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Theodore Ziolkowski: The Sin of Knowledge

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CHAPTER ONE

Adam: The Genesis of Consciousness

THE BIBLICAL FALL

Who among us has not been moved by the familiar tale? After God has accomplished the immense labor of creating heaven and earth, he amuses himself by modeling from the moist dust of the ground—almost playfully, it appears—a figure into which, through divine CPR, he breathes life. What now to do with this weakling on an earth still raw and inhospitable from the Creation? As a home for his “Adam,” whose name in Hebrew is the generic word for “man,” he plants a garden in Eden, a horticulturalist’s delight in which thrives every variety of tree both pleasing and useful: among them in the center the Tree of Life and the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil. He informs his Adam-Man that he may eat freely from every tree of the garden except, on pain of death, the Tree of Knowledge. Then, to provide companionship for his new earthling, the divine potter shapes from the same clay, in sportive experimentation, various beasts of the field and birds of the air. Although the man asserts his authority by giving names to all the cattle and birds, he finds among them no helpmate suitable for himself. (According to ancient tradition, Adam’s first and unsatisfactory sexual intercourse was with the animals.) So God anesthetizes the man and removes one of his ribs, from which he clones a being similar to him. For an unspecified period—some rabbinical readings grant them no more than that first day—the two protoplasts live happily, and still in nameless generic universality, in their nature preserve, neither aware nor ashamed of their nakedness.
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But the serpent, wilier than any of the other creatures that God made and with no apparent motivation other than mischief, approaches the woman to ask why God has forbidden her and her mate to eat the fruit of the tree in the center of the garden, or even to touch it. “You will not die,” the serpent assures her. Rather, if they should taste it, their eyes would be opened, and they would be “like God[s], knowing good and evil.” Since the tree’s fruit looks both nutritious and delicious (the biblical phrase anticipates the Horatian *dulce et utile*) and is reputed, moreover, to make wise, she samples a piece and takes some to her husband, who also partakes. Then their eyes are opened and, becoming suddenly aware of their nakedness, they cover themselves with makeshift aprons of fig leaves.

When next they hear God strolling in the garden in the cool of evening, they hide among the trees. But God summons them, and they confess that they concealed themselves out of shame for their nakedness. At this point the whole story, along with its sad but psychologically plausible finger-pointing, comes out. The man’s eyes were opened to his nakedness because, at the woman’s bidding, he consumed some of the forbidden fruit. The woman, in turn, pleads that she was just following orders: the serpent beguiled her. Thereupon God, in a most unholy burst of anger, curses everything in sight: the serpent is condemned to crawl forevermore on his belly, to eat dust, and to be trodden on by humankind; the woman, to feel sexual desire for her husband, to whom she shall be subservient, and yet to suffer great pain in bearing the children that result from their union; the earth, to bring forth thorns and thistles; and the man, hitherto the beneficiary of a lavish garden, to toil laboriously for his sustenance in the sweat of his brow. The man and his mate, finally, are condemned to eventual death and a return to the dust of the earth from which they were taken.

At this point, when they have been cast through sin from generic universality into human individuality, Adam names the woman Eve, thereby affirming his dominion over her in the same manner as previously over the animals. As a last gesture
of goodwill—he angers easily but does not hold grudges—God clothes Adam and Eve in garments of animal skin and then expels them from the garden into the arid wilderness beyond, lest they eat from the Tree of Life and thus achieve the immortality that he has prohibited. To ensure their compliance, he posts cherubim with flaming swords at the entrance to block the way back into the garden and to the Tree of Life.

This so-called second narrative of the Creation with the myth of Adam and Eve, the Temptation, and the Fall (Gen. 2.4–3.24) is one of the most familiar stories of Western culture. Saint Paul established a powerful tradition by identifying Adam as the “type” of natural man who was to be redeemed by the Second Adam, the “antitype” yet to come, in the person of Jesus Christ (Rom. 5.14). Just as sin and death entered the world through Adam’s deed, so “one man’s act of righteousness leads to acquittal and life for all men” (Rom. 5.18). Earlier he had preached to the Corinthians that death came by one man and resurrection by another. “For as in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alive” (1 Cor. 15.22). This “figural” analogy, which juxtaposes the Fall and the Redemption, Adam and Christ, and more generally the Old Testament and the New, is evident as early as the fourth century in images in Christian catacombs and on sarcophagi, and it also informs those curious and closely related apocryphal books known as the Apocalypse of Moses and the Vita Adae et Evae. It is not conclusively understood whether these Greek and Latin works, both of which were probably written sometime between the first and the third century of the common era and translated into many languages, go back to a Hebrew original or to Judeo-Greek or Aramaic sources. Both works, which profoundly influenced medieval views of Adam and Eve, recount the life of the first couple after their exile from Paradise and feature a quest for the Oil of Mercy to relieve Adam’s suffering, followed by Adam’s death, pardon, and burial. While both works end with Eve’s death and burial, and although the Apocalypse includes a testament in which Eve
warns her children against sin by telling them about the Temptation and Fall, the Vita explicitly exonerates Adam and blames Eve for the expulsion from Paradise.

