

considered the Revolution's prime cause embraced virtually the entire Enlightenment. But ascribing the Revolution to an undifferentiated *philosophie moderne* undermined their case by being too sweeping and too general. They failed to focus on the particular current embodying the main revolutionary tendency. This was pointed out by various contemporary observers, often political and Enlightenment moderates like the young revolutionary leader Antoine-Pierre-Joseph-Marie Barnave (1761–93) and the celebrated legal reformer Jean-Étienne Portalis (1745–1807). *L'esprit philosophique* was the Revolution's principal cause, agreed Barnave and Portalis, but it was not Enlightenment philosophy generally, only a certain kind of philosophy, that was responsible. The real agent was the radical current that rejected Locke and Montesquieu, which was promoted by Denis Diderot (1713–84), Claude-Adrien Helvétius (1715–71), and Paul-Henri-Thiry, Baron d'Holbach (1723–89).³³ Portalis, like the journalist Jacques Mallet du Pan (1749–1800), believed thoroughgoing legal and penal reform in Europe could have been accomplished by the moderate Enlightenment, by kings and courts, without any revolution and without adopting the radical systems Mallet dubbed *la philosophie de Paris*, which they all deemed the root of the Revolution.³⁴

Exactly this same insistence on the need to distinguish between moderate and materialist-revolutionary philosophy recurs in another well-known late eighteenth-century writer, Jean-François de La Harpe (1739–1803). La Harpe first ardently supported and then later, after the Terror, equally fervently repudiated the Revolution. What exactly is the philosophy that caused the Revolution, asked La Harpe in 1797? A Parisian-born foundling of unknown parentage and recognized philosophe in his own right, La Harpe's perspective is of particular relevance here. Applauded by Portalis among others for disavowing the Revolution and the philosophy that caused it,³⁵ La Harpe, originally a disciple of Voltaire, had known several leading philosophes personally. His principal work rejecting philosophique and Revolution principles, the two-volume *Philosophie du Dix-Huitième Siècle*, was mostly composed in 1797 while the Revolution was still in full swing. Voltaire, he argued, was the first to emancipate the human mind and render philosophique reason popular with readers. But Voltaire was marginal in terms of the philosophy that caused the Revolution. It is in his long chapter on Diderot that La Harpe chiefly develops his critique of the *secte philosophique*. Here he sought to uncover the intellectual and psychological

causes of what he, like the apologists he had once combated, now considered a revolutionary catastrophe.

Primarily responsible, argued La Harpe, were those propagating the doctrines of Diderot, including in one crucial respect Rousseau. For despite the great quarrel that shattered their former friendship, from 1757, the two great thinkers nurtured one particularly subversive political doctrine that Rousseau derived from Diderot, namely, that all the ills and crimes of the world arise not from innate defects of human nature (which both saw as fundamentally good) but from the “radical viciousness” Diderot was the first to see in all existing institutions, systems of government, morality, and society. This was a truly monstrous tenet, held La Harpe after 1794, an absurdity, destroying “all social order among all nations.” It stemmed not just from the implacable aversion to all existing authority common to Diderot and Rousseau but also from their fervent conviction that their insights supplied a basis for giving the world an entirely new set of moral rules and laws. There is a direct line, contended La Harpe, connecting Diderot to the Revolution’s most socially uncompromising initiatives, including the conspiracy of Babeuf and his followers, crushed by the Directory in 1797.³⁶

