

THE SILENT SEX ONLINE APPENDIX

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A RESEARCH DESIGN

a. Subject Recruitment and Experimental Procedures

Recruitment

We recruited participants, including students and non-students, from the campuses and surrounding communities of a small northeastern university and a large western university. Potential participants were asked to take part in a two-hour experiment investigating “how people make decisions about important issues.” Recruitment was conducted through a wide variety of methods including emails to students¹, postcards to purchased random lists of community members, online advertisements, flyers posted both on and off campus, and direct contact to local community groups. Recruits were promised the chance to earn between \$10 and \$60 depending on their decisions during the experiment. Volunteers were not allowed to take part in the experiment if they knew any other participant prior to participation. In all, 600 people participated in the 120 sessions of the experiment.

Procedures

Gender composition and decision rule were systematically manipulated. There were 12 types of groups (6 gender compositions and 2 decision rules). Gender compositions were randomly assigned to days on the schedule. Participants were then scheduled to the day that worked best for them. This process ensured that participants had a roughly equal probability of being assigned to each group type and that group types did not cluster on particular days of the week. For each session, more than 5 participants were allowed to sign up. These additional participants helped ensure that we could fill the session’s assigned gender composition. Participants who showed up at a session but were not needed were paid \$10 and allowed to sign up for a subsequent session. No participant was allowed to take part in the experiment more than once. Prior to each session’s start the experimenter rolled a die to randomly select the decision rule that would hold for the experiment.

Once the participants arrived they were informed of the risks and benefits of participation and signed a consent form. Then, the experimenter read an introduction outlining the three stages of the experiment: the first stage in which participants learned about the different principles of just income distribution, the second stage in which they deliberated about the theories and voted to adopt the “most just” principle, and the third stage in which they performed an unspecified task to earn money, which would then be redistributed (or not) according to the rule adopted by the group.

After the introduction was read, participants moved to computer stations and began the first stage. They began by completing a 35-question introductory questionnaire that measured general attitudes towards redistribution, feelings about group work, risk aversion, prosociality,

¹ At the northeastern university, student emails were those of volunteers for previous experiments in their lab, and later to the entire student body. At the western university, several random samples of the entire student body were obtained and used.

and more. Participants then read a five-page description of the four distributive principles that could be adopted during the experiment. After reading the descriptions, each participant completed an 11-question quiz about the principles and registered a pre-deliberation preference ordering of the principles. Selections of the materials provided to the participants have been reproduced at the end of this appendix.

During the second stage of the experiment, the participants read instructions about the deliberation and voting process. Participants were instructed to conduct a “full and open discussion” that considered their role as “establishing rules for a new society which you will be part of.” Participants were seated randomly around the table. The experimenter opened discussion by asking “Would someone like to start by explaining which principle they believe to be most just and why?” Participants deliberated until they agreed first by unanimous vote to end deliberation and then by the assigned decision rule to adopt a particular principle of distribution. Deliberation was required to last for at least five minutes, and all voting occurred by secret ballot.

The average group deliberated for just over 25 minutes (standard deviation = 11). This is the total time spent from the point at which the researcher read the group deliberation instructions to the point at which the participants agreed to stop talking. Participants agreed by unanimous vote to end deliberation. In analyses that use *Proportion Talk* or *Talk Time*, we employ a slightly different version of total talk time, which is the sum of all individual talk times, not counting the researcher instructions or any silences in which no member of the group spoke. For this alternative measure, the mean is just over 19 minutes (standard deviation = 11). Groups at our Western site talked for several minutes longer than groups at the East Coast site. Despite this intercept shift, the relationships we observe between our dependent variables and the experimental conditions are very similar at the two locations.

Groups were allowed four voting rounds to come to a decision. The experimenter remained in the room during the deliberation to manage the recording equipment and answer clarification questions about the distribution principles or other aspects of the process, but did not otherwise moderate the discussion. Once the deliberation was complete, the participants moved back to their computer terminals, preference-ranked the principles, and completed a post-deliberation questionnaire that measured their evaluation of the group’s most influential member and their perceptions and satisfaction with various aspects of the deliberation and the group’s final decision. Deliberations were recorded both on individual microphones and a group microphone and video.

In the third stage, subjects were informed that their task would be to correct spelling mistakes in blocks of text. After a practice round, the subjects completed three rounds of the task. The performance in each task round was converted to a yearly salary. The income was then redistributed so that the group’s final distribution of income conformed to the principle chosen by the group. At the end of each round, participants were privately told their “annual income” as well as the group’s high, low, and average incomes both before and after redistribution. They were also asked to again rank the distributional principles from most to least preferred and indicate how happy they were with the group’s decision. Following the final round,

participants completed a battery of demographic questions and were paid according to their performance, plus a \$10 show-up fee which had not been previously disclosed.

Additional Research Elements

As a control, fourteen group sessions were completed in which no deliberation occurred. The group recruitment and scheduling processes were identical. We treated the control condition as another potential decision rule for selection before the start of the experiment. In these cases, all discussion instructions were omitted and participants were informed that a principle of justice would be assigned to them at a certain point in the experiment. All other aspects of the experiment were identical, except for the post-discussion questionnaire, which was omitted. The principle imposed on these groups was a Floor Constraint of \$14,500.

b. Recording Configuration and Verbal Behavior Analysis Software

Each group of five deliberators was recorded using a total of 6 microphones and two separate digital video cameras. Five individual Shure low profile headset microphones were worn by the participants. The unidirectional cardioid pattern of these microphones helped eliminate any contamination of each speaker's audio by background noise and other participants' speech. The sixth microphone was an omnidirectional flat tabletop model. The microphones were connected to a MOTU 8PRE 8-channel microphone preamplifier. This preamplifier connected via a Firewire cable to a standard Microsoft Windows lab PC running Adobe Audition multi-track recording software.

A simple Microsoft Visual Basic 6.0 application was written (using the 'sendkeys' function) to automate the operation of the Audition software to ensure that recording was started on all channels at the same time, to name the channels according to experimental naming standards to ease data archiving and post-processing, and to copy the final files to a large network server disk drive for storage. The audio files are so large (often over a GB per group) that they would rapidly fill the hard drive of the recording PC.

Once the individual participants' audio channels were recorded, they were processed using a software package written expressly for this project. This software application first performed voice activity detection (VAD) on each channel. Each participant's audio was converted from an audio file (.wav file) to an amplitude data file (.amp) of average speaking amplitudes, by calculating the average amplitude of the speaker's voice during every .25 second interval of the recording. These averaged amplitudes for each speaker were then converted to binary on-off Voice Activity files (.vad). That is, if the amplitude for a .25 second interval for this speaker was greater than a minimum threshold that was manually determined for each speaker, then their speaking status was set to 1 or ON for that interval, otherwise it was set to 0.

This process yielded data files (.vad) for each subject with their speaking turns (utterances) identified. This data was then post-processed to ensure that slight pauses during utterances were bridged if they were less than 1 second in duration (to avoid having long single utterances broken into two shorter utterances). Then to avoid spurious short utterances due to microphone noise, etc., any of these utterances that did not contain at least one .25 second interval of some

minimum high amplitude during the utterance were eliminated. For the present experiment, the ‘minimum maximum’ for an utterance was set to +5 above the specified minimum threshold.

Once all individual .vad files were processed, the software integrated them into a single group data file (.grp) for each deliberative group. Verbal behavior statistics were then run on this data, including such measures as total amount of speaking time for the group, % of time for this speaker, etc.

c. Experimental Methodology Issues

An experiment that revolves around the manipulation of group characteristics poses many interesting challenges for experimenters. In our case, some pertinent questions might be:

- What does it mean for "gender" to be a treatment?
- Is a within- or between-subjects design best?
- Are the assumptions of the Rubin Causal Model (RCM) violated?
- Is assigning gender composition an experimental manipulation, or is this an observational study?

Our general response to these questions is that the design in this study conforms to definitions of “experiment.” It uses what Don Green and his colleagues call a “passive” experimental design that randomly assigns individuals to the discussion group based on their demographic, ideological, or other pre-existing characteristics, and observes the outcomes (Farrar et al. 2009, pp. 617-618). While individual gender cannot be manipulated, a group’s gender composition can be. Other experiments that manipulate the composition of groups and where the units purposely interact correctly claim to be experimental and note no violations of the Rubin model. These include Druckman 2004; Druckman and Nelson 2003; Luskin et al. 2002; and Myers and Bishop 1970.

In what sense is our design experimental? According to Morton and Williams (2010), an experiment occurs “when a researcher intervenes in the data generating process (DGP) by purposely manipulating elements of the DGP”, where manipulating means “varies the elements of” (p. 42). We varied the elements of the data generating process – specifically, the gender composition and decision rule for all groups in our sample.

In addition, we use the hallmark of experiments as traditionally conceived: random assignment to a treatment. Gender composition conditions were randomly assigned to each scheduled experimental session. Through this process, each man had an equal probability of assignment to a given condition, and the same is true for each woman. (And of course, each deliberating group has an equal chance of assignment to a rule by rolling dice prior to the start of the experimental session.) Additionally, several assumptions of the Rubin Causal Model and its variants are satisfied in this study where they would not be in observational studies to the same extent or at all: 1) ignorability or independence for Y_i and for X_i (Druckman, Green, Kuklinski and Lupia 2011, pp. 23-24), confirmed by our propensity score analysis (see below); 2) individual units do not influence each other across treatments, nor across groups within a treatment, nor do groups influence each other; 3) the exclusion restriction (the assignment works only through the treatment); 4) units cannot choose or decline treatment and thus

noncompliance and self-treatment are non-issues. The present study thus is far preferable to an observational study of naturally-occurring gender compositions.

Is interaction among subjects a violation of SUTVA (Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption)?

Our particular type of design, namely a passive design, is a special case of the more general treatment-interaction-outcome (T-I-O) design. Morton and Williams (2010) cite several studies with the general T-I-O design without noting any violations of the Rubin Causal Model (RCM) (e.g., pp. 238-40), and implicitly endorse (p. 278) the passive design of Don Green and colleagues (Farrar et al 2009). In fact, many of the experimental game-theory studies proliferating in the field are also a case of the T-I-O design, yet they are not thought to violate the RCM by virtue of the subject interaction component.

How is SUTVA not violated when the units are treating each other? We have several responses.

First, SUTVA refers to avoiding treatment spillover effects – for example, when treatment 1 affects units assigned to treatment 2. The fact that units influence the outcome of others within a deliberating group does not create bias in the treatment effect because an individual unit does not affect individuals in other treatment conditions. That is, the interaction among units does not carry the effect of a treatment to units not assigned to the treatment. This means that the interaction among units does not create bias in the treatment effect. Second, relatedly, this interaction among units constitutes a set of mediating variables, not a confounding variable, and poses no bias to the treatment effect. Third, most of our analysis uses the group as the unit of analysis, avoiding the problems of using the individual as the unit and thus avoiding the SUTVA problem. Fourth, when we employ individual-level data, we employ random effects models or regression models with cluster robust standard errors to account for the interdependence of the units (observations) within the deliberating group. Fifth, our treatment is placement in a discussion group assigned to a particular gender composition and to unanimous or majority decision rule. This allows us to make use of the random assignment and control we do have without appearing to claim that what follows after the manipulation is exogenous.

Is individual gender a treatment? Individual gender is (obviously) not manipulated and we do not claim that it is. Our treatment is gender composition. Regarding *individual* gender specifically, we note in Chapter 4 the potential concern that gender is correlated with other factors that could be doing the actual causal work, and we control on those noted in the literature, namely the value of egalitarianism and preferences over redistribution principles. In addition, since individual gender is exogenous, any attitudinal difference (in preferences, ideologies, values, etc.) that may be associated with it occurs later in the causal chain and would constitute mediating rather than confounding variables. Known works in the field have treated those attitudinal variables as mediators for demographic effects rather than confounds of them (e.g., Gilens 1999). Nevertheless, we do not rely on this assumption about the causal order but rather use the standard method of controls for confounds. We also check for the effects of other demographic characteristics that might be driving the results, such as age, education, or income, and we find no effect of those variables, either at the individual level or with respect to how those attributes aggregate within the group. Of course, neither the attitudinal variables nor the demographic characteristics have been experimentally manipulated in the current research

design, so future work could provide additional insight by exercising experimental control over these variables. Nonetheless, our statistical analysis provides helpful reassurance that gender composition is not merely a proxy for these other factors.

Would a within-subjects design be better than our between-subjects design? Assigning different individuals to different compositions creates some potential difficulties. However, these are the standard difficulties of a between-subjects design. The primary difficulty is that the estimates have high variance. Bias is not a problem, however. We chose to use a between-subjects design rather than a within-subjects design because we worried that prior treatment would bias the effect of current treatment, the standard problem of within-subjects designs (Morton and Williams chapter 4). For example, experiencing an all- female group before experiencing a predominantly male group may alter the response of a female to the predominantly-male group. Thus we choose the inefficient estimates of between-subjects design to avoid the higher bias that would result from sequential treatments. This is, therefore, not a choice that violates SUTVA.

Is SUTVA violated in some other way? The design might be thought to violate SUTVA in the sense that each group consists of a different set of co-members surrounding the subject and thus units receive different versions of the treatment. For example, when a 4-female group consists of females A, B, C, and D, while another 4-female group consists of females E, F, G and H, the man in group 1 gets a different version of the 4-female treatment from the man in group 2. A-D differ from E-H in a number of ways that might affect the outcome of interest. However, we do not regard this as a source of bias in the estimate of treatment effects because the variance is uncorrelated with the treatment. Even if this is unpersuasive, the resulting effects are still unbiased, if more narrowly stated. In that case, according to the Rubin Causal Model, our effect would be merely the average of the difference between the observed outcome for each treated unit and what would have been observed for each unit under the alternative treatment. We would not claim that the effect we estimate is the average difference in potential outcomes that would have been observed given all units experiencing treatment vs. all experiencing control.

Though experiments manipulating group-level features present unique challenges, our summary view is that ours is an experimental rather than observational study, and it has strengths comparable to or exceeding those of prominent experimental studies with a similar design.

d. Randomization Checks

We performed several types of randomization checks. Using regression models, we generally found no relationship between demographic characteristics such as age, education, student status, ideology, income, or religiosity and assignment to experimental conditions for either women or men. We tested 160 potential relationships and found no differences beyond those likely to emerge by chance alone when testing a large number of demographic characteristics. The general result of these tests is strong reassurance that randomization worked properly.

In addition, we conducted propensity score randomization checks. This method relies on propensity scores to test whether experimental data can be treated as the result of a perfectly

randomized experiment. A propensity score is the probability that a unit in an experiment is assigned to each experimental treatment. In a randomized experiment, the propensity score for each unit should be the same; units that are assigned to a treatment should have been no more likely to be assigned to the treatment than units that were not assigned to the treatment.

In practice, true propensity scores are never known. Instead, they are estimated using a logit or probit specification where the dependent variable is whether each unit received the treatment and the independent variables are a series of covariates that the researcher believes might influence the chance that a unit received the treatment. Generally these are demographic covariates. Once a logit or probit model is created, it is used to generate a predicted probability of receiving the treatment for each experimental unit. Propensity scores are estimates of the true propensity score, just as a statistical model is at best a well-informed guess at the true data generating process it approximates. The scores are only as good as the selection of covariates used to estimate them.

