilibrium and continuity in the world. He gave philosophical articulation to the need always to rebuild, reorder, and reconstitute extant materials when they prove disordered, unintelligible, and useless. Dewey saw philosophy as a perpetual effort to *reconstruct* the world according to our current aims and interests. Indeed, he identified *inquiry* or *intelligence* itself with such activity, and he saw philosophy as the systematic attempt to apply intelligence to all varieties of human practice. And, perhaps most importantly, he saw democracy as both the precondition for and the social expression of intelligence.

Dewey’s philosophy is thus more systematic and comprehensive than that of either of his pragmatist predecessors. Peirce sought to make our ideas clear and James sought to resolve long-standing metaphysics disputes; Dewey, however, built his pragmatism into a grand philosophical system rooted in Darwinian naturalism. He devised a far-reaching and integrated network of philosophical accounts of experience, logic, existence, language, mind, knowledge, psychology, science, education, value, art, religion, and politics out of his commitment to the Darwinian thought that the fundamental philosophical datum is activity of living creatures interacting with various factors and materials within their environments.

Importantly, this basic Darwinian commitment also drives Dewey’s critical stance toward traditional philosophical approaches. According to Dewey, the philosophical lesson of Darwinism is that there are no strict *discontinuities* in nature. He reasons that therefore any philosophy that proceeds from a *dualism* of, say, mind and body,

substance and accident, ideal and real, empirical and conceptual, necessary and contingent, fact and value, and experience and reason is not so much in error as simply *obsolete*. In this respect, Dewey breaks with James: his pragmatism is aimed not at reconciling apparently opposed positions but rather at showing that nonpragmatic philosophical programs are nonviable. Again, Dewey shares this much with Peirce. They both saw pragmatism as a critical stance toward the traditional positions, arguments, and categories of philosophy.

Yet we must emphasize that Dewey's attitude toward the philosophical tradition is more extreme than Peirce's. To be sure, Peirce's maxim would have it that many traditional metaphysical statements are nonsense; however, it also leaves a great number of philosophical claims unmolested. For example, Peirce thought that the dispute between nominalism and realism was a *real* philosophical dispute. He proposed his maxim as a way to ensure that legitimate philosophical debates, like the debate between nominalists and realists, could proceed profitably. Dewey, by contrast, aimed his criticisms not at specific statements, but at entire philosophical programs. He dismissed Cartesianism, Kantianism, Humeanism, Platonism, Aristotelianism, and nearly every other philosophical school as instantiations of the common defect of employing some or other dualism. Again, Dewey's charge is that all such approaches are *obsolete*: not meaningless, but useless. Condemning all rival philosophies as hopelessly mired in antiquated categories and thus beyond repair, Dewey proceeded as if they had been decisively vanquished. One need not wait for a rejoinder from a proponent of an obsolete and useless philosophy, much less endeavor to respond to it. Consequently, he declared his own approach "the way, and the only way . . . by which one can freely accept the standpoint and conclusions of modern science" (LW1:4).<sup>3</sup> Whereas Peirce saw pragmatism as a rule for conducting philosophical inquiry, Dewey saw pragmatism as a substantive philosophical program in itself.

These philosophical differences were well recognized by the original pragmatists themselves. The work of James and those he influenced led Peirce in 1905 to officially renounce the term pragmatism; he rebaptized his philosophy *pragmaticism*, a name he hoped was "ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers" (CP5.415). Dewey also distanced himself from James, disapproving of the appeals to his work in James's *Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking* (MW4:107ff.). And in personal correspondence with Dewey, Peirce complained that Dewey's philosophy was "too loose" and employed too many "slipshod arguments" (CP8.180). In any case, Dewey stopped characterizing his view as pragmatism sometime in the early 1920s; in his mature work, he refers to his view as *empirical naturalism* or *instrumentalism* or *experimentalism*.<sup>4</sup>

## II

Despite these disputes among the original pragmatists, there is nonetheless a discernible trajectory running from the work of Peirce, James, and Dewey through the middle of the twentieth century to the present. To repeat, there is no distinctive

philosophical thesis common to all versions of pragmatism; rather, the pragmatists assembled in this volume share a *common aspiration*. More specifically, the essays collected here represent varied attempts to work out a version of naturalism committed to taking seriously the actual practices of human investigators. That is, the thread tying thinkers otherwise as diverse as Peirce, Nelson Goodman, W.V.O. Quine, Susan Haack, Richard Rorty, Richard Posner, and the others assembled in this volume is the pragmatist aspiration of devising a philosophy that is at once naturalist and humanist, a philosophy that fully respects the modern scientific worldview without thereby losing contact with the world of human practice.<sup>5</sup>