These two fundamentally opposing tendencies within the Enlightenment, one accepting and the other rejecting the prevailing social and political order, must be the essential starting-point for any valid account of the Revolution. The revolutionary philosophical tendency, acknowledged political leaders belonging to the *parti de philosophie* like Mirabeau, Sieyès, Brissot, Condorcet, Volney, Ginguené, Roederer, and Desmoulins, had absorbed the contributions of many different writers—d’Argenson, Voltaire, Montesquieu, Mably, Diderot, Rousseau, Helvétius, d’Holbach, and Raynal. Brissot also deeply admired the subversive roles of Bayle and Boulanger. Revolutionary leaders construing the Revolution as they did often commented on the various contributions. Thus, Voltaire mattered chiefly for his peerless literary skill and relentless ridiculing of old, established prejudices, for the rest being a friend of kings and aristocrats. Brissot was especially caustic about Voltaire, whom he rightly judged no friend of the people.³⁷ Montesquieu seasoned the collective philosophical recipe with “salt and energy,” commented Roederer; but this great man, being “unfortunate enough” to be a nobleman and *parlementaire* himself, also fell into *des erreurs* regarding social status and “corporations.”³⁸ Rousseau taught readers to think about “les droits des hommes” (the rights of man). A key role in

the 1770s and 1780s was afterward widely and correctly ascribed to the subversive group referred to collectively as Raynal, who, unlike the others, directly attacked social oppression and tyranny “armé d’une plume de fer” (armed with a fiery pen).³⁹ Many also warmly praised Mably’s contribution.

Most of the Enlightenment in France and Europe generally was moderate and therefore, in La Harpe’s opinion in 1797, good. Only a fringe was sweepingly subversive religiously and politically. Whereas Fontenelle, Montesquieu, Buffon, d’Alembert, and Condillac were true philosophers deservedly exonerated of responsibility for the great catastrophe that engulfed France and Europe, those responsible were the “false philosophers and *sophistes*,” the worst, in his opinion, being Diderot, Raynal, Rousseau, Voltaire, and Helvétius. These were the Revolution’s true “artisans,” the “first and most powerful movers of the frightful *bouleversement*.”⁴⁰ To Helvétius, whose materialism had, in his view, attracted attention for all the wrong reasons, he dedicated a separate refutation. La Harpe, like Portalis, saw la philosophie moderne as a complex, cumulative corpus of ideas and attitudes reaching back many decades, gradually distilling within itself all the *extravagances* of which the human mind is capable: “By a necessary consequence, the revolution that [subversive philosophy] has caused in our century nurtured all the crimes and ills to which the human species is susceptible.”⁴¹

Whereas the Revolution’s supporters conceived la philosophie moderne as the path to universal emancipation and happiness, after 1794 La Harpe located the secte philosophique’s revolutionary potential in its having evolved under oppression into an effective bandwagon for attracting all the vain, grudging, and resentful spirits opposing the existing order. Radical Enlightenment, he recognized, was not just the intellectual cauldron of the Revolution but, equally, its principal social and cultural factor, for it was primarily this package of interlinked concepts that channeled, organized, armed, and mobilized the great mass of endemic, long-standing, popular disgruntlement, frustration, resentment, and ambition.⁴²

What was Rousseau’s role in this revolution of the mind? On the one hand, he was the ubiquitous inspirer of the age. As one perceptive author put it, “every party of the Revolution made some claim on the heritage of Rousseau.”⁴³ An immense variety of participants of varying stripes adored Rousseau, from the celebrated court portraitist Elisabeth Vigée Le Brun (who detested the Revolution) and Fauchet the Catholic revolutionary to Robespierre and Saint-Just, the men who wrecked

the Revolution of 1788–93. Rousseau was the surpassing hero simultaneously of the Left and Right, a status no other ideologue ever achieved. Nevertheless, major leaders of the Revolution prior to 1793 remained mostly rather guarded and critical in their assessments of his admittedly massive contribution and some, like Condorcet, barely referred to Rousseau at all. Shortly after the Bastille's fall in July 1789, Mirabeau, who like most radical revolutionaries disparaged Montesquieu in his paper, the *Courrier de Provence*, exalted Rousseau for his central role in preparing the Revolution: never should one speak of liberty and the Revolution without paying homage to this immortal "vengeur de la nature humaine."⁴⁴ Among Rousseau's "truths" pronounced truly philosophique by Mirabeau was his doctrine that the social system benefits men only if they all own something and no one possesses too much, a notion dear to Fauchet and many revolutionaries.⁴⁵ Yet, there was also a continuous tension between the Rousseauist claim that men should be primarily guided by moral instinct and "feeling," "le sens moral," and the Radical Enlightenment's allegiance to "reason" alone.⁴⁶