Generally, propensity scores are used as part of a matching technique for observational data so that it can be treated more like experimental data. In contrast, this method checks randomization in an experiment by comparing the distribution of propensity scores among subjects assigned to a treatment to the distribution among those not assigned to that treatment. If randomization was successful, the distribution of propensity scores in the two groups should be indistinguishable. If the groups appear to be drawn from a different distribution, randomization may have not been successful.

We began our propensity score checks by dividing the set of participants randomly in half and using the first half of the sample to generate five propensity scores for each member in the second half of the sample, one for each treatment in which they could be placed. The model used to generate the scores was as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} InGroup = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 Student + \beta_2 EqualityIndex + \beta_3 DemsRating + \beta_4 Liberalism + \beta_5 Age \\ & + \beta_6 Age^2 + \beta_7 Income + \beta_8 PartyID \end{aligned}$$

We then compared the distribution of scores in the group that received the treatment to the distribution of scores in the group that did not receive the treatment. If treatment assignment was random, these distributions should be indistinguishable. We performed three checks on each set of propensity scores: a two-sample t-test, a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test (a non-parametric test analogous to the t-test) and a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (a non-parametric test that examines whether two datasets come from a similar distribution). The results suggest that randomization was successful. We find no evidence of differences in the distributions of treated and non-treated beyond those expected to have emerged by chance alone. These results lead us to conclude that subjects in groups that were assigned to a particular treatment were not significantly more likely to be assigned to that treatment than subjects who were assigned to other treatments.

B SUMMARY STATISTICS

Table B1: Demographic Characteristics of Participants

Variable	Question Text or Explanation	Response Options	N	Mean	St. Dev	Range
Age	Age of subjects	--	467	27.63	11.71	18-78
Income	Expected annual family income during year of study participation.	1. Under \$25,000 2. \$25,000 - \$39,000 3. \$40,000 - \$54,999 4. \$55,000 - \$69,999 5. \$70,000-\$84,999 6. \$85,000 - \$99,999 7. \$100,000 - \$114,999 8. \$115,000-\$129,999 9. \$130,000-\$144,999 10. \$145,000-\$160,000 11. Over \$160,000	466	4.12	3.31	1-11
Education	Highest level of schooling completed.	1. Some high school 2. High school diploma or equivalent 3. Some college 4. Technical or Associates degree 5. Bachelors degree 6. Graduate degree	466	3.79	1.16	1-6
Female	Self-reported gender	0. Male (n=238) 1. Female (n=232)	470	0.49	0.50	0-1
Partisanship	Self-reported party identification: “Generally speaking, do you consider yourself to be an ...”	1. Strong Democrat 2. Weak Democrat 3. Ind. leaning Democrat 4. Independent/Other/DK 5. Ind. Leaning Republican 6. Weak Republican 7. Strong Republican	433	4.39	2.01	1-7
Experimental Location	Site of Experimental Session	0. Western Site (n=230) 1. Eastern Site (n=240)	470	0.51	0.50	0-1

Table B2: Descriptive Statistics

* For the sake of completeness, we report the sample means for all our variables, but many of these variables are affected by the experimental conditions themselves, as our hypotheses predict.

Variable	Description	Scale Coding	N	Mean	St. Dev	Empirical Range	Ch.
<i>Pre-Deliberation Attitudes (Individual-Level)</i>							
Egalitarianism index	Additive index that combines the next nine items together ($\alpha=0.73$), rescaled to run from 0-1.	0 - Low egalitarianism 1 - High egalitarianism	470	0.51	0.18	0-.97	5, 6, 7, 8, 9
1.Those who work hard get what they want	“If people work hard they almost always get what they want.” (Reverse coded in index)	0 - Strongly Disagree .25 - Disagree .5 - Neutral .75 - Agree 1 - Strongly Agree	470	0.54	0.26	0-1	5, 6, 7, 8, 9
2. Difficulty of reaching goals	“Even if people try hard, they often cannot reach their goals.”	0 - Strongly Disagree .25 - Disagree .5 - Neutral .75 - Agree 1 - Strongly Agree	470	0.54	0.28	0-1	5, 6, 7, 8, 9
3. We should worry less about equality	“This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are.” (Reverse coded in index)	0 - Strongly Disagree .25 - Disagree .5 - Neutral .75 - Agree 1 - Strongly Agree	470	0.40	0.26	0-1	5, 6, 7, 8, 9
4. Equality of wealth is a good thing	“Relative equality of wealth is a good thing.”	0 - Strongly Disagree .25 - Disagree .5 - Neutral .75 - Agree 1 - Strongly Agree	470	0.57	0.24	0-1	5, 6, 7, 8, 9
5. Hard work leads to chance for success	“Any person who is willing to work hard has a good chance at succeeding.” (Reverse coded in index)	0 - Strongly Disagree .25 - Disagree .5 - Neutral .75 - Agree 1 - Strongly Agree	470	0.75	0.23	0-1	5, 6, 7, 8, 9

Variable	Description	Scale Coding	N	Mean	St. Dev	Empirical Range	Ch.
6. Not a problem if some have more chances in life	“It is not really that big of a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others.” (Reverse coded in index)	0 - Strongly Disagree .25 - Disagree .5 - Neutral .75 - Agree 1 - Strongly Agree	470	0.39	0.26	0-1	5, 6, 7, 8, 9
7. More equality would reduce problems	“If people were treated more equally in this country we would have fewer problems.”	0 - Strongly Disagree .25 - Disagree .5 - Neutral .75 - Agree 1 - Strongly Agree	470	0.60	0.25	0-1	5, 6, 7, 8, 9
8. Society should do whatever necessary for equal opportunity	“Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed.”	0 - Strongly Disagree .25 - Disagree .5 - Neutral .75 - Agree 1 - Strongly Agree	470	0.70	0.25	0-1	5, 6, 7, 8, 9
9. People who fail should blame selves, not system	“Most people who fail should not blame the system; they have only themselves to blame.” (Reverse coded in index)	0 - Strongly Disagree .25 - Disagree .5 - Neutral .75 - Agree 1 - Strongly Agree	470	0.51	0.25	0-1	5, 6, 7, 8, 9
Individual liberalism	“On most political matters do you consider yourself to be:”	0 - Strongly conservative .25 - Moderately conservative .5 - Neither, middle of the road .75 - Moderately liberal 1 - Strongly liberal *Don't Know, Other recoded to .5	470	0.47	0.30	0-1	5, 6, 7, 8, 9
Pre-deliberation Confidence in speaking ability	“I am frequently frustrated by my inability to express my opinions to others.”	0 - Strongly Disagree .25 - Disagree .5 - Neutral .75 - Agree 1 - Strongly Agree	470	0.32	0.24	0-1	5
Confidence index	Additive index that combines the next six variables together ($\alpha = 0.71$), rescaled to run between 0-1	0 - Low confidence 1 - High confidence	470	0.58	0.18	0-1	6

Variable	Description	Scale Coding	N	Mean	St. Dev	Empirical Range	Ch.
1. Confidence in political issues	Participant feels he/she has good understanding of political issues	0 - Strongly Disagree .25 - Disagree .5 - Neutral .75 - Agree 1 - Strongly Agree	470	0.64	0.24	0-1	6
2. Complexity of political issues	Participant feels sometimes political issues are too complex	0 - Strongly Agree .25 - Agree .5 - Neutral .75 - Disagree 1 - Strongly Disagree	470	0.61	0.25	0-1	6
3. Effective participation in groups	Believe that participant effectively participates in groups on political issues	0 - Strongly Disagree .25 - Disagree .5 - Neutral .75 - Agree 1 - Strongly Agree	470	0.72	0.20	0-1	6
4. Articulate	Frustrated by inability to express self	0 - Strongly Agree .25 - Agree .5 - Neutral .75 - Disagree 1 - Strongly Disagree	470	0.68	0.24	0-1	6
5. Relative Confidence	Confidence in ability compared to other people	0 - Strongly Disagree .25 - Disagree .5 - Neutral .75 - Agree 1 - Strongly Agree	470	0.65	0.21	0-1	6
6. Confidence in New Tasks	Confidence in ability on new tasks	0 - Strongly Disagree .25 - Disagree .5 - Neutral .75 - Agree 1 - Strongly Agree	470	0.72	0.20	.25-1	6
High Confidence	Respondent scored above median for confidence index	Dummy variable indicating confidence score was above median	470	0.50	0.50	0-1	6

Variable	Description	Scale Coding	N	Mean	St. Dev	Empirical Range	Ch.
Comfort with disagreement	“I feel uneasy and uncomfortable when people argue about politics.”	1 -Strongly Agree 2- Agree 3- Neutral 4- Disagree 5- Strongly Disagree	470	3.59	1.02	1-5	6
Empathy	“I easily put myself in the shoes of those who are in discomfort”	1 -Strongly Agree 2- Agree 3- Neutral 4- Disagree 5- Strongly Disagree	470	2.30	0.82	1-5	6
Negative quiz feedback	Proportion of questions for which participant received negative feedback	Individual-level proportion	470	0.16	0.17	0-0.73	6
<i>Pre-deliberation Redistribution Preferences (Individual-Level)</i>							
Maximize floor (pre-deliberation)	“Rank the following 4 principles of distributive justice according to your personal preference. Place the principles in the correct order by clicking on a principle and dragging it to its appropriate location.”	Average rank	468	2.80	0.97	1-4	9
No redistribution (pre-deliberation)		Average rank	468	2.92	1.11	1-4	9
Set floor (pre-deliberation)		Average rank	468	1.59	0.83	1-4	9
Set range (pre-deliberation)		Average rank	468	2.69	1.00	1-4	9
Pre-deliberation certainty	“How do you feel about your ranking of these principles?”	1 – Very Unsure 2 – Unsure 3 – No Opinion 4 – Sure 5 – Very Sure	470	3.45	1.03	1-5	9
Preference matched pre-deliberation majority preference	The person’s pre-deliberation preference for a principle of redistribution matched the principle preferred by the majority prior to deliberation. <u>Response Options:</u> Maximize the Floor Income No Taxes or Redistribution Set a Floor Constraint Set a Range Constraint	Dummy variable coded 1 if person’s top preference matched the majority pre-deliberation preference, 0 otherwise. Groups with no pre-deliberation majority are coded as 0	470	0.56	0.50	0-1	5

Variable	Description	Scale Coding	N	Mean	St. Dev	Empirical Range	Ch.
Pre-deliberation preference for floor principle	Respondent ranks “set floor” principle highest	Dummy variable indicating preference for floor principle	470	0.60	0.49	0-1	7
Pre-deliberation preference for maximum redistribution principle	Respondent ranks “maximum redistribution” principle highest	Dummy variable indicating preference for maximum redistribution principle	470	0.11	0.31	0-1	7
Pre-deliberation preference for no redistribution	Respondent ranks “no redistribution” principle highest	Dummy variable indicating preference for no redistribution	470	0.16	0.36	0-1	7
<i>Attitudes and Redistribution Preferences (Group-Level)</i>							
Number of Individuals Favoring No Redistribution	# of subjects in group ranking “no redistribution” first in a ranking of principles of distribution prior to deliberation.	Group-level count	64*	0.77	0.73	0-2	5
			94	0.78	0.76	0-3	5
Number of Individuals Favoring Maximum Redistribution	# of subjects in group ranking “maximize the floor” (maximize the minimum amount guaranteed to the poorest) first in a ranking of principles of distribution prior to deliberation.	Group-level count	64*	0.48	0.67	0-3	5
			94	0.53	0.71	0-3	5
Number of egalitarians	# of subjects in group scoring above the midpoint of 0.5 on scale of egalitarianism.	Group-level count	64*	2.68	1.26	0-5	5, 6, 7, 8, 9
			94	2.54	1.26	0-5	5, 6, 7, 8, 9
Number of liberals	# of subjects in group scoring above the midpoint of 0.5 on liberalism.	Group-level count	64*	1.86	1.55	0-5	5, 6, 7, 8, 9
			94	1.83	1.56	0-5	5, 6, 7, 8, 9
Average warmth of feeling toward poor	Average feeling thermometer of all group members toward the poor (not asked of initial 16 groups)	Group-level average	78	62.06	8.28	39-88	9

*Mixed-gender groups only

Table B2.2: Deliberation Stage Variables

Variable	Description	Scale Coding	N	Mean	St. Dev	Empirical Range	Ch.
<i>Talk Statistics (Individual-Level)</i>							
Talk time	Individual subject's talk time in minutes.	Time in minutes	470	3.85	3.16	0.09-16.63	5
Proportion Talk	Proportion of group talk time for each individual.	Individual-level proportion	470	0.20	0.11	0.01-0.58	5, 6, 7, 8, 9
Word count	Total words spoken by subject	Individual-level count	470	749.50	616.00	13-3298	7
Log word count	--	--	470	6.24	0.96	2.56-8.10	7
Number of speaking turns	Subject's number of speaking turns.	Individual-level count	470	41.2	28.8	1-157	8
Proportion of speaking turns	Proportion of speaking turns for each individual.	Individual-level proportion	470	0.20	0.09	0.01-0.50	8
<i>Talk Statistics (Group-Level)</i>							
Group deliberation time	Total length of group discussion in minutes, not counting researcher instructions or silences in which no one spoke. Created by adding all individual subject talk times for each group.	Time in minutes	94	19.27	10.99	4.1 -47.1	5
Gender gap in speech participation	Difference between the average Proportion Talk of men and the average Proportion Talk of women within each mixed gender group	-1 to 1	64*	0.06	0.13	-0.27-0.48	5
Gender gap in influence	Average number of influence votes in group for men minus average number of votes in group for women	-4 to 4	64*	0.62	1.27	-3-4	5
Group Gini coefficient	Inequality in talk time within each group	0-100	94	42.5	15.7	12.5-76.9	5
Group Gini coefficient (women only)	Inequality in talk time within each group (women only)	0-100	79	28.2	22.5	0-78.6	5
Female group talk	Proportion of group's talk spoken by women	Group-level proportion	94	0.45	0.36	0-1	7
<i>Care vs. Financial References (Individual-Level)</i>							
Children (Frequency)	Frequency of mentions of children or related terms (out of total words spoken)	Percentage of words spoken	470	0.13	0.24	0-1.45	7
Family (Frequency)	Frequency of mentions of family or related terms (out of total words spoken)	Percentage of words spoken	470	0.18	0.33	0-3.57	7
Poor (Frequency)	Frequency of mentions of poor or related terms (out of total words spoken)	Percentage of words spoken	470	0.40	0.60	0-6.9	7

