"In this impressive new book, David Lewis tells us why presidents often--but not always--rely on political appointees to staff bureaucracies. With its mixture of insightful theory, careful statistical tests, and a deep understanding of how bureaucracies work, this book represents the scientific study of bureaucracy at its finest."--Charles Shipan, coauthor of Deliberate Discretion?
"Political science is sadly currently producing few scholars concerned with improving the management of the federal government. David Lewis is a striking exception. This well-argued, methodologically rigorous study of the baleful impact of the increasing number of political appointees in agencies on government performance makes an important contribution both to the academic literature and to an important practical debate about governance."--Steve Kelman, Harvard University
"This book is an important contribution to our understanding of how power works in the executive branch of government. Lewis is careful in his arguments, precise with his data, and logical in his presentation. He has collected and analyzed impressive evidence to explain the techniques of politicization and their consequences. This book is the most complete analysis of presidential personnel policy available."--James P. Pfiffner, George Mason University
"This is a remarkable work. Lewis challenges some of the basic assumptions that have been made in past research on this subject. He demonstrates that the increase in politicization occurred until 1980 and then flattened out. Lewis finds that while politicization continues, it is not trending upward as past research suggests. All presidents do not have the same incentives when it comes to politicizing the bureaucracy."--Richard W. Waterman, University of Kentucky
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File created: 8/19/2014