Furthermore, the democratic republicans who made the Revolution of 1789–93, or as Mme. Roland expressed it, the "wise men" showing the people the way who "helped them recover their rights" until pushed aside by more ambitious characters who "flatter and delude the people and turn them against their true defenders," objected to major strands of Rousseau's political thought. It was impossible for the republican democrats to embrace Rousseau's stern strictures regarding "representation," his claim that "sovereignty cannot be represented," and extremely difficult to accept his view that republics can be viable only in small countries, that popular piety should be respected (not attacked), and that a measure of book censorship is needed. Very many, like Brissot, disliked Rousseau's aversion to cosmopolitanism, universalism, and the pursuit of universal peace, and like d'Holbach especially despised his veneration of the Spartan martial spirit and the narrow chauvinism his thought appeared to encourage.⁴⁷

This friction between the cosmopolitanism of the parti de philosophie, later taken to its furthest extreme by ideologues like Gorani, Proly, and Cloots, and the narrow patriotism and xenophobia of Robespierre, Saint-Just, and their populist faction, lay at the root of the ceaseless battle waged unremittingly within the Jacobins and throughout the Revolution between the Revolution of Reason and the Revolution of the Will, a tension that needs to be emphasized more than it has been by historians. The uncompromising antilibertarianism, anti-intellectualism, and

chauvinism of Robespierre's Revolution justified itself in large part by appealing to emotional, sentimental aspects of Rousseau, whereas opposing Robespierre's ideology inevitably meant questioning much of Rousseau from the critical perspectives of Diderot, d'Holbach, Helvétius, Naigeon, and Condorcet.⁴⁸ Hostility to the *secte philosophique* during Robespierre's ascendancy intensified, together with rejection of atheism as unpatriotic and contrary to virtue and the ordinary.⁴⁹ The institutionalized Rousseauism of the post-1793 (*Robespierriste*) Jacobins was the militant opposite of the Radical Enlightenment guardedness toward Rousseau of Mirabeau, Sieyès, Brissot, Cloots, Volney, Condorcet, and the revolutionary leadership of 1788–93 generally. Here was a clash between two antagonistic, ideological streams pervading the struggle for control of the Revolution's course and direction.

Robespierre identified "atheism" as a defining feature of the radical ideology, republican and democratic, of the *parti de philosophie* that he overwhelmed. But why did the question of atheism play such a pivotal role in the fight between the Revolution of Reason and the Revolution of the Will, as well as in the battle between Revolution and Counter-Enlightenment? In 1789, after all, the vast majority everywhere in the Western world regarded atheism as "madness," as Desmoulins expressed it, believing it obvious the cosmos was created by God. But what chiefly distinguished the democratic *philosophique* standpoint from how most men thought, explained Desmoulins, was not their questioning God's existence as such, or the issue of whether or not God created the world, but rather the question of whether and how, if divine Providence exists, it governs the world. The real issue segregating most of society, including Robespierre, from the *parti de philosophie* that made the Revolution of 1788–93 was whether God is an authority to whom men can appeal. For God offers no sign. He does not show himself. It is in vain, held Desmoulins, that men ask which cult is the most pleasing to him; his natural power revealed in earthquakes, floods, and other calamities wrecks churches no less than mosques or synagogues. Since he manifests the most perfect indifference to which religion men choose and his providence does nothing for Christians or Muslims in preference to others, why not, asked Desmoulins, replace the "dismal" cult the French revered for so many centuries, a faith supportive of the Inquisition, kings, monks, and self-mortification, with a religion of joy, like that of the ancient Greeks, a cult friendly to pleasure, women, and liberty?⁵⁰