Variable	Description	Scale Coding	N	Mean	St. Dev	Empirical Range	Ch.
Needy (Frequency)	Frequency of mentions of needy or related terms (out of total words spoken)	Percentage of words spoken	470	0.40	0.58	0-3.59	7
Rich (Frequency)	Frequency of mentions of rich or related terms (out of total words spoken)	Percentage of words spoken	470	0.12	0.25	0-1.55	7
Taxes (Frequency)	Frequency of mentions of taxes or related terms (out of total words spoken)	Percentage of words spoken	470	0.14	0.27	0-3.3	7
Salary (Frequency)	Frequency of mentions of salary or related terms (out of total words spoken)	Percentage of words spoken	470	0.29	0.39	0-2.65	7
Frequency of care issues (aggregated)	Total frequency of care issue mentions	Percentage of words spoken	470	1.11	0.99	0-7.14	7
Frequency of financial issues (aggregated)	Total frequency of financial issue mentions	Percentage of words spoken	470	0.42	0.46	0-3.3	7
Ratio of care issues to financial issues (all)	Ratio of average frequency of care topics to average frequency of financial topics	Raw means	348	1.61	2.01	0-13.21	7
Ratio of care issues to financial issues (women)	Ratio of average frequency of care topics to average frequency of financial topics	Raw means	159	2.03	2.43	0-13.21	7
Ratio of care issues to financial issues (men)	Ratio of average frequency of care topics to average frequency of financial topics	Raw means	189	1.26	1.49	0-9.93	7
Frequency of care words (TM)	Frequency of care words using TM method	Percentage of words spoken	470	1.11	0.95	0-6.67	7
Frequency of financial words (TM)	Frequency of financial words using TM method	Percentage of words spoken	470	1.63	1.15	0-6.67	7
Children (Mention)	Mention children or related terms at least once	Dummy variable indicating issue category was mentioned	470	0.37	0.48	0-1	7
Family (Mention)	Mention family related terms at least once	Dummy variable indicating issue category was mentioned	470	0.48	0.50	0-1	7
Poor (Mention)	Mention poor or related terms at least once	Dummy variable indicating issue category was mentioned	470	0.65	0.48	0-1	7
Needy (Mention)	Mention needy or related terms at least once	Dummy variable indicating issue category was mentioned	470	0.57	0.50	0-1	7
Rich (Mention)	Mention rich or related terms at least once	Dummy variable indicating issue category was mentioned	470	0.33	0.47	0-1	7
Taxes (Mention)	Mention taxes or related terms at least once	Dummy variable indicating issue category was mentioned	470	0.43	0.50	0-1	7
Salary (Mention)	Mention salary or related terms at least once	Dummy variable indicating issue category was mentioned	470	0.63	0.48	0-1	7
Mention care issues (aggregated)	Mention any care issue at least once	Dummy variable indicating issue category was mentioned	470	0.86	0.35	0-1	7

Variable	Description	Scale Coding	N	Mean	St. Dev	Empirical Range	Ch.
First mention of care topic	1st member of group to mention feminine issue	Dummy variable indicating issue category mentioned 1 st	470	0.20	0.40	0-1	7
Second mention of care topic	2nd member of group to mention feminine issue	Dummy variable indicating issue category mentioned 2 nd	470	0.19	0.40	0-1	7
Mention financial issues (aggregated)	Mention any financial issue at least once	Dummy variable indicating issue category was mentioned	470	0.74	0.44	0-1	7
<i>Care vs. Financial References (Group Level)</i>							
Average Frequency of Care Issues	Average frequency of care issue references for all group members	Group-level average	94	1.11	0.61	0.06-3.23	7
Average Frequency of Financial Issues	Average frequency of financial issue references for all group members	Group-level average	94	0.42	0.22	0.05-1.07	7
Proportion of women mentioning care issues	Proportion of women in the group who mentioned women's issues at least once	Group-level proportion	79	0.83	0.31	0-1	9
<i>Negative interruptions (individual level)</i>							
Negative Interruptions Received	Total number of negative interruptions received by each participant	Individual-level count	470	2.29	3.09	0-17	8
Proportion of Speaking Turns Receiving Negative Interruption	Proportion of participant's speaking turns that received a negative interruption	Individual-level proportion	470	0.05	0.05	0-0.29	8
Negative Proportion of Interruptions Received	Proportion of positive and negative interruptions received that were negative	Individual-level proportion	393	0.34	0.30	0-1	8
Negative Proportion of Interruptions Received from Men	Proportion of positive and negative interruptions received from men that were negative	Individual-level proportion	268	0.36	0.34	0-1	8
Negative Proportion of Interruptions Received from Women	Proportion of positive and negative interruptions received from women that were negative	Individual-level proportion	271	0.35	0.33	0-1	8
Negative Interruptions Given	Total number of negative interruptions given by each participant	Individual-level count	470	2.29	2.92	0-18	8
Elaborated Negative Interruptions Received	Total number of elaborated negative interruptions received by each participant	Individual-level count	470	1.80	2.57	0-15	8
Elaborated proportion of negative interruptions received	Proportion of negative interruptions received that were elaborated	Individual-level proportion	291	0.76	0.32	0-1	8
Elaborated Negative Interruptions Received from Men	Proportion of negative interruptions received from men that were elaborated	Individual-level proportion	180	0.79	0.33	0-1	8
Elaborated Negative Interruptions Received from Women	Proportion of negative interruptions received from women that were elaborated	Individual-level proportion	187	0.74	0.34	0-1	8

Variable	Description	Scale Coding	N	Mean	St. Dev	Empirical Range	Ch.
Elaborated Negative Interruptions Given	Total number of elaborated negative interruptions given by each participant	Individual-level count	470	1.80	2.43	0-13	8
Negative Interruptions Received and Only Completed by Recipient	Proportion of all negative interruptions received where only the recipient (and not the giver) completed his or her sentence	Individual-level proportion	291	0.23	0.30	0-1	8
Negative Interruptions Received Completed by Giver	Proportion of negative interruptions received by each participant that were completed by the giver	Individual-level proportion	291	0.66	0.33	0-1	8
Negative Interruptions Received Completed by the Recipient	Proportion of negative interruptions received by each participant that were completed by the recipient	Individual-level proportion	291	0.68	0.32	0-1	8
Negative Interruptions Received from Men Completed by the Giver	Proportion of negative interruptions received from men that were completed by the giver	Individual-level proportion	180	0.65	0.37	0-1	8
Negative Interruptions Received from Men Completed by the Recipient	Proportion of negative interruptions received from men that were completed by the recipient	Individual-level proportion	180	0.68	0.35	0-1	8
Negative Interruptions Received from Women Completed by Recipient	Proportion of negative interruptions received from women that were completed by the recipient	Individual-level proportion	187	0.70	0.34	0-1	8
Negative Interruptions Received from Women and Only Completed by Recipient	Proportion of all negative interruptions received where only the recipient (and not the giver) completed his or her sentence	Individual-level proportion	291	0.23	0.30	0-1	8
Negative Interruptions Received from Women Completed by Giver	Proportion of negative interruptions received from women that were completed by the giver	Individual-level proportion	187	0.66	0.34	0-1	8
<i>Positive Interruptions (Individual-Level)</i>							
Positive Interruptions Received	Total number of positive interruptions received by each participant	Individual-level count	470	3.95	5.03	0-38	8
Proportion of Speaking Turns Receiving Positive Interruption	Proportion of participant's speaking turns that received a positive interruption	Individual-level proportion	470	0.09	0.09	0-0.67	8
Positive Interruptions Given	Total number of positive interruptions given by each participant	Individual-level count	470	3.95	4.74	0-36	8
Elaborated Positive Interruptions Received	Total number of elaborated positive interruptions received by each participant	Individual-level count	470	1.63	2.46	0-24	8
Elaborated proportion of positive interruptions received	Proportion of positive interruptions received that were elaborated	Individual-level proportion	363	0.41	0.33	0-1	8

Variable	Description	Scale Coding	N	Mean	St. Dev	Empirical Range	Ch.
Elaborated Proportion of Positive Interruptions Received from Men	Proportion of positive interruptions received from men that were elaborated	Individual-level proportion	231	0.40	0.36	0-1	8
Elaborated Proportion of Positive Interruptions Received from Women	Proportion of positive interruptions received from women that were elaborated	Individual-level proportion	242	0.40	0.35	0-1	8
Elaborated Positive Interruptions Given	Total number of elaborated positive interruptions given by each participant	Individual-level count	470	1.63	2.44	0-19	8
Elaborated proportion of positive interruptions given	Proportion of positive interruptions given that were elaborated	Individual-level proportion	470	0.03	0.04	0-0.30	8
<i>Neutral Interruptions (Individual-Level)</i>							
Neutral Interruptions Received	Total number of neutral interruptions received by each participant	Individual-level count	470	0.90	1.50	0-9	8
Elaborated Neutral Interruptions Received	Total number of elaborated neutral interruptions received by each participant	Individual-level count	470	0.47	0.94	0-8	8
Neutral Interruptions Given	Total number of neutral interruptions given by each participant	Individual-level count	470	0.90	1.35	0-8	8
Elaborated Neutral Interruptions Given	Total number of elaborated neutral interruptions given by each participant	Individual-level count	470	0.47	0.86	0-6	8
<i>Sentence Completions (Individual-Level)</i>							
Received Sentence Completed by Recipient	Total number of interruptions received where the participant finished his or her sentence	Individual-level count	470	5.21	6.04	0-34	8
Received Sentence Completed by Giver	Total number of interruptions received where the giver finished his or her sentence	Individual-level count	470	4.54	5.29	0-41	8
Given Sentence Completed by Recipient	Total number of interruptions given where the recipient finished his or her sentence	Individual-level count	470	5.21	5.66	0-38	8
Given Sentence Completed by Giver	Total number of interruptions given where the participant finished his or her sentence	Individual-level count	470	4.54	5.06	0-32	8
<i>Interruptions (Group-Level)</i>							
Group Negative Interruptions	Total number of interruptions in the group that had a negative disposition	Group-level count	94	11.45	11.55	0-48	8
Group Positive Interruptions	Total number of interruptions in the group that had a positive disposition	Group-level count	94	19.72	17.84	0-96	8

Variable	Description	Scale Coding	N	Mean	St. Dev	Empirical Range	Ch.
Group Neutral Interruptions	Total number of interruptions in the group that had a neutral disposition	Group-level count	94	4.48	5.02	0-28	8
Group Elaborated Negative Interruptions	Total number of interruptions in the group that had a negative disposition and were elaborated	Group-level count	94	8.98	9.42	0-37	8
Group Elaborated Positive Interruptions	Total number of interruptions in the group that had a positive disposition and were elaborated	Group-level count	94	8.17	9.02	0-56	8
Group Elaborated Neutral Interruptions	Total number of interruptions in the group that had a neutral disposition and were elaborated	Group-level count	94	2.36	2.96	0-17	8
Ratio of women to men receiving negative interruptions	The average proportion of negative interruptions received by the women in the group divided by the average for men	Group-level ratio	53	1.95	3.66	23.42	8
Ratio of women to men giving negative interruptions	The average proportion of negative interruptions given by the women in the group divided by the average for men	Group-level ratio	50	1.66	2.11	10.55	8
Ratio of women to men receiving positive interruptions	The average proportion of positive interruptions received by the women in the group divided by the average for men	Group-level count	59	1.06	1.14	0-4.65	8
<i>Redistribution Outcomes (Individual-Level)</i>							
Group choice matched preferences (Pre-deliberation preference matched group outcome)	The person's pre-deliberation preference for principle of redistribution matched group decision.	Dummy variable created from individual preferences and group outcomes	470	0.58	0.49	0-1	5
Expressions of Support for No Taxes or Redistribution	Number of times an individual expressed support for no taxes or redistribution	Individual-level count	470	0.16	0.47	0-3	9
Individual first preference expressed	First expressed preference for guaranteed minimum income to the poor	Dollar amount, in thousands	237	27.39	8.42	0-60	9
Individual Maximum Endorsed Preference	Highest preferred guaranteed minimum income to the poor	Dollar amount, in thousands	237	28.45	8.46	0-60	9
Individual Minimum Endorsed Preference	Lowest preferred guaranteed minimum income to the poor	Dollar amount, in thousands	237	25.91	8.02	0-55	9
Individual last preference expressed	Last expressed preference for guaranteed minimum income to the poor	Dollar amount, in thousands	237	26.92	7.91	0-55	9
Endorsements of Principles Other than Most Preferred	Individual expressions of support for any principle other than that ranked highest prior to deliberation	Individual-level count	468	0.74	1.31	0-9	9

Variable	Description	Scale Coding	N	Mean	St. Dev	Empirical Range	Ch.
Opposition to Principles Other than Most Preferred	Individual expressions of opposition to any principle other than that ranked highest prior to deliberation	Individual-level count	468	0.11	0.35	0-3	9
<i>Redistribution Outcomes (Group-Level)</i>							
Group minimum endorsed preference	Lowest group-preferred guaranteed minimum income to the poor	Dollar amount, in thousands	79	26.34	7.74	10-50	9
Group maximum endorsed preference (Maximum endorsed floor/safety net)	Highest group-preferred guaranteed minimum income to the poor	Dollar amount, in thousands	79	28.47	7.65	10-50	9
Group generosity toward the poor (Group safety net generosity; Guaranteed minimum income)	Group's chosen dollar amount for a minimum standard of living	Dollar amount	94	27,074	8,286	0-50,000	9

*Mixed-gender groups only

Table B2.3: Post-Deliberation Variables

Variable	Description	Scale Coding	N	Mean	St. Dev	Empirical Range	Ch.
<i>Post-Deliberation Discussion Evaluation (Individual-Level)</i>							
Influence (own vote included)	“Who was the most influential member of your group during the group discussion? (Indicate using the letter on the nameplate in front of the group members.)” [A, B, C, D, E]	Number of votes subject received	470	1.00	1.34	0-5	5
Influence (own vote excluded)	“Who was the most influential member of your group during the group discussion? (Indicate using the letter on the nameplate in front of the group members.)” [A, B, C, D, E]	Number of votes subject received	470	0.83	1.13	0-4	5, 8
Different perspectives welcome	“All different perspectives were welcome in our discussion.”	0 - Strongly Disagree .25 - Disagree .5 - No preference .75 - Agree 1 - Strongly Agree	470	0.75	0.18	0-1	5, 7
A few didn't dominate	“A few people dominated the discussion.”	0 - Strongly Agree .25 - Agree .5 - No preference .75 - Disagree 1 - Strongly Disagree	470	0.51	0.27	0-1	5, 7
My voice heard	“I feel like my voice was heard during the group discussion.”	0 - Strongly Disagree .25 - Disagree .5 - No preference .75 - Agree 1 - Strongly Agree	470	0.80	0.16	0-1	5, 7, 8
My opinions influential (self-rating of speaker's influence)	“My opinions were influential in shaping the group discussion and final decision.”	0 - Strongly Disagree .25 - Disagree .5 - No preference .75 - Agree 1 - Strongly Agree	470	0.68	0.20	0-1	5, 7, 8
Satisfaction Index	Additive index that combines the next eight items together ($\alpha=0.77$), rescaled to run from 0-1.	0 - Strongly Disagree .25 - Disagree .5 - No preference .75 - Agree 1 - Strongly Agree	470	0.71	0.16	0-1	5, 7