The familiar story was rehearsed again and again in such popular medieval texts as the ninth-century Old Saxon Genesis, the tenth-century Old English Genesis B, the eleventh-century Middle High German Viennese Genesis, and the twelfth-century Anglo-Norman mystery play Jeu d’Adam. At the same time, it provided images for scores of illuminated manuscripts as well as the bronze doors, reliefs, mosaics, statues, and stained-glass windows of medieval ecclesiastical buildings. The tale of Adam and Eve was matched in popularity only by scenes from the lives of Jesus and the Madonna. Lucas Cranach’s well-known paintings of the Temptation were paralleled in Reformation Germany by such dramatic representations as Hans Sachs’s Tragedy of the Creation, Fall, and Adam’s Expulsion from Paradise (Tragedia von schöpfung, fal und außtreibung Ade auß dem paradyß, 1548).

The age of the baroque in Catholic Spain as well as the Protestant Netherlands and England—from Lope de Vega’s La creación del mundo y primera culpa del hombre (1618–1624) to Joost van den Vondel’s Adam in ballingschap (Adam in exile, 1664) and John Milton’s Paradise Lost (1667)—was obsessed by the subject. The fascination of the theme continued into the music, art, and poetry of the nineteenth century, and its popularity in the traditional genres was paralleled in folk art by its use on tiles, baking forms, and wedding chairs, and in songs and riddles (“Why did Adam bite the apple?” “Because he had no knife”). The myth of Adam and Eve provides without doubt several of the shaping images of the Western consciousness, which have demonstrated their continuing popularity in such twentieth-century media as advertisements and New Yorker cartoons.

For that reason it is all the more astonishing that, after their walk-on performance in the early chapters of Genesis (2–5), Adam and Eve do not reappear in the Old Testament. Adam is mentioned once by name at the beginning of the genealogy in
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Chronicles (1.1). And Ezekiel (28.11–19), without naming him, laments the Son of Man who once walked blameless in Eden, the garden of God, until iniquity was found in him and he was cast out as profane. But the story itself apparently held no interest for the judges, the kings, the chroniclers, the psalmists, or the prophets. Nor, apparently, did Jesus know, or at least care about, Adam, who is mentioned only twice in the Gospels—once as one of the two unnamed protoplasts (Matt. 19.4–6) and once by name as the terminus a quo for the genealogy in Luke (3.38). Not the Gospels but the Pauline letters sound the keynote for the Christian obsession with the Adamic myth, and the early Christian theologians, eager to demonstrate the historical continuity between their upstart religion and the traditions of the Hebrew Bible, worked out the typological-figural analogies in elaborate detail. The myth of the Fall, one might almost conclude, became important only in light of the myth of Redemption. Thus Milton exhorts his Heavenly Muse to sing

Of Man’s first disobedience, and the fruit
Of that forbidden tree, whose mortal taste
Brought death into the world, and all our woe,
With loss of Eden, till one greater Man
Restore us, and regain the blissful seat. . .

(Paradise Lost, 1.1–5)

NEAR EASTERN SOURCES

How, then, and why did the story make its way into Genesis? The concept of a fall from an earlier paradise appears in the myths of many peoples. Etiological interest in the origin of things did not begin with modern cosmologists and the big bang theory; it is evident in the earliest legends of most cultures. This interest, combined with the Rousseau-esque need to explain the deplorable human condition, suggested that humankind once lived in a happier state, from which it was
plunged—by disobedience, by fate, or by accident: for instance, by the unwitting violation of a taboo—into present misery.