Morally and politically, it was urgent that the French should make this substitution, for “the most devout of our kings were the worst.” Mirabeau and other philosophes, contended Desmoulins, had wholly disproved claims that monarchical government is the best form of government. Louis XIV was certainly venerated by a horde of flatterers, but in the “eyes of reason” he was a despot, contemptible egoist, bad parent, and abysmal friend and husband. Cruel and vindictive, this “Jesus king” who loved war was an insane persecutor who used his dragoons forcibly to convert millions of “heretics.” To combat tyranny one must combat religious authority together with all conventional notions. If the nobility and clergy resisted the critiques and attacks on monarchy, faith, and hereditary privilege, the rest of society did too. The Revolution had to fight them all.⁵¹

In 1789, Desmoulins justified imposing Revolution principles on a largely uncomprehending and partly unwilling people, and remaking France’s institutions and laws, repudiating all previously accepted laws, on the grounds of *la volonté générale* (the general will). This was a principle locating sovereignty in the people as a whole, defined by what best serves the majority according to “reason” and what people would want if prejudices did not prevent them from actually wanting it,⁵² a new principle in political thought devised by a specific group of philosophes beginning in France with Diderot and his circle in the 1740s. These were the thinkers who were rejecting modérantisme, relativism, traditionalism, and enthusiasm for the British model, taught by Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Hume. Society was not created for the misery of the majority or happiness of the few, typically asserts the tract *Vérités philosophiques et patriotiques* (late 1788) by the Norman lawyer Jacques Guillaume Thouret (1746–94); rather, everyone’s will is subject to the *volonté générale*, the common will working for each individual’s happiness subsumed within that of all in general.

Deriving from a complex interplay reaching back, underground, over many decades, *volonté générale*, originally introduced by Diderot, had been vigorously adopted in his sense by d’Holbach, Helvétius, Condorcet, and Volney but adapted to mean something rather different by Rousseau.⁵³ Intimately entwined with the greatest innovation in political thought of the eighteenth century—the doctrine that sovereignty lies in the people—the term is mostly used in early Revolution debates in its more general, non-Rousseauist sense. Thus, the pending Estates-General, proclaimed Thouret (one of the few lawyers among the revolutionary

leadership), must be an assembly based on the *volonté générale*, meaning the needs and desires of the whole nation with every individual's interest being treated equally. Neither God nor the Church nor any prophet or tradition decreed this. It is stipulated rather by that "eternal reason that regulates the universe," an "eternal reason" that predicted the coming *révolution*.⁵⁴ Sieyès, among the Revolution's chief promoters of the doctrine of *volonté générale*, was especially unsympathetic to Rousseau's inflexion of the concept, most obviously in his views on representation and direct democracy.⁵⁵

Hence, the democratic republican publicists of 1788–93 were summarizers, not innovators. It was not his purpose to say anything new, explained Desmoulins in *La France libre*. An ardent disciple of Rousseau as a young man, Desmoulins, like most key revolutionary leaders, became more critical later. His aim was to expand on the useful things already demonstrated, fanning a fire "happily relit by the flame of philosophy." And what exactly had la philosophie demonstrated? It had proved, averred Desmoulins, that the nobility are the worst of pests, that all the laws of every country needed rewriting, that the monarchical is not the best but the worst form of government, that monks are useless, and that religion is in need of fundamental reform.⁵⁶ Kings had turned France into a land of despotism, but even the most downtrodden people produce a few republican-minded souls for whom love of liberty outweighs all existing institutions. Despite the ignorance and prejudice inculcated by religion, "the lies of orators and poets," the eternal eulogies of kingship pronounced by priests, publicists, and "all our books," by 1788 he himself burned with republican ardor impelling him toward liberty. What society needed was not just a republic but a democratic republic: "je me déclare donc hautement pour la démocratie."⁵⁷ By displaying ingenuity and constancy in his writings, agreed the long-standing republican Brissot in 1782, the philosophe can conquer "l'opinion publique," and "l'opinion publique" would before long "prove stronger than kings and command the entire universe." The true esprit philosophique, he asserted in 1782, "necessarily brings also *l'esprit républicain*."⁵⁸