Variable	Description	Scale Coding	N	Mean	St. Dev	Empirical Range	Ch.
1. Satisfied with discussion	“How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your group discussion?”	0 - Very dissatisfied .25 - Somewhat dissatisfied .5 - Neither .75 - Somewhat satisfied 1 - Very satisfied	470	0.84	0.21	0-1	5, 7, 8
2. Discussion was fair	Group discussion was fair.	0 - Strongly Agree .25 - Agree .5 - No preference .75 - Disagree 1 - Strongly Disagree	470	0.88	0.19	0-1	5, 7
3. Group members share basic values	Group members shared “the same basic values.”	0 - Strongly Disagree .25 - Disagree .5 - No preference .75 - Agree 1 - Strongly Agree	470	0.71	0.21	0-1	5, 7
4. Accomplish more	“I feel like I accomplished more because I worked with other people.”	0 - Strongly Disagree .25 - Disagree .5 - No preference .75 - Agree 1 - Strongly Agree	470	0.65	0.21	0-1	5, 7
5. Group not harder	“Group work made everything slower and harder to accomplish.” (Reverse coded in index.)	0 - Strongly Disagree .25 - Disagree .5 - No preference .75 - Agree 1 - Strongly Agree	470	0.68	0.23	0-1	5, 7
6. Group showed respect and courtesy	Group members treated each other with “respect and courtesy.”	0 - Strongly Disagree .25 - Disagree .5 - No preference .75 - Agree 1 - Strongly Agree	470	0.87	0.16	0-1	5, 7
7. Different perspectives welcome in group	“All different perspectives were welcome” in the discussion.	0 - Strongly Disagree .25 - Disagree .5 - No preference .75 - Agree 1 - Strongly Agree	470	0.75	0.18	0-1	5, 7

Variable	Description	Scale Coding	N	Mean	St. Dev	Empirical Range	Ch.
8. Disagreement made discussion difficult	Disagreement made discussion “difficult.” (Reverse coded in index.)	0 - Strongly Agree .25 - Agree .5 - No preference .75 - Disagree 1 - Strongly Disagree	470	0.76	0.23	0-1	5, 7
<i>Post-Deliberation Redistribution Preferences (Individual-Level)</i>							
Maximize floor (post-deliberation)	“Rank the following 4 principles of distributive justice according to your personal preference. Place the principles in the correct order by clicking on a principle and dragging it to its appropriate location.”	Average rank	464	2.91	0.89	1-4	9
No redistribution (post-deliberation)		Average rank	464	2.94	1.03	1-4	9
Set floor (post-deliberation)		Average rank	464	1.31	0.59	1-4	9
Set range (post-deliberation)		Average rank	464	2.84	0.96	1-4	9
Post-deliberation certainty	“How do you feel about your ranking of these principles?”	1 – Very Unsure 2 – Unsure 3 – No Opinion 4 – Sure 5 – Very Sure	470	3.99	0.77	1-5	9

C SUPPORTING TABLES AND FIGURES BY CHAPTER

*Chapter 5***Table C5.1: Effect of Proportion Talk on Satisfaction with Group Discussion
(Mixed-Gender Groups Only)**

VARIABLES	Women	Men
Proportion Talk	0.221** (0.127)	0.080 (0.135)
Egalitarianism	-0.006 (0.150)	0.074 (0.130)
Number of Egalitarians	-0.011 (0.013)	-0.007 (0.016)
Group Choice Matched Preferences	0.117*** (0.033)	0.085** (0.037)
Constant	0.785*** (0.075)	0.776*** (0.066)
Observations	157	163
R-squared	0.120	0.063
Control for Outlier	Yes	Yes
Control for Experimental Location	Yes	Yes

Note: OLS regression coefficients with cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
 *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$, one-tailed test.

Table C5.2: Determinants of the Gender Gap in Speech Participation and the Gender Gap in Influence, Controls for Liberals (Group-Level Data)

	(1) Gender Gap in Speech Participation	(2) Gender Gap in Speech Participation	(3) Gender Gap in Influence	(4) Gender Gap in Influence
Majority Rule	0.180** (0.080)	0.217** (0.089)	1.071* (0.753)	0.826 (0.844)
Number of Women	0.028* (0.020)	0.029* (0.020)	0.250* (0.190)	0.250* (0.191)
Majority x Number of Women	-0.072** (0.030)	-0.070** (0.030)	-0.568** (0.279)	-0.579** (0.280)
Number of Liberals	-0.015 (0.018)	-0.008 (0.020)	-0.170 (0.172)	-0.221 (0.190)
Majority x Number of Liberals		-0.021 (0.022)		0.139 (0.212)
# Favoring Maximum Redistribution	0.018 (0.026)	0.015 (0.026)	-0.066 (0.245)	-0.044 (0.249)
# Favoring No Redistribution	-0.017 (0.026)	-0.018 (0.026)	0.039 (0.246)	0.044 (0.247)
Constant	0.015 (0.070)	0.002 (0.072)	0.529 (0.663)	0.617 (0.680)
Observations	64	64	64	64
R-squared	0.165	0.178	0.168	0.174
Control for Outlier	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control for Experimental Location	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, one-tailed test.


Table C5.3: Determinants of Speech Participation in Mixed-Gender Groups with Control for Liberalism (Individual-Level Analysis)

VARIABLES	(1) PercentTime	(2) PercentTime
Female	0.000 (0.049)	-0.003 (0.050)
Majority Rule	0.043** (0.024)	0.043** (0.024)
Female x Majority Rule	-0.112** (0.063)	-0.113** (0.064)
Number of Women	0.024** (0.012)	0.021** (0.012)
Female x Number of Women	-0.023 (0.020)	-0.021 (0.020)
Majority Rule x Number of Women	-0.023* (0.015)	-0.021* (0.015)
Female x Majority x Number of Women	0.046** (0.025)	0.044** (0.025)
Egalitarianism	-0.034 (0.035)	
Match Group's Pre-deliberation Preferences	0.002 (0.011)	0.003 (0.011)
Liberalism		-0.035 (0.024)
Constant	0.191*** (0.025)	0.188*** (0.020)
Observations	320	320
R-squared	0.070	0.073
Control for Outlier	Yes	Yes
Control for Experimental Location	Yes	Yes


Note: Dependent variable is Proportion Talk. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, one-tailed test.

Figure C5.1: Gender Gap in Percent Speaking Turns by Experimental Conditions



Note: Stars indicate gender gaps that are significantly different from 0. ** $p < .05$, * $p < .10$, one-tailed difference of means test.

Figure C5.2: Influence for Men and Women by Experimental Condition

Chapter 6

Table C6.1: Comparing the Effect of Confidence Across Conditions, Women Only

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	1-2 Women	Majority Rule	Majority Rule 1 Woman and 4 Women Groups Only
Confidence	0.039 (0.098)	0.307** (0.135)	0.445** (0.189)
Majority Rule	-0.198*** (0.074)		
Majority Rule x Confidence	0.315** (0.165)		
Majority Women		0.138** (0.066)	0.197** (0.082)
Confidence x Majority Women		-0.179 (0.149)	-0.285* (0.201)
Constant	0.273** (0.119)	-0.078 (0.095)	-0.193** (0.107)
Observations	44	75	41
R-squared	0.367	0.288	0.415

Note: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. Models include controls for income, age, education, experimental location, ideology, negative quiz feedback, comfort with disagreement, and empathy. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, one-tailed test.

Table C6.2: Effects of Negative Quiz Feedback Across Genders and Conditions


VARIABLES	(1) 1-2 Women Majority Rule	(2) 3-4 Women Majority Rule	(3) Majority Rule Women Only	(4) Majority Rule Men Only
Female	0.010 (0.052)	-0.068* (0.039)		
Negative Feedback	-0.055 (0.214)	-0.491*** (0.115)	-0.252** (0.107)	-0.043 (0.215)
Female x Negative Feedback	-0.323* (0.239)	0.331** (0.137)		
Majority Women			0.018 (0.038)	0.050 (0.040)
Majority Women x Negative Feedback			0.149 (0.148)	-0.334* (0.221)
Constant	0.138 (0.086)	0.083 (0.056)	0.047 (0.076)	0.127 (0.087)
Observations	80	73	75	78
R-squared	0.239	0.327	0.283	0.129

Note: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. Models include controls for income, age, education, experimental location, ideology, confidence, comfort with disagreement, and empathy. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$, one-tailed test.


Chapter 7

Figure C7.1: Effect of Controls for Group & Individual Egalitarianism on Average Care Category Frequency and Mention (Predicted Values)

Panel A: Frequency



Panel B: Mention



Note: Majority Rule Groups Only

Chapter 8

i. Additional Results, Summarized

1. As noted in the paper, minority women under majority rule receive positive affirmations at less than half the rate enjoyed by men in their group (Figure 2). Here we note that the results are similar when we subtract women's from men's average instead of taking the ratio of women's to men's. In addition, the women/men ratio of the negatively interrupted proportion of the person's speaking turns does not change in a statistically discernible way (results not shown). Neither does the gender ratio of the interrupting proportion of the issuer's speaking turns, for either positive or negative interruptions (results not shown).
2. If we collapse mixed and enclave groups in Figure 4, Panel A, a similar pattern holds. The negative balance of interruptions received is influential for women and men ($B = -1.18$, $SE = 0.31$, $p < 0.001$ among women, versus $B = -0.64$, $SE = 0.32$, $p < 0.05$ for men). However, when we control for participants' proportion of talk time instead of speaking turns, the effect of the person's negative balance of interruptions received is very similar for women though smaller ($B = -0.682$, $SE = 0.245$, $p < 0.01$). The effect for men disappears ($B = -0.226$, $SE = 0.265$).

ii. **Supplementary Tables and Figures**

Table C8.ii.1: Negative Proportion of Negative or Positive Interruptions Received, for Men and for Women, Mixed Groups

	(1)	(2)
	Women	Men
Majority Rule	0.30 (0.18)	-0.05 (0.11)
Number of Women	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.03)
Majority Rule x Number of Women	-0.11* (0.06)	0.03 (0.05)
Number of Speaking Turns	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)
Egalitarianism	-0.10 (0.17)	-0.19 (0.17)
Number of Egalitarians	0.08*** (0.02)	-0.04 (0.04)
Constant	0.18 (0.15)	0.37*** (0.10)
Observations	128	141
R-squared	0.19	0.09
Control for Experimental Location	Yes	Yes

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, two-tailed test.

Table C8.ii.2: Formal Test of Mediation

	Others' Ratings of Speaker's Influence	Self-Rating of Speaker's Influence
Average Causal Mediation Effect	0.29 [0.02 – 0.67]	0.08 [0.01 – 0.15]
Direct Effect	-0.08 [-1.26 – 1.11]	-0.22 [-0.42 – -0.03]
Total Effect	0.21 [-0.81 – 1.19]	-0.15 [-0.30 – -0.01]

Note: 90% confidence intervals in brackets below estimates. Estimates based on 1,000 simulations. Models include main effects for group gender composition and for decision rule as well as controls for total # of comments, egalitarianism, and experimental location. These are only partial estimates, as Imai et al. (2010) have not yet extended their method to include the interaction + main effect when the model includes an interaction between experimental conditions.

Table C8.ii.3:
Panel A: Effect of Proportion of Turns Receiving Positive Interruptions and Confidence on Talk Time, Mixed Groups

	(1)	(2)
	Women	Men
Confidence	0.042* (0.021)	-0.012 (0.024)
Proportion Speaking Turns w/ Positive Interruption	1.176* (0.630)	0.667 (0.679)
Confidence x Prop. Turns w/ Positive Interruption	-0.270 (0.813)	0.436 (0.810)
Outlier Control	-0.134** (0.064)	-- --
Number of Speaking Turns	0.002*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)
Constant	0.055** (0.021)	0.098*** (0.019)
Observations	157	163
R-squared	0.40	0.31
Control for Experimental Location	Yes	Yes

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, two-tailed test.

Table C8.ii.3:
Panel B: Effect of Confidence and Proportion of Turns Receiving Positive Interruptions on Influence Votes, Mixed Groups

	(1) Women	(2) Men
Confidence	0.701* (0.401)	0.140 (0.297)
Proportion Speaking Turns w/ Positive Interruption	26.088** (10.930)	16.297** (6.648)
Confidence x Prop. Turns w/ Positive Interruption	-20.119 (13.951)	-7.317 (8.523)
Outlier Control	-18.219*** (1.433)	-- --
Number of Speaking Turns	0.016*** (0.004)	0.011*** (0.002)
Constant	-2.012*** (0.508)	-0.772*** (0.222)
Alpha	0.833 (0.355)	0.208 (0.145)
Observations	157	163
Control for Experimental Location	Yes	Yes

Note: Coefficients from a negative binomial model. Robust standard errors in parentheses
 Models in Panels A and B include a control for an outlier that receives well over 2 SD more positive interruptions than anyone else in the sample; patterns are similar if the outlier control is removed. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, two-tailed test.

Table C8.ii.4: Effect of Confidence and Proportion of Turns Receiving Positive Interruptions on Self-efficacy, Mixed Groups

	(1)	(2)
	Women	Men
Confidence	0.096* (0.051)	0.018 (0.039)
Proportion Speaking Turns w/ Positive Interruption	4.799*** (1.330)	0.283 (1.256)
Confidence x Prop. Turns w/ Positive Interruption	-3.360* (1.933)	0.499 (1.637)
Outlier Control	-0.333*** (0.120)	-- --
Constant	0.550*** (0.037)	0.685*** (0.031)
Observations	157	163
R-squared	0.11	0.01
Control for Experimental Location	Yes	Yes

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Models include a control for an outlier that receives well over 2 SD more positive interruptions than anyone else in the sample; patterns are similar if the outlier control is removed. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, two-tailed test.

Table C8.ii.5: Effect of the Proportion of Speaking Turns Receiving Positive Interruptions on Male Proportion Talk

	Men in Enclaves		Minority Female (1-2 women)				Majority Female (3-4 women)			
	(1) Majority Rule	(2) Unanimous Rule	(3) Majority Rule From Women	(4) Unanimous Rule From Men	(5) Majority Rule From Women	(6) Unanimous Rule From Men	(7) Majority Rule From Women	(8) Unanimous Rule From Men	(9) Majority Rule From Women	(10) Unanimous Rule From Men
Prop. w/ Positive	1.018 (1.063)	0.292 (0.364)	0.248 (1.240)	0.878 (0.527)	-0.367 (0.909)	0.945 (1.335)	0.657 (0.440)	1.074* (0.546)	0.295 (0.320)	2.113*** (0.471)
Constant	0.180*** (0.019)	0.194*** (0.007)	0.225*** (0.035)	0.235*** (0.027)	0.264*** (0.044)	0.229*** (0.035)	0.206*** (0.011)	0.194*** (0.013)	0.200*** (0.011)	0.165*** (0.011)
Observations	35	40	22	14	26	18	57	57	58	58
R-squared	0.03	0.01	0.00	0.08	0.00	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.01	0.16
Prop. w/ Positive	1.132 (1.187)	0.419 (0.352)	-0.002 (1.140)	1.012 (0.657)	0.012 (0.867)	0.828 (1.514)	0.681 (0.443)	1.109* (0.611)	0.368 (0.319)	2.155*** (0.529)
Egalitarianism	-0.018 (0.182)	0.161 (0.140)	-0.053 (0.124)	-0.043 (0.148)	-0.182 (0.177)	-0.095 (0.191)	-0.013 (0.085)	-0.032 (0.092)	0.064 (0.066)	0.041 (0.062)
Constant	0.178* (0.074)	0.118* (0.061)	0.272*** (0.057)	0.257*** (0.057)	0.305*** (0.096)	0.257* (0.112)	0.208*** (0.042)	0.209*** (0.037)	0.186*** (0.030)	0.142*** (0.028)
Observations	35	40	22	14	26	18	57	57	58	58
R-squared	0.03	0.08	0.06	0.09	0.10	0.07	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.17
Control for Experimental Location	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes


Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, two-tailed test.