While several of the elements, such as the creation of man from clay, belong to world folklore generally, biblical scholars have long been aware that the Genesis account is based on cosmological legends and mythological elements known to various peoples of the ancient Near East—in particular the image of a garden of the gods containing trees with mysterious powers. The anthropomorphic conception of a god strolling in his garden, as alien to the Hebrew tradition as is the walking and talking serpent, probably also came from another source. Notably, most of the characteristic motifs of the Genesis account are to be found, albeit in wholly different configurations, in the Mesopotamian epic of Gilgamesh.

In the Akkadian text of that epic, which was written around the turn of the second millennium B.C.E., Enkidu is created from the clay of the steppes by the love-goddess Aruru. Enkidu, though not alone in the world, first lives in paradisiacal innocence (and sexuality?) among the wild beasts, with whom he jostles at the watering place, exemplifying the “absolutely undifferentiated human consciousness, corresponding to a psyche that has hardly left the animal level,” according to C. G. Jung’s definition of the trickster archetype in its purest manifestation. A hunter, frightened by Enkidu’s fierce demeanor, seeks counsel from Gilgamesh, who advises him to tempt the man of nature with a seductive harlot or temple prostitute. The hunter takes the woman to the watering place, where she exposes her breasts and “lays bare her ripeness.” After Enkidu has mated with the temptress for six days and seven nights, the wild beasts of the steppe draw away from him. But while Enkidu’s physical strength and speed—that is, his trickster qualities—are weakened by his encounter with human sexuality, “he now had wisdom, broader understanding,” and the harlot tells him, in words anticipating the biblical serpent’s, “Thou art wise, Enkidu, art become like a god!” Clothing him with half of her
garment, she leads him to Uruk, where, following a giant contest with Gilgamesh at the gates of the city, the heroes become blood brothers and embark on their epic adventures.

Initially it is Enkidu who, in his newfound understanding, fears death. Gilgamesh reassures him:

“Who, my friend can scale heaven?
Only the gods live forever under the sun.
As for mankind, numbered are their days;
Whatever they achieve is but the wind!
Even here thou art afraid of death.”

They undertake a successful expedition against the monster Huwawa in the hope of achieving at least the immortality of fame. However, when they slay the destructive Bull of Heaven, the gods ordain that Enkidu must die. After he has watched his friend waste away, Gilgamesh, now himself overcome by the fear of death, laments:

“When I die, shall I not be like Enkidu?
Woe has entered my belly.
Fearing death, I roam over the steppe.”

His wanderings bring him to Utnapishtim (the hero of the Mesopotamian flood myth), who reveals to Gilgamesh a secret of the gods concerning a magical thorned plant that bestows renewed youth (and hence, implicitly, immortality). Gilgamesh obtains the plant, which grows at the bottom of the sea, and intends to rejuvenate himself by eating it. But when he stops to bathe in a cool well, a serpent smells the plant’s fragrance and carries it away. (The magic of the plant accounts etiologically for the serpent’s subsequent ability to shed its skin and renew its own youth.) Gilgamesh weeps for his wasted labor, and a few lines later the epic breaks off.

Even this brief sketch of the principal episodes makes it evident that the epic contains virtually all the elements of the biblical account of the Creation, Temptation, and Fall although the
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roles are divided between two heroes, not concentrated in one. Like Adam, Enkidu is created by a deity from the clay of the earth and spends his early days in naked innocence among the beasts of the field. Then, succumbing to a woman’s temptation, he loses his innocence and acquires godlike knowledge. The motifs of a plant of life and the serpent that tricks Adam and Eve out of immortality occur after Enkidu’s death in connection with Gilgamesh, who obtains the plant but is prevented from eating of it.

Several of these common Mesopotamian elements occur also in the later (fourteenth-century B.C.E.) Akkadian tale of Adapa, who is created by the culture-god Ea as “the model of men,” and to whom is given wisdom but not eternal life. When Adapa offends the supreme deity Anu and is summoned to heaven, Ea advises him not to eat or drink what will be offered to him, saying that it will be the bread of death and the water of death. But when Adapa refuses Anu’s offerings, the gods laugh at him and return him to earth and mortality: for what he refused was in fact the bread and water of life.

