Reasons without Rationalism
Kieran Setiya

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ADDITIONAL ENDORSEMENTS:

"It is a great virtue of Kieran Setiya's Reasons without Rationalism that it poses the issue between rationalism and virtue theory in such clear terms. If one accepts the kind of minimalist conception of practical thought that Setiya favors, then there is probably nothing else for good practical thought to be except a disposition to intentional action that is good as a trait of character. Setiya's subtle and provocative development of this line of thought is a substantial philosophical achievement. It offers a distinctive and interesting account of intentional action, and shows how that account provides the basis for a distinctive way of thinking about practical reason, in terms of virtues of character."--Jay Wallace, University of California, Berkeley

"This is a valuable work that contains sharp and interesting arguments. It is original and makes a refreshing contribution to a discussion that, while it fascinates many moral psychologists, threatens to become stale and repetitive. It should also be of interest to ethicists and metaethicists, even though it is not about morality in the narrow sense."--Nomy Arpaly, Brown University

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File created: 11/5/2009

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