Table C8.ii.6: Proportion of Negatively Interrupted Turns that were Completed without Interrupter Completion, Mixed Groups

	(1)	(2)
	Women by Men and Women	Men by Men and Women
Majority Rule	0.0720 (0.1381)	0.1126 (0.1335)
Number of Women	0.0539* (0.0269)	0.0114 (0.0317)
Majority Rule x Number of Women	-0.0446 (0.0440)	-0.0131 (0.0666)
Egalitarianism	-0.3593 (0.3174)	-0.0426 (0.1496)
Number of Egalitarians	0.0552* (0.0321)	-0.0292 (0.0407)
Constant	0.0946 (0.1438)	0.2642*** (0.0986)
Observations	92	104
R-squared	0.12	0.05
Control for Experimental Location	Yes	Yes

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, two-tailed test.

Figure C8.ii.1: Predicted Self-Efficacy among Women with Low and High Confidence, Mixed Groups



iii. Alternative Estimator Models

Table C8.iii.1: Negative Proportion of Men's and Women's Interruptions Received, Separately by Male and Female Interrupters, Mixed Groups (compare to Table 1)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Women from Men		Women from Women		Men from Men		Men from Women	
	OLS	Tobit	OLS	Tobit	OLS	Tobit	OLS	Tobit
Majority Rule	0.470**	1.004**	0.066	0.131	0.078	0.118	-0.041	0.038
	(0.205)	(0.490)	(0.373)	(0.666)	(0.159)	(0.271)	(0.124)	(0.236)
Number of Women	-0.018	-0.070	-0.109*	-0.190**	0.050	0.064	0.002	0.056
	(0.052)	(0.115)	(0.060)	(0.091)	(0.060)	(0.103)	(0.036)	(0.071)
Majority Rule x Number of Women	-0.185***	-0.404**	-0.038	-0.073	-0.118	-0.199	0.048	0.035
	(0.068)	(0.174)	(0.105)	(0.187)	(0.093)	(0.170)	(0.055)	(0.100)
Number of Speaking Turns	0.004***	0.010***	0.003**	0.005**	0.003**	0.005***	0.003***	0.007***
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Egalitarianism	0.040	0.031	-0.556**	-0.857**	-0.277	-0.505	0.021	-0.058
	(0.244)	(0.481)	(0.223)	(0.380)	(0.229)	(0.386)	(0.167)	(0.292)
Number of Egalitarians	0.089**	0.242**	0.106***	0.184***	0.008	-0.008	-0.078*	-0.148*
	(0.042)	(0.111)	(0.038)	(0.065)	(0.038)	(0.071)	(0.040)	(0.081)
Constant	-0.068	-0.728	0.729**	0.822*	0.246*	0.166	0.277**	0.015
	(0.190)	(0.463)	(0.277)	(0.446)	(0.137)	(0.219)	(0.125)	(0.231)
Observations	102	102	94	94	107	107	111	111
R-squared	0.24	--	0.17	--	0.13	--	0.12	--
Control for Experimental Location	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, two-tailed test.

Table C8.iii.2: Proportion of Turns Receiving Positive and Negative Interruptions, Mixed Groups (compare to Table 2)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Women Positive		Women Negative		Men Positive		Men Negative	
	OLS	Tobit	OLS	Tobit	OLS	Tobit	OLS	Tobit
Majority Rule	-0.025** (0.011)	-0.037** (0.015)	0.003 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.013)	0.005 (0.007)	0.004 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.007)
Number of Women	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.002)
Majority Rule x Number of Women	0.007* (0.004)	0.011** (0.005)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.004)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.003)
Egalitarianism	-0.020** (0.010)	-0.030** (0.013)	-0.011 (0.007)	-0.017 (0.011)	0.013 (0.009)	0.016 (0.011)	-0.000 (0.007)	0.000 (0.009)
Number of Egalitarians	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)
Constant	0.041*** (0.011)	0.045*** (0.013)	0.012* (0.006)	0.010 (0.009)	0.018*** (0.005)	0.015** (0.006)	0.014*** (0.004)	0.012** (0.006)
Observations	157	157	157	157	163	163	163	163
R-squared	0.07	--	0.11	--	0.04	--	0.03	--
Control for Experimental Location	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, two-tailed test.

Table C8.iii.3: Elaborated Proportion of Positive Interruptions to Women from Men, Mixed Groups (compare to Table 3)

	(1)	(2)
	OLS	Tobit
Majority Rule	0.545** (0.239)	1.174** (0.556)
Number of Women	0.077 (0.058)	0.120 (0.113)
Majority Rule x Number of Women	-0.225*** (0.079)	-0.496** (0.190)
Egalitarianism	0.022 (0.284)	0.015 (0.630)
Number of Egalitarians	-0.003 (0.047)	0.023 (0.113)
Constant	0.232 (0.208)	0.018 (0.443)
Observations	83	83
R-squared	0.11	--
Control for Experimental Location	Yes	Yes

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, two-tailed test.

Table C8.iii.4 – Panel A: Effect of Negative Proportion of Interruptions Received on Others’ Ratings of Speaker’s Influence, All Groups (compare to Table 4 – Panel A)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Mixed Groups Only		Women			Men	
	NB	Tobit	Log	NB	Tobit	Log
Neg / (Neg + Pos)	-1.315*** (0.388)	-2.178*** (0.737)	-1.654*** (0.561)	-0.541* (0.318)	-0.997* (0.574)	-1.104* (0.647)
Egalitarianism	-0.181 (0.300)	-1.036 (1.547)	-1.514 (1.509)	-0.552 (0.488)	-1.171 (0.984)	-1.651^ (1.241)
Number of Speaking Turns	0.019*** (0.005)	0.038*** (0.009)	0.036*** (0.008)	0.011*** (0.002)	0.023*** (0.005)	0.029 (0.005)
Constant	-0.947** (0.472)	-1.188 (0.878)	-3.005*** (0.835)	0.035 (0.231)	0.535 (0.471)	-1.493 (0.624)
Alpha	0.646 (0.319)	-- --	-- --	0.138 (0.119)	-- --	-- --
Observations	128	128	128	141	141	141
R-squared	--	--	0.14	--	--	0.13
Pseudo R-squared	--	0.06	--	--	0.04	--
Control for Experimental Location	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Enclave Groups Only	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
		Women			Men	
	NB	Tobit	Log	NB	Tobit	Log
Neg / (Neg + Pos)	-1.098** (0.537)	-1.749* (0.919)	-1.491* (0.840)	-0.631 (0.715)	-1.258 (1.467)	-0.834 (1.135)
Egalitarianism	-1.474* (0.820)	-1.948 (1.694)	-1.141 (2.008)	-1.357* (0.754)	-3.347 (2.084)	-2.785 (1.725)
Number of Speaking Turns	0.011*** (0.004)	0.024*** (0.008)	0.025** (0.011)	0.024*** (0.007)	0.055** (0.025)	0.033** (0.015)
Constant	0.083 (0.561)	-0.187 (1.181)	-2.867* (1.379)	-1.156** (0.585)	-1.955 (1.881)	-3.144** (1.428)
Alpha	0.516 (0.315)	-- --	-- --	0.371 (0.349)	-- --	-- --
Observations	65	65	65	59	59	59
R-squared	--	--	0.09	--	--	0.18
Pseudo R-squared	--	0.04	--	--	0.11	--
Control for Experimental Location	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: NB stands for negative binomial. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, two-tailed test.

**Table C8.iii.4 – Panel B: Effect of Negative Proportion of Interruptions Received on Self-rating of Speaker’s Influence, All Groups
(compare to Table 4 – Panel B)**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Women				Men			
	Mixed		Enclave		Mixed		Enclave	
	OLS	Tobit	OLS	Tobit	OLS	Tobit	OLS	Tobit
Neg / (Neg + Pos)	-0.132** (0.053)	-0.132** (0.053)	0.084 (0.156)	0.110 (0.197)	-0.039 (0.052)	-0.041 (0.056)	-0.036 (0.063)	-0.051 (0.068)
Number of Speaking Turns	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)
Egalitarianism	-0.018 (0.088)	-0.039 (0.096)	0.039 (0.170)	-0.029 (0.205)	-0.035 (0.112)	-0.040 (0.130)	0.006 (0.109)	-0.022 (0.134)
Constant	0.688*** (0.059)	0.697*** (0.064)	0.471*** (0.131)	0.476*** (0.140)	0.690*** (0.055)	0.687*** (0.065)	0.580*** (0.051)	0.576*** (0.060)
Observations	128	128	65	65	141	141	59	59
R-squared	0.07	--	0.05	--	0.02	--	0.27	--
Control for Experimental Location	Yes							

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, two-tailed test.

iv. Fully-Saturated Control Models

Table C8.iv.1: Negative Proportion of Men's and Women's Interruptions Received, Separately by Male and Female Interrupters, Mixed Groups, Saturated Model (compare to Table 1)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Women from Men	Women from Women	Men from Men	Men from Women
Majority Rule	0.588** (0.229)	0.111 (0.368)	0.232 (0.166)	-0.055 (0.124)
Number of Women	-0.030 (0.053)	-0.115* (0.059)	0.033 (0.056)	0.004 (0.037)
Majority Rule x Number of Women	-0.146* (0.080)	-0.019 (0.116)	-0.076 (0.097)	0.044 (0.069)
Number of Egalitarians	0.129** (0.053)	0.125** (0.053)	0.062 (0.045)	-0.082** (0.041)
Majority Rule x Number of Egalitarians	-0.077 (0.067)	-0.036 (0.073)	-0.093* (0.054)	0.009 (0.055)
Number of Speaking Turns	0.005*** (0.001)	0.003* (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)
Egalitarianism	0.015 (0.242)	-0.568** (0.223)	-0.276 (0.219)	0.019 (0.166)
Constant	-0.129 (0.197)	0.695** (0.297)	0.146 (0.131)	0.286** (0.123)
Observations	102	94	107	111
R-squared	0.25	0.17	0.16	0.12
Control for Experimental Location	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, two-tailed test.

Table C8.iv.2: Proportion of Turns Receiving Positive and Negative Interruptions, Mixed Groups, Saturated Model (compare to Table 2)

	Women		Men	
	(1) Positive	(2) Negative	(3) Positive	(4) Negative
Majority Rule	-0.024*	0.006	0.005	-0.001
	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Number of Women	-0.002	-0.001	0.000	-0.002
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Majority Rule x Number of Women	0.007*	-0.002	-0.003	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.002)
Number of Egalitarians	-0.001	0.005***	0.001	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Majority Rule x Number of Egalitarians	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Egalitarianism	-0.020**	-0.011	0.013	0.000
	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.007)
Constant	0.041***	0.011*	0.017***	0.013**
	(0.013)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Observations	157	157	163	163
R-squared	0.07	0.12	0.04	0.03
Control for Experimental Location	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, two-tailed test.

Table C8.iv.3: Elaborated Proportion of Positive Interruptions to Women from Men, Mixed Groups, Saturated Model (compare to Table 3)

Majority Rule	0.602** (0.274)
Number of Women	0.074 (0.059)
Majority Rule x Number of Women	-0.205** (0.093)
Number of Egalitarians	0.020 (0.066)
Majority Rule x Number of Egalitarians	-0.041 (0.087)
Egalitarianism	0.002 (0.280)
Constant	0.199 (0.224)
Observations	83
R-squared	0.11
Control for Experimental Location	Yes

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, two-tailed test.

v. Liberal Control Models

Table C8.v.1: Negative Proportion of Men's and Women's Interruptions Received, Separately by Male and Female Interrupters, Mixed Groups, Liberalism Controls (compare to Table 1)

	(1) Women from Men	(2) Women from Women	(3) Men from Men	(4) Men from Women
Majority Rule	0.412* (0.221)	-0.061 (0.400)	0.077 (0.158)	-0.010 (0.125)
Number of Women	0.004 (0.055)	-0.072 (0.074)	0.045 (0.058)	-0.027 (0.030)
Majority Rule x Number of Women	-0.172** (0.079)	-0.007 (0.112)	-0.108 (0.095)	0.053 (0.057)
Number of Speaking Turns	0.004*** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)
Liberalism	0.022 (0.160)	0.078 (0.200)	-0.247* (0.141)	-0.110 (0.145)
Number of Liberals	0.044 (0.046)	-0.000 (0.046)	-0.020 (0.038)	-0.082** (0.035)
Constant	0.059 (0.156)	0.558** (0.255)	0.236* (0.128)	0.266** (0.106)
Observations	102	94	107	111
R-squared	0.20	0.09	0.15	0.14
Control for Experimental Location	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, two-tailed test.

Table C8.v.2: Proportion of Turns Receiving Positive and Negative Interruptions, Mixed Groups, Liberalism Controls (compare to Table 2)

	Women		Men	
	(1) Positive	(2) Negative	(3) Positive	(4) Negative
Majority Rule	-0.022** (0.011)	-0.000 (0.008)	0.005 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.005)
Number of Women	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.001)
Majority Rule x Number of Women	0.006 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	0.001 (0.002)
Liberalism	0.003 (0.006)	0.003 (0.004)	0.009 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.004)
Number of Liberals	0.002 (0.002)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.001)
Constant	0.028*** (0.009)	0.013** (0.005)	0.020*** (0.005)	0.017*** (0.004)
Observations	157	157	163	163
R-squared	0.05	0.11	0.03	0.03
Control for Experimental Location	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, two-tailed test.

Table C8.v.3: Elaborated Proportion of Positive Interruptions to Women from Men, Mixed Groups, Liberalism Controls (compare to Table 3)

Majority Rule	0.606** (0.229)
Number of Women	0.080 (0.065)
Majority Rule x Number of Women	-0.241*** (0.079)
Liberalism	0.297 (0.196)
Number of Liberals	-0.044 (0.048)
Constant	0.160 (0.170)
Observations	83
R-squared	0.13
Control for Experimental Location	Yes

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, two-tailed test.

Table C8.v.4: Effect of Negative Proportion of Interruptions Received on Others' Ratings of Speaker's Influence, All Groups, Liberalism Controls

Panel A
(compare to Table 4 – Panel A)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Women		Men	
	Mixed	Enclave	Mixed	Enclave
Neg / (Neg + Pos)	-1.315*** (0.388)	-1.014* (0.587)	-0.600* (0.319)	-0.572 (0.694)
Liberalism	-0.203 (0.586)	0.403 (0.676)	-0.942*** (0.355)	0.240 (0.767)
Number of Speaking Turns	0.019*** (0.005)	0.014*** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.002)	0.023*** (0.006)
Constant	-0.973*** (0.344)	-0.944*** (0.268)	0.083 (0.208)	-1.710*** (0.541)
Alpha	0.639 (0.325)	0.558 (0.333)	0.088 (0.117)	0.408 (0.416)
Observations	128	65	141	59
Control for Experimental Location	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Coefficients from negative binomial model. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, two-tailed test.