Of course, there is significant dispute among the pragmatists concerning what the world of human practice is like. For some, the most fundamental aspect of human practice is its creative, constructive dimension. We build theories, worldviews, and possibly even worlds themselves. For others, human practice is aimed primarily at communication and coordination with other humans. This inevitably involves *interpretation* and thus *inference*, which in turn might require membership in a community of interpreters or a group of persons disposed to make the same inferences. And for still others, the distinctive element of human life is our cognitive aim of being as right as we can about our world and ourselves. Achieving this end entails not only recognizing the limits of our capacity to know but showing how criteria for correctness need not be exclusively theoretical: the practicability of our theories can be evidence for them, too. As such, the project of inquiry is integrated with our lives not as a special isolated enterprise.

The readings in this volume reflect this (and perhaps an even wider) variety of emphases on the distinctive elements of human experience. To be sure, emphasizing one aspect does not necessarily entail holding the others in contempt or seeing them as derivative. Nelson Goodman is exemplary, as his “Words, Works, Worlds” is an account of creativity and making one’s world. Alternately, “The New Riddle of Induction” is a reminder of our cognitive limits and the practical consequences of those limits, namely, that we must “find a way of exercising some control over the hypotheses to be admitted” for confirmation.

This said, Richard Rorty’s essays “Solidarity or Objectivity?” and “The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy” are clear cases for the valorization of the aspects of social coordination over the demands for correctness or, as better put, seeing the cognitive aspirations of human practice in the service of social goals. Rorty captures the commitment as follows:

For pragmatists, the desire for objectivity is not the desire to escape the limitations of one’s community, but simply the desire for as much intersubjective agreement as possible, the desire to extend the reference of “us” as far as we can.

The pragmatic enterprise, as Rorty sees it, is conceiving the cognitive demands of knowledge through a social lens. Accordingly, he takes the primary aspects of social life to be that of social coordination.

These three general rubrics of humanism for the pragmatists—clarity, coordination, and correctness—are at issue in each of the selections in this volume. Depending on what aspect of human life the authors take as most significant, their works will follow certain trajectories with the problems they address. And sometimes the authors try to emphasize multiple values. Sidney Hook, Huw Price, and Cheryl Misak see the demands of correctness and those of coordination as mutually informative; consequently, they take politics, conversation, controversy, and inquiry to be continuous. Nelson Goodman and Cornel West articulate the importance of working out philosophical theories that improve our lives, which requires a measure of freedom and spontaneity but also a degree of attentiveness to the needs of one's society. Wilfrid Sellars, W.V.O. Quine, Donald Davidson, and Robert Brandom articulate the ways that our accounts of objectivity and reality arise from the facts of social coordination. Richard Posner, by contrast, takes it that coordination is of singular importance—specifically a coordination that yields the *most efficient* form of social arrangements. C. I. Lewis, Rudolf Carnap, and Susan Haack take it that there are practical criteria for cognitive success but that achieving that success demands often a measure of creativity in coming up with what is proposed and how the evidence is to be assessed. What makes each of these authors *pragmatist* is their emphasis on naturalistic and variously humanistic accounts of philosophical problems and solutions. One of the reasons as to the variety of pragmatisms is the variety of humanisms available to pragmatists.

### III

We have said that the essays collected in this volume trace the major developments associated with pragmatism, from its founding to the present. Looking at our table of contents, one notices that we present pragmatism as a highly influential program within mainstream Anglophone philosophy. Moreover, one will notice that we see pragmatism as a *persistent* force throughout the twentieth century and into the present. As it turns out, the conception of pragmatism we have adopted is highly controversial.

According to the dominant narrative regarding pragmatism, the 1940s and 1950s brought an “eclipse” of pragmatism and pragmatist philosophers by more technical forms of philosophizing described variously as “logical positivism,” “scientism,” or, most generally, “analytic philosophy.” The *eclipse narrative*, as we shall call it, is a resurrection story of a familiar stripe: The original pragmatists arrive on the scene around the turn of the twentieth century and attempt to overturn the past by exposing the untenable assumptions underlying traditional philosophy. They offer a radical and new kind of philosophy, one that upsets traditional assumptions and dethrones the status quo. Pragmatism prevails for a brief while, but then the force of tradition reasserts itself, forcing pragmatism underground. Darkness descends. But eventually

pragmatism reemerges, due in large measure to the publication of Richard Rorty's groundbreaking 1979 work, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, which restored the philosophical reputation of John Dewey and opened the field to new work in pragmatism. According to the vast majority of commentators, the past twenty years have seen the "renaissance" of pragmatism.<sup>6</sup>