Clearly, the Hebrew storyteller who wrote the second narrative was drawing on a common pool of ancient Near Eastern folkloric elements, which he combined in a new configuration but with profound psychological insight and with a wholly original emphasis. Man is still created from clay by a god and then lives, naked and innocent, among the beasts of the field. Tempted by a woman, he loses his innocence and acquires wisdom along with clothing. But at this point the emphasis is shifted. Enkidu is seduced solely by sexual desire; and there is no hint in the Akkadian epic that this trickster, though rejected by the animals, is scorned by the gods. Indeed, the parallel tale of Adapa suggests that wisdom is a power granted freely by the gods and not begrudged mankind. To be sure, both Gilgamesh and Adapa are cheated of immortality. But in the case of Gilgamesh it is the random gourmandise of the serpent that deprives him of the plant of eternal youth. And Adapa, despite
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the wisdom bestowed upon him by Ea, is still offered by Anu the bread and water of life, which he loses because of the jealousy of a lesser deity.

THE PARADOX OF KNOWLEDGE IN

SOLOMON’S JERUSALEM

The essential and characteristic difference between the biblical tale of the Fall and the Mesopotamian accounts is, simply, that Adam-Eve sins by eating from the Tree of Knowledge. From Paul (Rom. 5.19) by way of Dante (Paradiso 26.115–17) to Milton, to be sure, Christian theology has emphasized the fact of “Man’s first disobedience”: it was the act of disobedience that condemned Adam-Man; the means of that act, the tree, is of lesser importance. As Paul Ricoeur has summarized, “In the new and peculiarly Hebraic myth, the forbidden fruit stands for prohibition in general; compared to murder, eating forbidden fruit is a peccadillo” (248). The transformation of the original plant of youth into a forbidden Tree of Knowledge has major structural implications as well.

Motivation is, of course, important. In the biblical account the serpent is no longer the hungry creature of folklore, who achieves immortality by stealing the fruit of life, and not yet the evil Satan of later Christian interpretations. In a profound psychological sense it embodies a projection of Eve’s very human curiosity and desire. Structurally, at the same time, it assumes the role of trickster that was originally held by Enkidu, but that can no longer be occupied by Adam in his new function as culture-hero and primogenitor of the human race.

As a result of its part in the sinful act the tree itself acquired a share in the guilt. (According to a widespread medieval legend reported in such sources as the Legenda Aurea of Jacobus de Voragine, it was the wood of that same tree, later transplanted to Adam’s grave, on which Jesus was subsequently crucified.)
Yet if Adam had chosen correctly, it is implied, he might with impunity have achieved immortality by eating instead from the Tree of Life. (As Frazer has demonstrated, trees functioned widely in folklore as embodiments of the life-spirit.) It is the combination of knowledge and eternity that God begrudges him, unlike the Akkadian Anu, who offers Adapa the bread of life despite the wisdom he has already received. Adam-Eve’s sin, in short, is the desire for knowledge.

This poses an interesting dilemma. Why should the people who subsequently prided themselves for centuries on being the People of the Book have placed at the beginning of history a myth suggesting that the fall of humankind was due to the desire for knowledge? Despite the widespread presence of trees in the other Near Eastern gardens of delight—no wonder, after all, in light of the regional topography with its wildernesses and oases—and despite the frequent occurrence of trees or plants of life, as in the Gilgamesh epic, only Hebrew mythology has a Tree of Knowledge. (It is worth stressing at this point that the qualifying phrase “of Good and Evil,” far from restricting the knowledge communicated by the tree to matters of morality and conscience, is intended to suggest the entire extent of human knowledge, of consciousness generally. The opposing terms simply convey the idea of everything between those two extremes. The exegetical history of the phrase over the past century reveals that every generation has interpreted it in a manner appropriate to the times: for example, the scientific reading of positivism, the ethical reading of the 1920s, the sexual reading of the 1960s and 1970s.)

Why should it have been a tree of knowledge through which sin was introduced into the world? The question becomes all the more urgent in light of the assumption that the Israelite narrator changed it from what, according to Adapa and other tales, was originally probably a tree of death. The authorship and dating of the second narrative remain problematic. (It is called the second narrative because a later postexilic scribe known as P, presumably feeling that the primeval account did
not do full justice to the dignity of the Creation, added the now familiar chronology of the first chapter of Genesis.) Known as the “J Source” and attributed to a scribe known as “the Yahwist” (for his use of the tetragrammaton YHWH to designate God), the document has been variously dated, and current opinion suggests that the major units of the source—primeval history, patriarchs, exodus, wilderness, conquest of Canaan—may in fact have been compiled at different periods during the four hundred years extending from Solomon through the Babylonian Exile. It is generally agreed, however, that the section of interest here—the “prologue” or primeval history of pre-Israelite mankind covered in Genesis 2–11—whether compiled by a “school” or written by a single narrator, was composed during the so-called Solomonic enlightenment of the mid–tenth century. And internal textual evidence suggests certain conclusions that bear out such a dating.