Table C8.v.4: Effect of Negative Proportion of Interruptions Received on Self-rating of Speaker's Influence, All Groups, Liberalism Controls

Panel B
(compare to Table 4 – Panel B)

	Women		Men	
	(1) Mixed	(2) Enclave	(3) Mixed	(4) Enclave
Neg / (Neg + Pos)	-0.133** (0.052)	0.075 (0.162)	-0.036 (0.052)	-0.037 (0.072)
Liberalism	0.011 (0.053)	0.112 (0.167)	-0.003 (0.077)	-0.101 (0.080)
Speaking Turns	0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)
Constant	0.676*** (0.035)	0.462*** (0.085)	0.677*** (0.040)	0.611*** (0.040)
Observations	128	65	141	59
R-squared	0.07	0.06	0.02	0.29
Control for Experimental Location	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, two-tailed test.

Chapter 9

**Table C9.1: Expressions of Support for No Taxes or Redistribution,
Mixed-Gender Groups Only**

	(1) Women	(2) Women	(3) Men	(4) Men
Majority Rule	1.74 (1.36)	1.74 (1.64)	-1.19 (0.81)	-1.55* (0.91)
Number of Women	0.64** (0.26)	0.64** (0.27)	-0.57 (0.36)	-0.53 (0.38)
Majority Rule x Number of Women	-0.72 (0.44)	-0.72* (0.42)	0.61 (0.39)	0.49 (0.43)
Proportion Talk	4.78** (2.02)	4.78** (2.02)	2.27* (1.24)	2.25* (1.24)
Egalitarianism	-2.20 (1.49)	-2.20 (1.41)	-3.81*** (0.83)	-3.85*** (0.83)
Number of Egalitarians	-0.36 (0.32)	-0.36 (0.43)	0.12 (0.24)	-0.01 (0.34)
Majority Rule x Number of Egalitarians		0.00 (0.55)		0.24 (0.38)
	-2.56** (1.21)	-2.56* (1.39)	0.26 (0.70)	0.49 (0.71)
Alpha	-0.04 (0.84)	-0.04 (0.84)	-0.56 (1.01)	-0.72 (1.17)
Observations	157	157	163	163
Control for Experimental Location	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Negative binomial coefficients. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$, two-tailed test.

Table C9.2: Effect of Gender on Expressing Redistribution Preference

	Likelihood of Expressing At Least One Preference		Number of Preferences Expressed among Those Who Expressed at Least One	
	(1) All Groups	(2) Mixed- Gender Only	(3) All Groups	(4) Mixed- Gender Only
Female	0.13 (0.13)	0.17 (0.14)	-0.32 (0.35)	-0.43 (0.43)
Proportion Talk	1.66*** (0.51)	1.65** (0.66)	6.44*** (1.51)	6.59*** (1.97)
Egalitarianism	-0.26 (0.35)	-0.80* (0.41)	1.07 (0.78)	0.89 (0.90)
Number of Egalitarians	0.18** (0.08)	0.31*** (0.10)	0.04 (0.18)	0.28 (0.21)
Constant	-0.45* (0.24)	-0.66** (0.32)	2.44*** (0.55)	1.75** (0.72)
Observations	470	320	237	149
Control for Experimental Location	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: In models 1 and 2, cell entries are probit coefficients; in models 3 and 4, OLS regression coefficients. For all models, cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$, two-tailed test.

Table C9.3: Gender Differences in Endorsed Safety Net Amounts

	<u>All Groups</u>			<u>Enclave Groups Only</u>		
	First Endorsed Amount	Maximum Endorsed Amount	Minimum Endorsed Amount	First Endorsed Amount	Maximum Endorsed Amount	Minimum Endorsed Amount
Women	3.37** (1.39)	3.33** (1.42)	3.08** (1.33)	6.73** (2.55)	6.85*** (2.41)	5.69** (2.56)
Constant	23.98*** (1.32)	24.87*** (1.26)	22.12*** (1.23)	25.14*** (2.33)	26.04*** (2.11)	23.74*** (2.43)
Observations	237	237	237	88	88	88
R-squared	0.09	0.10	0.13	0.16	0.18	0.17
Control for Experimental Location	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Coefficients are endorsed floor amounts in thousands of dollars. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, two-tailed test.

Table C9.4: The Relationship between Proportion Talk and Expressed Redistribution Preferences by Gender

	<u>Women</u>		<u>Men</u>	
	All Groups	Mixed-Gender Only	All Groups	Mixed-Gender Only
Proportion Talk	15.70** (7.58)	14.56** (6.30)	-4.17 (7.28)	-7.94 (5.64)
Constant	25.57*** (1.86)	22.09*** (1.73)	24.94*** (1.66)	26.10*** (1.69)
Observations	124	78	71	113
R-squared	0.06	0.19	0.10	0.12
Control for Experimental Location	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Coefficients represent the maximum expressed floor amounts in thousands of dollars. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, two-tailed test.

Table C9.5: Effect of Experimental Conditions on Endorsed Safety Net Generosity, Mixed-gender Groups Only

	First Endorsed Amount		Maximum Endorsed Amount		Minimum Endorsed Amount		Last Endorsed Amount	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Majority Rule	-11.16*** (3.90)	-5.04 (4.51)	-12.76*** (4.24)	-6.77 (4.54)	-9.76** (4.04)	-3.95 (4.62)	-11.68*** (4.14)	-5.61 (4.57)
Number of Women	-1.35 (0.99)	-1.49 (0.98)	-1.68 (1.05)	-1.82* (1.04)	-1.00 (0.98)	-1.13 (0.98)	-1.39 (0.95)	-1.52 (0.94)
Majority x Number of Women	3.95** (1.59)	5.13*** (1.46)	4.36*** (1.62)	5.51*** (1.54)	3.48** (1.64)	4.60*** (1.55)	3.98** (1.65)	5.15*** (1.54)
Egalitarianism	7.01* (4.07)	6.36 (4.03)	5.50 (4.09)	4.85 (4.03)	7.38* (3.82)	6.76* (3.74)	6.34 (3.86)	5.68 (3.77)
Number of Egalitarians	0.36 (1.17)	1.51 (1.37)	0.84 (1.05)	1.97* (1.17)	-0.21 (1.17)	0.89 (1.32)	0.15 (1.10)	1.29 (1.18)
Majority x Number of Egalitarians		-3.16** (1.24)		-3.09** (1.17)		-3.00** (1.33)		-3.14** (1.25)
Constant	23.21*** (3.75)	20.74*** (3.82)	24.66*** (3.80)	22.24*** (3.78)	21.31*** (3.67)	18.97*** (3.75)	22.92*** (3.59)	20.47*** (3.61)
Observations	149	149	149	149	149	149	149	149
R-squared	0.22	0.26	0.25	0.29	0.26	0.30	0.30	0.34
Control for Experimental Location	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients are endorsed floor amounts in thousands of dollars.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, two-tailed test.

Table C9.6: Effect of Experimental Conditions on Maximum Endorsed Floor Amount by Gender with Controls for Liberalism, Mixed-Gender Groups Only

	(1) Women	(2) Men
Majority	-0.81* (0.44)	0.10 (0.29)
Number of Women	-0.16** (0.07)	-0.01 (0.08)
Majority x Number of Women	0.16 (0.13)	-0.09 (0.11)
Pre-Deliberation Certainty	0.27*** (0.08)	0.20*** (0.07)
Liberalism	0.03 (0.23)	-0.13 (0.22)
Number of Liberals	0.02 (0.06)	0.07 (0.07)
Majority x Number of Liberals	0.06 (0.10)	0.13 (0.08)
Constant	3.49*** (0.30)	3.35*** (0.32)
Observations	157	163
R-squared	0.16	0.13
Control for Experimental Location	Yes	Yes

Note: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, two-tailed test.

Table C9.7: Effect of Experimental Conditions on Maximum Endorsed Floor Amount by Gender with Controls for Liberalism, Mixed-Gender Groups Only

	(1) Women	(2) Men
Majority Rule	-8.56* (4.38)	-9.50* (4.84)
Number of Women	-0.48 (0.96)	-1.92 (1.28)
Majority x Number of Women	4.00** (1.82)	4.13** (1.60)
Liberalism	3.10 (3.66)	0.93 (3.07)
Number of Liberals	2.04* (1.04)	2.91*** (1.05)
Majority x Number of Liberals	-2.06 (1.54)	-1.42 (1.25)
Constant	23.19*** (2.89)	26.94*** (4.58)
Observations	78	71
R-squared	0.36	0.31
Control for Experimental Location	Yes	Yes

Note: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$, two-tailed test.

Table C9.8: Endorsement of or Opposition to Principles Other than Most Preferred

	Endorsements of Principles Other than Most Preferred		Opposition to Principles Other than Most Preferred	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Women	Men	Women	Men
Majority Rule	1.99*	-0.88	-3.18	-1.97
	(1.07)	(0.70)	(2.16)	(1.35)
Number of Women	0.49**	0.01	-0.54	-0.11
	(0.23)	(0.19)	(0.35)	(0.20)
Majority x Number of Women	-0.76***	0.31	1.19**	0.89**
	(0.27)	(0.25)	(0.59)	(0.38)
Liberalism	0.26	-0.87*	-0.82	-0.50
	(0.70)	(0.49)	(0.99)	(0.93)
Number of Liberals	-0.07	0.35	0.20	-0.01
	(0.13)	(0.24)	(0.27)	(0.32)
Majority x Number of Liberals	0.22	-0.11	-0.37	-0.28
	(0.15)	(0.19)	(0.42)	(0.32)
Proportion Talk	0.58	1.62	4.05*	1.10
	(1.28)	(1.23)	(2.21)	(1.79)
Constant	-1.98**	-0.51	-1.89*	-1.87**
	(0.99)	(0.50)	(1.12)	(0.90)
Alpha	0.11	0.33	0.15	-12.23
	(0.33)	(0.35)	(0.88)	(22.01)
Observations	156	162	156	162
Control for Experimental Location	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Negative binomial regression coefficients. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.


*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, two-tailed test.

Table C9.9: Effect of Rule and Gender Composition on Safety Net Generosity, with Controls for Liberalism

	(1) Majority Rule All Groups	(2) Unanimous Rule All Groups	(3) Mixed-Gender Groups Only	(4) Mixed-Gender Groups Only
3-4 Women in Group	3,578.26** (1,914.17)	1,674.42 (2,468.83)		-1,295.79 (2,270.62)
Majority x 3-4 Women in Group				4,569.48* (3,284.99)
Majority Rule			-3,761.74 (4,276.93)	-1,782.51 (2,995.73)
Number of Women			-679.54 (987.57)	
Majority x Number of Women			1,672.96 (1,430.20)	
Number of Liberals	1,052.99 (1,108.95)	1,710.74* (1,254.85)	1,944.85** (943.60)	1,960.34** (936.04)
Majority x Number of Liberals			-1,127.16 (1,090.64)	-1,193.89 (1,081.64)
Constant	21,582.78*** (1,730.86)	21,880.41*** (2,114.66)	22,765.60*** (2,995.63)	21,691.74*** (2,014.74)
Observations	46	48	64	64
R-squared	0.21	0.27	0.31	0.32
Control for Experimental Location	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Group-level data. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, one-tailed test.

Figure C9.1: The Interaction of Decision Rule and Group Gender Composition on Group's Safety Net Decision with Controls for Liberalism, Mixed-Gender Groups Only



Chapter 10

Table C10.1: Board and Meeting Characteristics

DISTRICT	STATE	MEETING DATE	MALES	FEMALES	REGION	FEMALE CHAIR	ENROLLMENT
ASOTIN ANATONE	WA	12/13/2010	4	1	WEST	NO	638
AITKIN	MN	12/19/2011	7	0	MIDWEST	NO	1,231
BAGLEY	MN	1/3/2012	4	3	MIDWEST	YES	981
BALTIMORE COUNTY	MD	4/17/2012	9	3	EAST	NO	105,315
BATTLE GROUND PUBLIC	WA	12/12/2011	4	1	WEST	NO	13,342
BELLE VERNON AREA	PA	12/19/2011	6	3	EAST	NO	2,662
BEND LA PINE	OR	5/8/2012	3	4	WEST	NO	16,300
BIRMINGHAM	AL	11/8/2011	5	4	SOUTH	YES	25,006
BRANDYWINE	DE	12/12/2011	3	4	EAST	YES	10,801
BUFFALO LAKE-HECTOR-STEWART	MN	1/17/2012	4	2	MIDWEST	NO	633
BURLINGTON EDISON	WA	12/12/2011	5	0	WEST	NO	3,661
CALVERT	MD	9/9/2010	3	2	EAST	NO	16,224
CANYONS	UT	11/15/2011	6	1	WEST	NO	33,490
CARMAN AINSWORTH	MI	2/1/2011	2	5	MIDWEST	NO	4,315
CECIL COUNTY	MD	2/13/2012	1	4	EAST	YES	15,648
CENTENNIAL	MN	12/5/2011	1	5	MIDWEST	YES	6,457
CENTRAL 13J	OR	1/16/2012	3	4	WEST	YES	2,954
CHARLOTTESVILLE	VA	1/5/2012	2	5	SOUTH	NO	4,089
CHENEY	WA	1/11/2012	3	2	WEST	YES	3,870
CHESTERFIELD	NH	11/14/2011	1	4	EAST	YES	293
CIMARRON	NM	12/14/2011	3	2	WEST	YES	420
CLARKSTON	WA	1/23/2012	4	1	WEST	NO	2,668
CLARKSTON COMMUNITY	MI	12/12/2011	2	5	MIDWEST	YES	8,100
CLOVIS	NM	9/28/2010	4	1	WEST	NO	8,529
COEUR D'ALENE	ID	1/9/2012	2	3	WEST	YES	10,160
CONWAY	NH	9/12/2011	4	3	EAST	YES	1,887
COTTONWOOD JOINT	ID	12/19/2011	3	2	WEST	NO	421
CRAIG CITY	AK	11/30/2011	3	2	WEST	NO	657
CROOK COUNTY	OR	6/14/2010	4	1	WEST	NO	2,988
CULDESAC JOINT	ID	3/14/2012	3	2	WEST	NO	82
DASSEL-COKATO	MN	1/26/2012	3	3	MIDWEST	YES	2,300
DAVID DOUGLAS	OR	1/5/2012	2	5	WEST	NO	10,187
DAVIS	UT	12/6/2011	4	3	WEST	YES	67,681
EDINA	MN	1/9/2012	2	5	MIDWEST	NO	8,184
ELK RIVER	MN	1/9/2012	2	5	MIDWEST	YES	12,708
ESPANOLA	NM	12/7/2011	5	0	WEST	NO	4,197
EVELETH-GILBERT	MN	1/24/2012	2	5	MIDWEST	YES	1,150
FREDERICK COUNTY	MD	5/11/2012	2	5	EAST	NO	40,188
GARDEN VALLEY	ID	1/10/2012	3	1	WEST	NO	217