Like many resurrection stories, the eclipse narrative is also a persecution story. It contends that pragmatism was not refuted but "eclipsed," covered over, put in the background. This element of the story runs as follows. Advances in formal logic associated with Russell and Frege gave rise to faddish intellectual trends that placed the analysis of language at the core of philosophy, thereby making it seem more scientific and rigorous; consequently, the pragmatists, who emphasized experience rather than language, were simply dismissed as confused, imprecise, irrelevant, or worse. The story continues that now we see that the "linguistic turn" characteristic of analytic philosophy was simply an error and that pragmatism has been all along "waiting at the end of the dialectical road" that analytic philosophy had taken fifty years to traverse (Rorty 1982, xviii).

Hence, the renaissance of pragmatism is often seen as a kind of *vindication* of pragmatism, a *victory* over analytic philosophy, a return to sweetness and light. In this way, the eclipse narrative identifies analytic philosophy as a philosophical *villain* and places pragmatism in opposition to it. Even today, it is widely held that the degree to which analytic philosophy represents the mainstream of philosophy in America is the extent to which pragmatism is being marginalized. Consequently, the eclipse narrative tends to foster an attitude of resentment toward professional philosophy that manifests itself in the tendency to demonize analytic philosophy as "narrow," "irrelevant," and "nihilistic," a tendency that Richard Bernstein has rightly criticized as unpragmatic and parochial (1995, 62).<sup>7</sup>

Though it is the dominant understanding of the career of pragmatism, the eclipse narrative is highly dubious. For one thing, those who promote the narrative rarely clarify what they mean by "analytic philosophy," and when a description is offered, it most often rings hollow. Bruce Wilshire, for example, identifies analytic philosophy with "scientism," the view that "only science can know" (2002, 4; cf. McCumber 2001, 49ff.), but it is clear that only the most extreme of the logical positivists, if anyone, ever held such a stark position. More importantly, if we examine the work of the most influential figures in mainstream philosophy from the past sixty years—for example (and excluding those whose work is collected in the present volume), Ludwig Wittgenstein, Bertrand Russell, Karl Popper, John Rawls, John Searle, Daniel Dennett, Charles Taylor, Michael Dummett, and Jürgen Habermas—we find that they either explicitly acknowledge a distinctively pragmatist inheritance or take themselves to be responding critically to identifiably pragmatist arguments. Judged according to the centrality of distinctively pragmatist theses concerning meaning, truth, knowledge, and action to ongoing debates in philosophy, pragmatism is easily among the most successful philosophical trends of the past two centuries. It seems, then, that

the eclipse narrative is demonstrably false; pragmatism was alive and well throughout the twentieth century and it continues to be a major force on the philosophical scene.

Against the eclipse narrative, Rorty has claimed that in the years following World War II “all that happened was that the philosophy professors got bored with James and Dewey and latched on to something that looked new and promising” (2004, 284). Although Rorty is correct to reject the eclipse narrative, this rather blasé alternative cannot be the entire story. For one thing, Rorty’s account leaves one to wonder why James and Dewey began to look boring and why other options seemed promising. We think Rorty’s account should be supplemented along the following lines.

It is worth reminding ourselves of two related facts. First, the alleged eclipse of pragmatism coincides with Dewey’s gradual withdrawal from the intellectual scene and eventual death in 1952. Second, the pragmatism that was allegedly eclipsed was primarily Deweyan pragmatism.<sup>8</sup> Accordingly, in order to fill in the story of the career of pragmatism, we need to look again at Dewey’s version of pragmatism.

As we mentioned earlier, Dewey explicitly conceived of his pragmatism in revolutionary terms. He thought that the truth of Darwinism required a comprehensive reconstruction of philosophy in which traditional problems of philosophy, and the categories that they presumed, would be discarded; he declared that “we do not solve” the traditional problems of philosophy, we “get over them” (MW4:14). Consequently, Dewey’s philosophy begins from a sweeping attack on all of the standard philosophical schools and positions. Perhaps the novelty of Dewey’s critique took proponents of these positions by surprise; for Dewey did not simply introduce new considerations into the standing debates, he criticized the presuppositions underlying the debates themselves. Hence, according to Dewey, philosophy’s past is composed of a series of mere “puzzles” (LW1:17) to be discarded as “chaff” (LW1:4).