Most Frenchmen during the early Revolution assuredly had little thought of rejecting monarchy or embracing revolution. But the "radical" wing of the revolutionary leadership—in sharp contrast to Robespierre and his allies—was already uncompromisingly republican by 1788. To Desmoulins, fighting "error" and "slavery" with philosophy meant replacing the existing legal framework with enlightened laws

and an Enlightenment morality, the true sources, as he saw it, of man's future happiness and prosperity. In another early revolutionary democratic pamphlet, *Réflexions d'un philosophe Breton*, of 20 December 1788, by a minor noble and former mayor of Quimper, Augustin Le Goazre de Kervélégan (1748–1825), the “philosopher” summons the Bretons to recover “their rights” by shattering the “humiliating chains” of slavery, whereby nobility and clergy had always oppressed the Third Estate. These “rapacious” orders are here denounced by philosophy, not for overstepping precedent or infringing some privilege but for appropriating “all the advantages of society” for themselves.⁵⁹

Such views explain the highly exceptional cultural and political character of the Revolution—its undeviating resolve to set aside all existing precedents and models. To the revolutionary leadership reorganizing the body politic and society more broadly, there were no grounds for consulting, much less emulating, any earlier or still existing model. “We shall surpass these English,” affirmed Kervélégan, “who are so proud of their constitution and so used to insulting our abasement.” In fact, the French would eradicate all hereditary nobility, venality of office, purchasing of noble titles for money, hereditary privilege, monopolies, arbitrary arrests, seigneurial jurisdiction, and illicit decrees. There would be no more Richelieus or Catherine de Medicis. The revolutionaries would establish liberty of commerce, liberty of conscience, liberty to write, liberty of expression. The Revolution would extinguish the parlements with their decrees, prohibitions, and lording it over the public. Once the Revolution gathered momentum, the parlementaire elite of France would perish, its influence and very name eradicated. France's laws would henceforth be identical for everyone and the system of police spies and secret reports abolished.⁶⁰ The Bastille will be raised to the ground, predicted Kervélégan, and a “National Assembly” put in its place, a “temple of liberty” subordinate to the nation and stripped of all hereditary trappings, that in the future would remain permanently in session and decide all questions of peace and war. Desmoulins, echoing Mirabeau, envisaged completely transforming the magistracy, priesthood, army, and state finances on principles national in character and destined solely for national purposes.⁶¹ Moreover, this Revolution about to begin, admonished Desmoulins in 1789, would unquestionably succeed. “Sublime effet de la philosophie,” no power on earth, he predicted (wrongly), could resist the revolution that had won the minds of those, like himself, eager to lead the people. To him, la philosophie had accomplished its task. The most crucial part of the revolution was effectively

over. Even before anything had yet been formalized or accomplished, there was already a vital sense in which “la France est libre.”⁶²

By 1788, emerging Third Estate leaders already proclaimed equality the overriding moral and legal principle in legitimately determining relations among men. To them, the Crown was irrelevant, the clergy’s authority usurped, and nobility illicit. Their plans were molded not by social class or experience, nor profession or economic interest, but a comprehensive, interlocking system of principles rooted in la philosophie, which, according to Mirabeau, Sieyès, Volney, Condorcet, and Brissot, was solidly anchored in empiricism and science.⁶³ By 1788, this republican and near-republican core had long rejected the division of a future national assembly into three orders—nobility, clergy, and Third Estate—along with everything Montesquieu recommended concerning division of powers and emulating Britain. They were uniformly disdainful of “institutions aristocratiques.”⁶⁴ Society would be reordered on the basis of equality. All men should enjoy the same “rights.” The law should be remade on the basis of philosophique principles because “reason” and equity are the sole criteria of moral and social legitimacy.