DISTRICT	STATE	MEETING DATE	MALES	FEMALES	REGION	FEMALE CHAIR	ENROLLMENT
GILBERT PUBLIC SCHOOLS	AZ	2/14/2012	1	4	WEST	YES	39,000
GOFFSTOWN	NH	1/23/2012	4	5	EAST	NO	2,921
GRANITE FALLS	WA	9/7/2011	3	2	WEST	YES	2,312
GRANTS PASS	OR	6/14/2011	4	3	WEST	NO	5,561
HOLLIS-BROOKLINE	NH	12/21/2011	6	1	EAST	YES	1,341
HOMEDALE	ID	7/29/2011	5	0	WEST	NO	1,185
HOOD CANAL	WA	3/22/2012	0	5	WEST	YES	335
INDIAN RIVER	DE	12/19/2011	7	3	EAST	NO	8,871
INTER-LAKES	NH	1/24/2012	4	3	EAST	NO	1,139
JEFFCO	CO	1/19/2012	0	5	WEST	YES	84,602
JEFFERSON COUNTY	AL	9/7/2011	2	3	SOUTH	YES	35,952
KANSAS CITY	KS	1/24/2012	1	6	MIDWEST	YES	20,235
KIMBERLY	ID	1/19/2012	5	0	WEST	NO	1,450
KYRENE ELEMENTARY	AZ	1/10/2012	1	4	WEST	YES	18,000
LAUREL	DE	4/26/2012	3	2	EAST	NO	2,156
LAWNDALE	CA	1/24/2012	0	5	WEST	YES	5,642
LINCOLN COUNTY	OR	4/12/2012	1	4	WEST	NO	5,373
LITCHFIELD	NH	4/18/2012	3	2	EAST	NO	1,508
LONDENDERRY	NH	1/5/2012	4	1	EAST	NO	4,847
MARLOW	NH	1/11/2012	0	5	EAST	NO	43
MARSH VALLEY	ID	1/10/2012	5	0	WEST	NO	1,270
MERRIMACK	NH	11/21/2011	2	3	EAST	YES	4,516
NASSAU COUNTY	FL	1/26/2012	0	5	SOUTH	YES	10,982
NEWFOUND AREA	NH	10/30/2011	5	2	EAST	NO	1,412
NEWMARKET	NH	1/19/2012	2	3	EAST	NO	1,053
NORTH SLOPE BOROUGH	AK	3/1/2012	3	4	WEST	YES	1,817
OAKRIDGE	OR	4/9/2012	3	2	WEST	NO	524
OROFINO JOINT	ID	11/21/2011	0	5	WEST	YES	1,221
OYSTER RIVER JOINT	NH	2/1/2012	2	4	EAST	NO	2,039
PARMA	ID	1/9/2012	4	1	WEST	NO	1,073
PECOS	NM	3/15/2011	4	1	WEST	NO	676
PELHAM	NH	4/18/2012	3	2	EAST	NO	2,219
POST FALLS	ID	4/9/2012	1	4	WEST	YES	5,533
PRINCETON CITY	OH	2/23/2012	1	4	MIDWEST	NO	5,399
ROLLINSFORD	NH	11/17/2011	1	2	EAST	NO	342
RYE	NH	11/16/2011	1	4	EAST	YES	682
SEMINOLE	FL	1/10/2012	0	5	SOUTH	YES	63,909
SOMERSWORTH	NH	11/8/2011	6	2	EAST	NO	1,758
SOUTH HAMPTON	NH	9/6/2011	0	3	EAST	YES	110
SUSSEX TECHNICAL	DE	12/12/2011	4	3	EAST	NO	1,309
TALBOT COUNTY	MD	4/25/2012	1	6	EAST	YES	4,419
TOOELE	UT	4/17/2012	3	4	WEST	NO	1,414

DISTRICT	STATE	MEETING DATE	MALES	FEMALES	REGION	FEMALE CHAIR	ENROLLMENT
WAKEFIELD	NH	12/21/2011	1	4	EAST	YES	427
WENDELL	ID	12/20/2011	3	2	WEST	NO	1,200
WEST SIDE JOINT	ID	11/16/2011	3	2	WEST	NO	589
WINDHAM	NH	4/3/2012	3	2	EAST	NO	2,318
WINNISQUAM	NH	9/19/2011	6	3	EAST	NO	1,615
WOODBIDGE	DE	12/13/2011	5	0	EAST	NO	2,260

Table C10.2: Summary Statistics of Relevant Variables

	MEAN	STD. DEV	MIN	MAX
SCHOOL BOARDS DATA				
Proportion of Females Present	0.505	0.297	0	1
Length of Meeting (Hrs.)	2.503	1.380	0.22	8.40
Proportion of Meetings with Public Comments	0.506	0.503	0	1
District is in Urban Area	0.506	0.503	0	1
Superintendent is Female	0.287	0.455	0	1
Students Enrolled	9,370	18,198	43	105,315
Budget per Student	\$12,049	\$5,522	\$6,039	\$42,739
Female Chairs	0.44	0.50	0	1
Years Served on Board	5.78	5.26	1	29
Total # of Board Members Present at Meeting (All Boards)	5.69	1.53	3	12
Total # of Non-Chair Board Members Present at Meeting (Mixed-Gender Boards Only)	5.57	1.72	2	11
Proportion Comments – Non-Chairs (Mixed-Gender Only)	0.20	0.20	0	1
Proportion of Non-Chairs Who Are Women (Mixed-Gender Only)	0.50	0.29	0	1
Total Turns by All Members	45.01	28.3	11	153
Equality Ratio - Motions	0.91	0.61	0	3.43
Equality Ratio - Comments	0.83	0.48	0	2
Equality Ratio - Seconds	1.07	0.57	0	2.92
CRAMER WALSH DATA				
Proportion of Females Present	0.68	0.12	0.46	0.86
Total # of Speaking Turns	248.41	108.75	76	502
Male Facilitator	0.14	0.35	0	1

Table C10.3: Effect of Gender Composition of the Proportion Recorded Comments among Non-Chair Men, Mixed-Gender Boards Only

	(1) Proportion Comments	(2) Proportion Comments	(3) Proportion Comments
Proportion Women (among Non-Chairs)	-0.09 (0.08)	-0.07 (0.08)	-0.07 (0.08)
# of Non-Chair Board Members	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)
Years Served on the Board	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
Board Member Education	0.08** (0.04)	0.06 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)
Board Has Female Chair			0.01 (0.04)
Public Comment at Meeting		0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)
Urban Area		-0.02 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)
Superintendent is Female		-0.04 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)
# of Students Enrolled		-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)
Budget per Student		-0.02 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.07)
Length of Meeting		-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
South		0.07 (0.08)	0.07 (0.08)
West		-0.05 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)
Midwest		-0.06 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.06)
Constant	0.42*** (0.06)	0.71 (0.62)	0.78 (0.69)
Observations	137	120	120
R-squared	0.15	0.15	0.15
Control for Outlier	Yes	Yes	Yes


Note: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses (cluster by board). *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$, one-tailed test.

Table C10.4: Determinants of the Group-Level Gender Gap

	(1) Gender Gap in Comments and Motions	(2) Gender Gap in Comments and Motions
Proportion Women	2.13*** (0.08)	2.16*** (0.23)
Female Chair		0.20** (0.11)
Size of Board		-0.02 (0.05)
Board Experience (median years)		-0.01* (0.01)
# of College Graduates on Board		0.03* (0.02)
Public Comment at Meeting		0.04 (0.11)
Urban Area		0.06 (0.09)
Superintendent is Female		-0.08 (0.08)
# of Students Enrolled		-0.06** (0.03)
Budget per Student		-0.20* (0.15)
Length of Meeting		0.05 (0.04)
South		-0.02 (0.27)
West		0.07 (0.10)
Midwest		-0.02 (0.11)
Constant	-1.18*** (0.06)	0.91 (1.29)
Observations	69	63
R-squared	0.71	0.77
Control for Outlier	Yes	Yes

Note: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$, one-tailed test.

**Figure C10.1: Seconds
Mixed-Gender Groups Only**



D EXCERPTS FROM PARTICIPANT HANDBOOK

PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE

This experiment deals with the justice or fairness of different income distributions. When considering the justice of income distributions, think about values that you hold. For example, think about how to promote equality of opportunity, how to reduce the gap between rich and poor, how best to provide for the poor, or how to reward talent and hard work. A number of principles have been suggested that reflect these value judgments. Today, we will focus on four such principles.

Consider the following four different ideas about how to distribute income fairly:

1. **MAXIMIZE THE FLOOR INCOME: “HELP THOSE WHO HAVE THE LEAST”**

Value Statement: The most just distribution of income is most concerned with the poorest among us.

This principle focuses on the well-being of the worst-off individual in society. This is done by linking the amount received by the least productive individuals to the group’s average income. In other words, the poorest are guaranteed to receive an amount close to the group’s average (though still below it). Those in the lowest income classes will receive more money as the average amount earned by the group goes up.

Application: The higher incomes are taxed so that everyone receives at least 80% of the group’s average income.

2. **NO TAXES OR REDISTRIBUTION: “I KEEP WHAT I EARN”**

Value Statement: The most just distribution of income best rewards those who produce the most.

This principle assumes that the best way to provide the most total income for the group, and therefore the highest average, is to preserve individual incentive to work hard. People will have a very strong incentive to work hard when they rely entirely on their own production to determine their income. Therefore, this principle does not guarantee any aid to the low income classes and allows the high income classes to keep everything they earn.

Application: Everyone keeps exactly what they earn, no more and no less.

3. **SET A FLOOR CONSTRAINT: “ENSURE EVERYONE HAS ENOUGH TO GET BY”**

Value Statement: The most just distribution of income provides a safety net of guaranteed income no one can fall below.

This principle provides an incentive to work hard and increase the group’s total income, but also sets a floor to ensure that individuals “at the bottom” receive a guaranteed minimum amount.

Application: The group must set a dollar amount for the floor, and all incomes above the floor will be taxed enough to raise everyone to that floor. If your group does not happen to produce enough to achieve the floor you set, we will reset the floor to be 80% of the average.

4. SET A RANGE CONSTRAINT: “REDUCE THE EXTREMES OF RICH AND POOR”

Value Statement: The most just distribution of income increases equality by reducing the differences between the rich and the poor.

This principle mandates that no matter how high or low the total group income is, the difference between the highest income and lowest income cannot be greater than a specified amount. Of course, as the group’s total production increases, every individual’s income will also increase accordingly. You may create complete equality, in which everyone receives the same income, by restricting the range to \$0. The greater the range constraint you choose, the greater the difference your group will allow between the highest and lowest incomes.

Application: The group sets a dollar amount for the range. Money is redistributed from high incomes to low incomes until they fall within the set range. If incomes are already within the set range, no action is taken, even if the low income is below average, and as low as zero.

Of course, there *are* other possible principles, and you may think of some of them. For this experiment, however, we will focus on the four principles we have described.

Detailed information about how each principle is applied in this experiment is available in the appendix at the end of the handbook. If you want, you may refer to this information as needed during your group discussion.

Make sure you feel comfortable with each of the four principles we have described. Review them and think about the values that go with each principle. When you are ready, move to the next page.

It is one thing to make a choice of an income distribution principle when fully aware of your individual talents and place in society. It is quite another to do so without such knowledge. Later you will be earning money by working at a task we have designed. **You do not know how well you will be able to perform at that task, how much income you will generate, and hence in which income class you will be.** Consider how you would feel in each income class. *Do not restrict your thinking or cloud your judgment by assuming that you will end up in the highest or lowest income classes. Make sure you will be comfortable with your results in every possible situation.* Will you be happy keeping only what you earned in a low income situation? Will you be happy with a guaranteed minimum income? Will you be happy giving up your wages in a high income situation? Which principle is most fair or just for the group as a whole?

Take a moment now to review the principles and think about how each might affect people at different places in the distribution.

In the next part of the experiment, you and the other group members will need to reach a decision about which principle of income distribution your group will adopt. This principle will govern the actual payments which will be made to each of you after your performance on the assigned task.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR GROUP DISCUSSION

In this part of the experiment your group will choose a principle of justice that will govern the distribution of incomes that result from the tasks you perform. Remember, this choice will be an important factor in the actual payment you and the other members of your group receive from participating in today's experiment.

You will be assigned tasks and earn money based on your performance. There will be three production and pay periods, each representing one year of work and resulting income. Remember, the tasks might include either manual or intellectual labor, or a combination of the two. Again, **you do not know how well you will perform on the task, how much income you will generate, and hence which income bracket you will be in.** Your income will be calculated according to the "work" you accomplish during each production period. Your earnings from each period will then be reallocated according to the principle chosen by the group to govern income distribution. The total from the three years of salaries will be converted to your final take-home payment only at the end of the study.

Before the group votes on adopting a principle of justice, there is to be full, open, and inclusive discussion of the matter. The best discussions consider underlying values and final effects of different income distributions. As you discuss these issues, think about how different distributive principles affect different household incomes. *Think of an average household as consisting of at least a single earner and two other individuals.*

You have whatever time you need, within reason, to discuss the issue. You must engage in discussion for at least 5 minutes. When you feel nothing can be gained by further discussion, tell the moderator. **FOR DISCUSSION TO END, PARTICIPANTS MUST AGREE UNANIMOUSLY BY SECRET BALLOT THAT FURTHER DISCUSSION IS UNNECESSARY.** Ending discussion does not necessarily mean that everyone agrees and that you have already chosen a principle; it simply means that you are ready to stop talking.

Detailed instructions for choosing principles and voting are available on the next page. Your moderator will be available to help you through the process.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR CHOOSING A PRINCIPLE

Though there are many possible principles, for this experiment, your group should thoroughly discuss and choose among the four principles of justice you have learned about today.

Constraints:

There are a few requirements you should bear in mind if you wish to adopt a principle which involves a constraint. *You should think of dollar figures as annual incomes for a household today. Think of an average household as consisting of at least a single earner and two other individuals.*

If you wish to consider a range constraint, you must specify the amount in dollars. This amount will determine the difference between the highest and lowest income categories.

- If the range constraint you choose is higher than the actual range of income earned by the group, there will be no redistribution. For example, if your group chooses an \$80,000 range constraint and the actual range of incomes (the difference between the highest and the lowest income) resulting from your work is \$60,000, no redistribution will take place.

If you wish to consider a floor constraint, you won't know what floor will be *achievable* based on the earnings of the group until after the task has been run. Therefore, we interpret a floor constraint as follows:

- You must specify an absolute dollar amount that you wish to have as a floor constraint. If that dollar amount is above the maximum floor achievable given the group's earnings, we will set the floor at 80% of the average income.

As you decide on a dollar amount, you should interpret the floor income as *the minimum income a household is guaranteed each year.*

VOTING INSTRUCTIONS

When your group has agreed unanimously that discussion should end, the moderator will guide you through details of the voting process.