Generally speaking, myths of a past Golden Age and of man’s fall from that happy state are produced by cultures that have reached a certain level of sophistication, that are interested in origins and look back with a degree of nostalgia at an imagined simpler, happier existence. (The focus on origins is implicit in the now traditional name “Genesis,” which was assigned to that book by the translators of the Septuagint; the Hebrew Bible knows it simply as “Bereshith” [“In the beginning”], the first of the five books of Moses.) If the Yahwist lived in Solomon’s glittering Jerusalem, then he was acquainted with a society that had advanced well past the culture of simple shepherds and peasants that characterized the era of the patriarchs, the settlement of Canaan, and the judges.

Prior to the political consolidation achieved by David and Solomon the twelve tribes were still essentially seminomadic with a social organization dominated by clanlike families. It was the sense of crisis produced among the tribes by the Philistines in the eleventh century—the defeat of the Israelites, the destruction of Shiloh, and the capture of the Ark of the Covenant—that first produced the clamor for a monarchy embrac-
ing all twelve tribes. This impetus, in turn, enabled Saul to begin the process of unification that entailed the revival of the national religion along with the abolishment of the worship of such foreign deities as Baal and Astarte. The consolidation was completed by David (ca. 1004–965 B.C.E.), who unified the seminomadic tribes still riven by internecine warfare and moved the seat of government to Jerusalem, which was established as the administrative center of the new monarchy. When Solomon (ca. 965–928 B.C.E.) built the Temple as a home for the Ark of the Covenant, the new urban capital became, in addition, the religious center of the nation. The historical consciousness that characterizes the Yahwist and produced his interest in origins constitutes a natural corollary to the process of consolidation.  

Yet even during this process of consolidation signs of stress were evident, as signaled by the seductions, rapes, treachery, political assassinations, fratricides, and other crimes reported in Samuel 2, along with Solomon’s own flagrant apostasies. During Solomon’s reign the people chafed under the heavy taxes imposed by a burgeoning bureaucratic administration to support the resplendent court life and, in particular, under the corveé that required citizens to contribute free labor to the elaborate public projects. Following the accession of Solomon’s son Rehoboam the resistance to further economic burdens resulted in the schism of the monarchy into the two kingdoms of Israel and Judah.

Living with such stresses as these and witnessing the commercial activity of the monarchy, the moral decay of the kings, the lavish imports of silver and cedar, the flourishing trade in horses, the fleets of ships sailing to Mediterranean ports—achievements so spectacular, indeed, that Solomon was pursued through antiquity and the Middle Ages by a reputation for sorcery—the writer of the primeval history had ample reason to feel that his society, for all its political power and urban sophistication, represented a decline away from what must have been
a simpler, better life in Israel’s nomadic and peasant past. Indeed, his text betrays more than a trace of the alienated intellectual familiar in modern times from Rousseau to communitarian thinkers of the present. In his self-conscious ruminations he turned naturally to originary thoughts, to meditations on the meaning of the past. If Max Weber was correct in his belief that reason and understanding tend to disenchant the world, perhaps the use of myth to explain the origin of things represents an attempt to “reenchant” a world grown rational and colorless—to restore myth to a world newly conscious of history. (As Nietzsche reminds us, in *The Birth of Tragedy* [1:23], myth tends to disappear when history emerges.)