To them, equality was the key to establishing basic human rights and reconstituting politics, institutions, social relations, marriage, education, and the law on their proper basis. For the Revolution’s innumerable opponents, by contrast, whether Counter-Enlightenment ideologues or “moderate” enlighteners, equality was an artificial and illicit concept. Opponents viewed their doctrine as derived from a false philosophy rooted in irreligion, fanaticism, and Freemasonry, or, as Burke, Gibbon, and Portalis preferred, in unwisely adopted “abstract propositions.”⁶⁵ What made it necessary to proclaim the Rights of Man, harnessing the power of the state to the principle of human rights, held Roederer, was inequality of means and wealth in society. Unless one accepts government by vested interests at the expense of the weak that oppresses the majority and enriches the strong, government must intervene to help the deprived, watch over the whole citizenry, and guarantee to all “le plénitude de leurs droits” (plenitude of their rights).⁶⁶ Only in light of the “revolution that occurred before 1789”—the “revolution in concepts”—does it emerge clearly why the Revolution was not just a political but also a “financial, military, civil, moral and religious revolution.”⁶⁷

The Paris librarian and bookbinder Louis-Marie Prudhomme (1752–1830) expressly set out with his illustrated Sunday paper, the *Révolutions de Paris*, launched in July 1789, to forge a new society based

on a “Declaration of the Rights of Man,” guided principally by “la philosophie.”⁶⁸ While oppression was ubiquitous and the ultimate cause of all revolutions, nowhere had there been any real revolution prior to 1788, held Prudhomme. Such a revolution requires “les lumières de la raison,” la philosophie moderne, to forge the awareness, analysis, plans, media, knowledge, and conditions without which real revolution in the new sense, disseminated by the *philosophes-révolutionnaires*, is not possible. Doubtless, some peoples, like the Dutch and English, partially recovered “their rights” through revolt “before the reign of philosophy.” But this Prudhomme deemed sustainable only in a hesitant, vengeful, and incomplete manner, where not guided by “la pacifique opération de la philosophie.” The more philosophy guides, the less violent and more complete the revolution will be. It is earnestly to be hoped, he added, that la philosophie will overawe passion, hatred, and resentment during the revolution now commencing.⁶⁹ Here, Prudhomme, Desmoulins, Kervélégan, La Harpe, and many others were to be gravely disappointed.

Authentic revolution of the kind these writers envisaged needs not only to be made but also consolidated. If philosophy alone enables men to understand the human condition sufficiently to accomplish genuine revolution, likewise philosophy alone can prevent men from immediately sliding back under slavery. Without philosophy mankind cannot devise adequate, well-designed constitutions or correctly formulate “les droits sacrés de l’humanité,” or counter the risk of rural disorder and “le despotisme du peuple.”⁷⁰ There is no such thing as a successful fight against credulity and religious bigotry, contended Prudhomme, not directed by la philosophie. “O mes concitoyens!,” urged his journal, “do not forget that ignorance is the mother of error”; banish ignorance and your liberty is safe.⁷¹ Here was an ideology bound to convert the clash between la philosophie and its foes into a long and bitter struggle.

Those Roederer termed “les disciples de la philosophie moderne” in the end failed to consolidate the revolution they forged and, for a time, from the summer of 1793 to late 1794, were ousted by the Montagnards, the populist bloc derisively given this name originally because they sat on the highest benches, on the Left, in the Assembly. According to this faction, the people’s will and common man’s sentiments were the Revolution’s sole legitimate guide. This interruption, especially the ten-month Terror (September 1793–July 1794), followed a prolonged power struggle. It produced a complete reordering of the Revolution’s basic values, in fact, the undoing of the Revolution. During these months, democracy, freedom of thought and expression, and the Rights

of Man were jettisoned, freedom of the press aborted, individual liberty annulled, and terror exalted. But this catastrophic upset and trampling of human rights proved relatively brief and was then largely reversed again between 1795 and 1799.