Unlike Rorty, who saw pragmatism as a rejection of philosophy altogether, Dewey’s project was not merely critical. Dewey spent his career building a comprehensive philosophical framework based in a distinctively Darwinian brand of pragmatism. By the early 1940s, Dewey had constructed a grand and integrated philosophical system. Indeed, many of Dewey’s followers see the systematic nature of Dewey’s philosophy as its principal virtue.

What we see in the mid-1900s, however, is a series of new articulations of the old positions that Dewey claimed to have undermined. Frequently, these new articulations were designed to respond to precisely the kind of objections that Dewey had proposed. Consider just a few examples. In the 1950s and 1960s, John Rawls proposed a new methodology for moral theory and a new defense of contractarianism that rejected intuitionism, egoism, utilitarianism, and the metaphysical extravagances of Kantianism. In the late 1950s and following, Roderick Chisholm devised foundationalist epistemology that was also fallibilist. In the 1960s, philosophers of language such as Jerrold Katz and Jerry Fodor drew on Chomsky’s work in linguistics to devise a new kind of rationalism and nativism rooted in empirical data. Around the same time, John Searle resuscitated mind-body dualism in a form consistent with naturalism. By

the 1970s, powerful new versions of nearly all of the traditional philosophical positions and, importantly, compelling new studies of key historical figures—including Dewey's principal foes, Descartes and Kant—had emerged.

The availability of ostensibly viable new instantiations of traditional positions challenged Dewey's strategy of dismissing entire philosophical schools as premised on a single simple error. New Kantians relied upon the method of reflective equilibrium, not transcendental metaphysics; new foundationalists did not need to embark on a "quest for certainty"; new rationalists could appeal to scientific data in support of their semantics; philosophers of mind could adopt a *property* dualism of mind and body, thereby eschewing the Cartesian metaphysics of dual substances. Whether any of these new positions is philosophically successful is, of course, debatable. Our point is that the development of these views rendered unsustainable Dewey's claim that Darwinism supplied a perspective from which centuries of philosophy could be swept away with a single gesture; it no longer seemed plausible to assert, with Dewey, that his philosophical approach was "the way, and the only way . . . by which one can freely accept the standpoint and conclusions of modern science" (LW1:4). Accordingly, those who favored the kind of pragmatism and naturalism associated with Dewey were driven to abandon Dewey's style of criticism. Pragmatists would have to engage the new developments piecemeal, argument by argument.

This in turn led to a general distrust of the kind of comprehensive philosophical system building in which Dewey engaged. It no longer seemed useful to erect grand systems of philosophy. Most of those active in professional philosophy had come to see that no set of philosophical premises full-bodied enough to support a system was noncontroversial enough to justify the effort of grand system building. The most that pragmatic philosophers could pursue was a defensible account of some more or less specific phenomenon, with the hope that such an account could be shown to hang together with similar accounts of related phenomena. But note that this humbling of philosophical ambition is driven by the utterly *pragmatic* insight that, when no single approach can plausibly claim to be the only responsible way of proceeding, philosophy itself must advance dialectically and in piecemeal fashion, by way of meeting the arguments, challenges, and counterexamples raised by those who do not share one's fundamental philosophical orientation.

Hence, it seems more accurate to say that in the years following World War II, pragmatism was in *crisis*, not eclipse. And the crisis was precipitated by Dewey's own methodology. What was clear at that time was that if pragmatism was to survive, it needed to be reworked, revised in light of new challenges from rival philosophical approaches. Here, the post-Deweyan pragmatist par excellence is Quine. Quine's corpus presents an ongoing development of a few key pragmatist and naturalist insights about science, language, and ontology, and an attempt to fit them together. Importantly, Quine proceeds by way of critical engagement with nonnaturalist critics and interlocutors. It is unsurprising, then, that after Dewey's death Quine quickly rose to become so influential among professional philosophers in America, for he

understood that the case for pragmatism was to be made on a case-by-case basis, not by way of a comprehensive philosophical system. For similar reasons, it is no surprise that the Dewey that emerges heroic in Rorty's work is a "therapeutic" Dewey (Rorty 1982, 73), a Dewey shorn of system.

Hence, what is seen by those committed to the eclipse narrative as a turn in professional philosophy toward insularity, irrelevance, and technicality-for-its-own-sake is actually a pragmatically responsible reaction to the sheer plurality of philosophically forceful competitors to pragmatism, a plurality that Dewey had explicitly denied. There was no eclipse or abandonment of pragmatism; rather, the years following Dewey's death corresponded with the period in which pragmatism was forced to confront powerful challenges from opponents who had the opportunity to revise and rework their positions in light of pragmatist criticisms. Once again, we see that, far from being marginalized or excluded, pragmatism remained a highly influential and philosophically powerful force throughout the second half of the twentieth century and through the present. We take it that this assessment is borne out clearly enough in the following pages.