The Yahwist’s text suggests that he wonders specifically what happened to account for the fact that men must work so hard to eke out a living from an intransigent soil, that women are condemned to subservience and to the pains of childbearing, that humankind is ashamed of its nakedness, that a hostility exists between humankind and the animal world, with whose skins we conceal our nakedness, and that the serpent must crawl on the ground. Above all, why are men and women condemned to death, not blessed with immortality? (His etiological curiosity is suggested by such phrases as “therefore” or “that is why,” which punctuate the Yahwist’s narrative at certain points.) Life in Solomon’s Jerusalem was more glorious than anything the Jewish people had experienced. Yet at what cost had that glory been achieved? Sigmund Freud points out in *Civilization and Its Discontents* (1930) that, when God caused misfortune after misfortune to strike the people that considered themselves his favorite child, they never gave up the belief in their special relationship, nor did they question his power or righteousness. “Instead, they produced the prophets, who held up their sinfulness before them; and out of their sense of guilt they created the over-strict commandments of their priestly religion” (21:127). But they also produced thinkers like the Yahwist, who looked back in time to seek the causes of that guilt.
Freud famously argues that “the price we pay for our advance in civilization is a loss of happiness through the heightening of the sense of guilt” (21:134). Yet what else is civilization but knowledge? It was political knowledge that unified the twelve tribes, engineering knowledge that made possible the building of the Temple, economic knowledge that produced the conspicuous consumption in Jerusalem, military knowledge that defeated the Philistines. Paradoxically, it is knowledge itself that induces the tendency to thought and reflection generating the etiological and originary speculations of the Yahwist. Hence it is no accident that the tree whose fruit precipitates the Fall is specifically a tree of knowledge—not anything as simple as the sexual knowledge that estranges the trickster Enkidu from the animals, but the more profound knowledge of the world that puts men and women on the same level as the gods, *scientes bonum et malum*, and thereby alienates them as individual human beings from the general creation to which they originally belonged. The Yahwist is obsessed with the sin of knowledge. He is, after all, also the author of the episode recounting the building of the Tower of Babel, another incident in which humankind challenges the authority of an irascible God who carefully guards his privileges. The Lord realizes that the ambitious construction project “is only the beginning of what they will do; and nothing that they propose to do will now be impossible for them” (Gen. 11.6). That the whole enterprise is attributable to intelligence and knowledge is suggested by the circumstance that it is their unified language that makes everything possible. Rashi, in his commentary on the passage, identifies the builders of the tower simply as “the sons of Adam, the first man.” It is likewise consistent with the understanding of early Christianity that the builders, translated as “the sons of men” in the Revised Standard Edition, are called “sons of Adam” (*filii Adam*) in the Latin Vulgate. Saint Augustine, in his *Confessions* and elsewhere, routinely uses the expression *filii Adam* to designate man in his state of sinfulness. For it was precisely in their acquisition and application of knowledge and
human reason that they revealed themselves as the descendants of that first sinner.

The narrator of the primeval history, living in the sophisticated intellectual climate of Solomon’s Jerusalem and reflecting historically on origins, etiologically on the state of his present culture, and psychologically on the sources of modern malaise, appropriated motifs from the common pool of Near Eastern folktales concerning Creation and Fall and collated them in such a manner, most conspicuously through Adam’s name, as to make universal what had been local legends and to lend a new dimension of moral meaning to primitive myths that had held little but entertainment value for nomadic desert peoples—in sum, to transform the trickster Enkidu into the culture-hero Adam (and simultaneously to give the serpent a new importance by projecting upon it the role of trickster). We should always remind ourselves that the primeval history deals with humanity as a whole; the specific history of the Israelites begins only in Genesis 12 with the legend of Abraham. It is no longer fate, accident, or violation of a meaningless taboo that causes the fall of the entire human race from its state of primal bliss, but specifically the acquisition of knowledge that alienates humankind from its place in a unified creation, separating subject from object, man from nature. Here, for the first time in human consciousness, knowledge is sin.

The myth has been read in this manner at least since the Enlightenment. In his “Conjectures on the Beginning of Human History” (Mutmaßlicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte, 1786), which is essentially a reading of Genesis 2–3, Immanuel Kant argued that “man’s emergence from that paradise which reason represents to him as the first abode of his species was nothing other than his transition from a rude and purely animal existence to a state of humanity, from the leading-strings of instinct to the guidance of reason—in a word, from the guardianship of nature to the state of freedom.” Half a century later, in his world-weary essay entitled “Experience,” Emerson defined the Fall of Man simply as the discovery that we exist.
“Once we lived in what we saw; now, the rapaciousness of this new power [consciousness] engages us.” And Arnold Toynbee, searching for the factor that has occasionally shaken mankind out of “the integration of custom” into “the differentiation of civilization,” suggests that the Fall “symbolizes the acceptance of a challenge to abandon this achieved integration and to venture upon a fresh differentiation out of which a fresh integration may—or may not—arise” (65–67).