Nevertheless, this bloody aberration, relatively short-lived though it was, posed (and still poses) a question that from 1795, in turn, became an ideological battlefield. Was the Terror inherent in the revolutionary principles of 1789 and hence also the outcome of *la philosophie*? This was the undeviating claim of all antiphilosophes, ultraroyalists, constitutional monarchists, and disillusioned former revolutionaries like La Harpe. These were all eager to link philosophisme, republicanism, materialism, and atheism to moral perversity. But were they right to attribute the Terror to the *secte philosophique*? A thorough sifting of the evidence suggests that they were wrong. Many of the philosophes-révolutionnaires responsible for the revolution of 1788–93 were ruthlessly guillotined by Robespierre. The survivors adamantly denied that the Revolution had immolated itself. They explained the doctrine of Robespierre and his allies as the outcome of a completely different and antagonistic ideology. If Marxist accounts of the Revolution as the outcome of class struggle today look flawed, François Furet’s widely respected thesis ascribing innate totalitarian leanings and an embedded latent illiberalism to the Revolution in its origins and basic principles needs rejecting just as comprehensively.

Among the strangest misconceptions plaguing accounts of the French Revolution nowadays is the still-predominant consensus that the “break between the Revolution and Christianity”—especially the Catholic Church—was “non-essential, contingent and explicable only in terms of the subsequent vicissitudes of the Revolution itself.” The break was supposedly not inherent in the context of 1789. In fact, all the evidence demonstrates the opposite. The impulse to (nonviolent) revolutionary de-Christianization was basic to the outlook of the philosophique leadership who made the Revolution before, as well as in, 1789.⁷² There are also other widely accepted, striking, and utterly unfounded myths. Among the revolutionary leadership “in the summer of 1789,” reaffirmed one leading scholar recently, “virtually no one challenged the principle of monarchy,” a statement for which he assumed it suffices to invoke the general consensus.⁷³ There is, indeed, a wide consensus among historians about this. But no close observer took this view at the time—quite the contrary. When Jean-Louis Carra (1742–93), among the principal National Convention deputies, Jacobin activ-

ists, and Parisian newspaper editors, remarked in a pamphlet of June 1793 that he was a “republican” who had roundly rejected monarchy in 1789 and who had done so also long before 1789, he was merely echoing a standpoint not just widespread but general among the French revolutionary vanguard (but not, of course, Robespierre and the populist faction).⁷⁴ It would seem that historians’ prevailing consensus here once again rests on nothing more than the long-standing failure to give sufficient weight to the Revolution’s intellectual history and hence is likewise in urgent need of revision.

The Left revolutionary leadership in 1789 both rejected Christianity (whether from a deist or atheist-materialist standpoint) *and* as a bloc abjured the principle of monarchy, either wholly, like Carra, Brissot, and Desmoulins, or, as with Mirabeau and Sieyès, in the main. In 1789, Carra’s and Desmoulins’s republican stance was shared, we shall see, throughout the revolutionary democratic vanguard—by Condorcet, Kersaint, Dusaulx, Mandar, Lanthenas, Gorsas, Brissot, Pétion, Chamfort, Volney, Pierre-François Robert, Bonneville, Paine (who joined the French revolutionary leadership in the autumn of 1792), and the playwright Marie-Joseph Chénier. The philosophique revolutionary leadership as a group (unlike authoritarian populists such as Marat, Robespierre, Saint-Just, or Hébert) was overwhelmingly republican from the outset. In short, key general assumptions about the French Revolution, everywhere frequently repeated and long accepted by both philosophers and historians, turn out to be fundamentally incorrect, leaving us with an uncommonly urgent need for some very sweeping and drastic revision.