#### IV

The essays in this volume were selected not only for the influence they have exerted on professional philosophy but also for the directness with which they address familiar philosophical issues. This second selection criterion is crucial. Much of the work on pragmatism has a decidedly metaphilosophical flavor. The pragmatist is often found commenting on the state of professional philosophy, or declaring some traditional area of philosophical inquiry dead, or dismissing long-standing philosophical programs as rooted in some Cartesian or Kantian (and therefore untenable) presupposition. As a kind of naturalism, pragmatism is partly a thesis about the relation of philosophy to the natural sciences; consequently, one should expect pragmatists to engage the questions of the proper aims and methods of philosophy. However, there is a tendency among pragmatists to wax metaphilosophical to the exclusion of all else. This gives the impression that many pragmatists endorse a modified version of the positivist doctrine that all philosophical problems are problems of language: all philosophical problems are problems of metaphilosophy. In its most muscular form, the pragmatist thesis is that, once we understand properly the nature of philosophy, we will discover that there are no philosophical problems anyway.

The tendency to "go meta" obscures the extent to which pragmatists are committed to, and must engage in debates concerning, first-order philosophical claims. Our objective here is to present pragmatism as an engagement with philosophical problems, to show pragmatism at work. When its practitioners "go meta," pragmatism is little more than an appeal to contentious notion of proper philosophical method in order to dismiss a problem. This leaves many (including us) with the suspicion that

little or no work as been done. The pragmatist project is viable only on the condition that pragmatist answers to first-order philosophical problems are viable. Only once a philosophical tradition has a successful track record with the problems of philosophy should its practitioners have the right to speak to (or browbeat others regarding) the nature of proper philosophical method. That is, one gets to do metaphilosophy only once one has done well with philosophy. Solving philosophical problems with metaphilosophy, then, gets things entirely backward. As a consequence, excepting the preceding paragraph, there will be little or no metaphilosophical accounts in this volume, but only what we take to be hallmark pragmatist responses to standing philosophical problems.

## V

We have assembled this collection both for use in the classroom and as a scholarly resource. Accordingly, all selections are reprinted in full and were originally written as stand-alone pieces rather than as chapters in books developing an extended argument. Before each section, we have added a brief note providing the most general context for the piece. In these, we do not attempt to summarize the content of the article or even state its main thesis; rather, we provide some sense of the role the piece plays in the larger picture of pragmatism that this collection as a whole is trying to call attention to.

In the course of editing this collection we have incurred several debts. We would like to thank Erin Bradfield, Mary Butterfield, Joshua Houston, and Jo Matocha for their editorial assistance. We have also benefited from discussions, comments, and advice from Jody Azzouni, James Bednar, Steve Cahn, Harvey Cormier, Richard Gale, Micah Hester, David Hildebrand, Michael Hodges, Chris King, Cheryl Misak, and Jeffrey Tlumak. Finally, we would like to thank the production staff at Princeton University Press and our editor, Rob Tempio.

## Notes

1. We follow the convention in citing Peirce's *Collected Papers*: (volume number.paragraph number).
2. Reference to James's writings are keyed to *The Writings of William James*, edited by John McDermott (1977).
3. References to Dewey's work are keyed the *Collected Works*, which are divided into *Early*, *Middle*, and *Later* works. Citations employ the standard formula: (volume number: page number).
4. For a more complete account of the disagreements between Peirce, James, and Dewey, see Talisse and Aikin 2008, ch. 1.
5. See Aikin 2006 for an account of the details of pragmatist naturalism and humanism.

6. It is nearly impossible to find a current work on pragmatism that does not present some version of this story. See, for example, West 1989, 3; Bernstein 1992; Festenstein 1997, 2; Dickstein 1998, 1; and Westbrook 2005, xii.

7. See Talisse 2007, ch. 7 for further discussion.

8. Peirce was always highly regarded among professional philosophers; however, the full import of his thought could not be estimated, due to the unavailability of a systematic edition of his writings. For this reason, Peirce's pragmatism was never the dominant version. As for James, his pragmatism was never regarded as canonical, and, as we have mentioned, his own articulations of pragmatist themes were largely rejected by subsequent pragmatists, including Dewey.

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