All group members are required to cast a ballot. You should vote for the principle you believe would create the most just society. If you choose, your group may place multiple floor or range constraint amounts on the ballot. (For example, your group may want to vote on a floor constraint of \$20,000 *and* a floor constraint of \$50,000.)

IF A PRINCIPLE SECURES THE [MAJORITY/UNANIMOUS] SUPPORT OF THE GROUP AGAINST ALL OTHER PRINCIPLES ON THE BALLOT, THAT PRINCIPLE IS CHOSEN.

If no principle receives sufficient support, then the group returns to discussion. A new vote would follow after the group unanimously decides to stop the second round of discussion. This process can be repeated up to four times. If you, as a group, are not able to adopt any principle in four tries, then on the fifth we will select a principle which will be applied to your earnings in the next part of the experiment.

E INTERRUPTION CODING INSTRUCTIONS

1 Introduction

The coding unit for this project is a single possible interruption. Using a computer program, we have identified a list of possible interruptions for every deliberative group that we conducted. Fundamentally, the coders' first task is to determine if each listed 'interruption' is, in fact, an interruption. Then, for instances that the coder believes are valid interruptions, a series of decisions describing the disposition and content of the interruption will be made. The process for determining what is an interruption, and the decisions that follow, are described below in detail.

1.1 Coding Process

To complete this assignment, we will provide the following documents for each deliberative group:

1. An Excel spreadsheet that contains a row for each possible interruption and columns that correspond to the various variables (described in detail below) that you will code. This is where you'll enter your coding judgments.
2. A word-for-word transcript of the group discussion.
3. An MP3 file that contains the full group conversation.
4. 5 separate MP3 files that contain the audio recording for each individual speaker.

Each possible interruption is identified by the time that it occurs during the group discussion. To perform your coding, you should locate the specified time in both the written transcript and the group audio recording. Once you have located the conversational interaction that is identified as a possible interruption, use both the audio and written records at your disposal to determine if an interruption occurred or not and, if there was an interruption, continue by filling in the subsequent variables. If you have difficulty sorting out the conversation from the group audio files, please use the individual audio files to get things right. After coding the first possible interruption, move to the next row and repeat the process for the 2nd possible interruption, and so on.

PLEASE NOTE: For each group, the time that the interruption is listed at in the Excel file should correspond to the time it occurs at in the audio recording but the times may be slightly shifted in the timestamps that the transcripts contain. Be sure that you have matched the speech that you can hear at the specified time with the proper section of text in the transcript.

We suggest that you download and use Audacity in order to listen to the audio files. Using

this program, you can load in all 5 individual audio files as individual tracks and then select and play all of them at once or just the 2-3 speakers that are relevant to the exchange you're listening to. The program also allows you to easily jump to certain locations in the recording and is free. Download at: <http://audacity.sourceforge.net/download/>

As you listen to the group conversations, it is likely that you will hear what seem to be interruptions that are not listed in the Excel file. It is critical that you code only the possible interruptions listed in the Excel file: the computer has defined a universe of potential interruptions, and that is all that we are assessing. To do this, note the time of the possible interruption as well as the two speakers involved - this information is provided in the Excel file. Then carefully assess the written/audio exchange to make your coding determinations: does speaker Y interrupt speaker X? Etc. We realize that this method may omit some interruptions but, again, it is vital that coders focus only on the possible interruptions listed for them in the Excel files.

A few other notes to keep in mind:

- Some of the transcripts will have [interposing] placed at instances that have been flagged as interruptions, but many will not. The [interposing] annotations are not systematic and were provided by our transcriptionists. They should not be used as a substitute for your coding decisions.
- Laughter itself is not an interruption.
- Often, if you listen to all 5 speakers at once, somebody will make a joke and it seems like everybody laughs at the same time and there are no interruptions, even if the computer flagged one (or more). Listening to these episodes speaker-by-speaker often shows that the laughter is staggered and the first person laughing obscures the interruption(s) that the computer flagged. Be sure to listen to just the speakers flagged by the computer in laughter episodes to ensure that you code the exchange correctly.
- In general, please try to minimize your use of the missing data code.

2 Detailed Variable Information

2.1 Interruption #

This variable is a unique number identifying each interruption in every group.

2.2 Interruptee ID (computer coded)

This variable identifies the interruptee (or the 'original speaker') and corresponds with the individual subject ID that the speakers are identified by in the transcripts. It is vital to properly match the IDs from the list of interruptions with the actual group participants to

make sure that you are coding the correct exchange.

2.3 Interrupter ID (computer coded)

This variable identifies the interrupter and corresponds with the individual subject ID that the speakers are identified by in the transcripts. It is vital to properly match the IDs from the list of interruptions with the actual group participants to make sure that you are coding the correct exchange.

2.4 Interruption Start Time (computer coded)

This variable is the time in each group when a specific interruption begins. It is generated automatically by the VBA program and is listed in the Excel file to help you locate the part of the conversation that needs to be coded. As mentioned above, the time should correspond precisely with the audio file but may be slightly different from the timestamps in the transcripts.

2.5 Interruption End Time (computer coded)

This variable is the time in each group when a specific interruption ends. It is generated automatically by the VBA program and is listed in the Excel file to help you locate the part of the audio file, but may be slightly different than the timestamps in the transcripts.

2.6 Interruption Duration (computer coded)

This variable is a number generated by the VBA program that roughly corresponds to the length of the interruptive instance that you are assessing. The 'duration' variable isn't particularly accurate - it does not record the length of overlapping speech nor does it record the duration of the interruptive speaking turn.

Rather, the duration time should be used as a 'window': if an interruption of A by B is flagged at 3:23 for a duration of 16 seconds, coders should evaluate 3:23-3:39 to see if anywhere in that window an interruption of A by B occurs.

- If so, then the interruption should be verified and coded
- If more than one such interruption fits the bill in the “window”, then the first valid instance should be the one that is coded; the rest can be ignored (unless they are flagged separate by the computer).

2.7 Interruption Gender (computer coded)

This variable records the gender of the interruptee/interrupter. It should be coded as:

- 1: If a man interrupts a woman.

- 2: If a man interrupts a man.
- 3: If a woman interrupts a woman.
- 4: If a woman interrupts a man.

2.8 Interruption Verification

The first task of the human coders is determining whether or not the speaking exchange is an interruption. If it is determined to be a valid interruption, then coding continues. If not, it's marked as spurious and coding ceases after this variable. This verification step was conducted separately and before the following coding.

An utterance is an interruption if it is an intelligible word or words. Sounds or unintelligible word(s) are not interruptions. For example, “yeah”, “yep”, “sure”, “okay”, are all words that count; “hmm” or “uhhuh” and other similar interjections are sounds and do not count. Laughter, mic rumbling, buzzes and other sounds that the computer cannot discern from speech should be coded as not an interruption. Furthermore, to be an interruption the utterance must overlap with either the interruptee's speech or come at the end of an incomplete clause (a period could not properly be put at the end of the interrupted utterance).

- If the original speaker has clearly finished speaking before the second speaker begins and there was not an interruption, then it should not be coded as an interruption.
- If it sounds like both speakers started speaking at exactly the same instant (simultaneous speech), then it should not be coded as an interruption.
- They must start talking at exactly the same time to not be coded as an interruption.
- Even if it is hard to decipher crosstalk, it is vitally important that you attempt to verify whether or not the computer has accurately identified an interruption. We have removed the separate crosstalk code, so please make every effort to untangle the conversations.
- There are instances of 'interruptions' that sound less like somebody interrupting/speaking over another person and more like the 2nd speaker agreeing/encouraging the original speaker to continue. These are often referred to as “back-channel communications” (For our purposes, please code these as though they were interruptive. Most likely, they will be positive/negative/neutral without elaboration).
- What if there is an interruption of A by B but the computer flagged an interruption of B by A?
 - If the speakers involved in an interruption flagged by the computer don't seem to

match, then it should be 'not verified' and coding for that row should cease.

- Examples of clause/overlap requirement:
 - If the interruptee finishes with a complete clause (a period could be proper punctuation) and the interrupter does not speak over him or her (there is no overlap of words), it is not an interruption.
 - If the interruptee finishes with a complete clause (a period could be proper punctuation) and the interrupter does speak over him or her (their words overlap), it is an interruption.
 - If the interruptee does not finish a complete clause (a period would be improper) and the interrupter does or does not speak over him or her (their words may or may not overlap), it is an interruption.

The valid codes for this variable are:

0: No audible words and/or no interruption occurs. This is the general code for 'no interruption' and should be used if there is no audible interjection, only an unintelligible sound can be heard, or - as a last resort - if it is impossible to sort out crosstalk.

1: Interruption occurs.

If words have been spoken but it is impossible to determine what has been said, then the instance should be coded as missing data with a period (.) and the following variables should be left blank. If one of the speakers is actually the moderator, then this should also be coded as missing data (.).

2.9 Disposition of Interruption: Positive, Negative, or Neutral

Disposition consists of a set of dummy variables, coded 0 or 1, that are not mutually exclusive. In other words, all three of the disposition dummies may be coded as present (marked as 1) for a single interruption. That said, at least one of the three categories (positive, negative, or neutral) must be coded as a 1; all three may not be 0 simultaneously. An affirmative mark in the neutral category should be used sparingly, only when an interruption cannot be plausibly construed as positive or negative. When any dummy is coded as 1 (signifying the presence of positive, negative, and/or neutral feedback), then the elaboration dummies must be coded as either 1 (there is elaboration) or 0 (there is no elaboration).

- An elaboration requires, at a minimum, a phrase - a small group of words standing together as a conceptual unit - that is more than simply echoing or repeating what has been said in the interrupted turn. Examples include an idea, consideration, thought, other information that was not in the immediately previous speaking turn. This new information could be making explicit thoughts or concepts that are implicit in the previous statement. Elaborated content is not necessarily an elaboration of the particular disposition; it can be an elaboration of some other thought that is not part of the initial

positive or negative reaction.

- If the statement merely offers a general evaluation or agreement/disagreement, then it is not elaboration. A statement is not an elaboration merely because it uses many words; it could include many phrases of general agreement but it would still be general and thus not elaboration.
- An unelaborated interruption is one that only offers a general statement, opinion or evaluation, and does not include any specific thoughts, considerations, or examples not already uttered by the interruptee. If it is a general statement of opinion, agreement, and/or disagreement, then it is coded as unelaborated.

Note: The coding decisions regarding disposition and elaboration are not made based on the one speaking turn of the interruption as well as a few of the immediately preceding speaking turns. Disposition should be clarified by reviewing the prior few turns, e.g.:

Greg: But they need to live.

Ally: So...

Greg: They need to have...

Andrew: [interposing] just enough to get by.

Andrew is completing Greg's thought, hence Andrew's interruption is positive; Andrew's point that people need just enough to get by is in line with Greg's pre-interruption turn. Reviewing that pre-interruption turn clarifies the agreement. More disposition examples are provided in the following three sections.

2.9.1 Positive (agreement or support)

1. Simple definition:

- a. Expressing solidarity, affection, or support for the speaker or the speech (Leaper and Ayers 2007).
- b. An interruption that completes the prior speaker's thought in the same direction without disagreement or contradiction.
 - i. Answering the prior speaker's question does not count as completing the prior speaker's thought per se. See the definition of neutral below.
 - ii. Disposition should be determined according to the rules and examples in this document only.

2. Guidelines and examples:

- a. Phrases may begin with: “I know,” “I agree,” “That’s right,” or “I think X is a good/tremendous/fantastic/excellent idea” after a prior speaker suggested X (Stromer-Galley 2007). For example:
- i. This would be coded as positive with elaboration.

0:01:58 CHRIS, C: I actually thought about this a little bit. It should be high enough to support a person, but low enough that it’s uncomfortable-

0:02:09 PAUL, D: [Interposing] Right, so that they don’t just sit there.
 - ii. This would be coded as positive without elaboration.

0:02:12 JAN, A: –feel like they have to sit there - -

0:02:12 BARBARA, C: [Interposing] I agree.
 - iii. This would be coded as positive without elaboration.

0:03:57 JUSTIN, A: So yeah, it’s low enough to be uncomfortable but enough where they might want to say maybe I should get a part-time job - -

0:04:05 VINCE, E: Yeah.

0:04:05 JUSTIN, A: –or try to get some other type of social welfare program.
- b. Alternatively, an interruption that completes the prior speaker’s thought may be coded as positive even if it does not include an encouraging phrase or explicit agreement. For example:
- i. Wayne and Jason clearly agree here about redistribution, and this would be coded as positive with elaboration.

0:20:00 WAYNE, B: Well let’s take the other opposite though. What if you have a whole bunch of rich people? Who thinks that like Bill Gates who has tons and tons of money and that we should just redistribute some of his wealth because he has way too much?

0:20:11 JASON, A: I kind of do. Like to tell you the truth. I mean - -

0:20:13 WAYNE, B: [interposing] He has more money than anybody.
 - ii. Again, this is coded as positive with elaboration. Becka extends/completes Aaron’s thought - this is clear because Aaron then repeats what Becka said before he stops speaking, but even if he doesn’t do so, Becka is providing a logical completion to Aaron’s thought.

0:26:09 AARON, C: All those inventors that did hit a lucky break, they still had to - -

0:26:12 BECKA, B: [interposing] Worked hard.

0:26:12 AARON, C: They worked and they failed millions of times.
- c. Additionally, there may be an occasional brief interjection like “Okay”, “Go ahead”, or other similar phrases that are a part of conversational flows and sustain the conversation, but contain no evaluation. These may be coded as positive. Transitional words or phrases, like “yeah” or “alright,” are inherently positive and should be coded

accordingly - the neutral category is only for utterances that do not have a positive or negative disposition.

- d. However, an interruption could begin with an apparent agreement but move quickly to disagreement, by saying something like, “I agree with that, but...” or “That makes sense, though...” or “yeah, but...” Because this has both positive and negative elements, this counts as an agreement and it also counts as a disagreement. The turn should be coded as a “1” on each of those two categories. (See more on negative disposition below.)

2.9.2 Negative (disagreement)

1. Simple definition:

- a. Expresses disapproval of speaker or speech, criticism, or some other form of disagreement (Leaper and Ayers 2007), or makes a point that conflicts with an interruptee’s point, or completely ignores the content of the interrupted turn. It is negative if it includes a thought that “makes light of, or minimizes” or completely ignores the prior speech. A negative code does not require a detailed thought; it could just be unelaborated disagreement (e.g., “I don’t think so”, “No”, “But what if”).
- b. If the interruption clearly fails to address any aspect of the interrupted turn, it is negative. It is negative if it changes the topic without expressing understanding of the previous turn; does not use acknowledgment cues; and does not refer to prior turn in any way, implicit or explicit.

2. Guidelines and examples:

- a. A negative interruption may begin the turn with a word or phrase indicating opposition or negation of prior speech: “well”, “but”, “however”, “although”, “though”, “not”, “I sort of disagree”, “I’m not sure about that”, “I don’t know”, “That’s not right” or other similar interjections. (Adapted from Stromer-Galley 2007). For example:
 - i. The following interruption is a disagreement without elaboration:
 00:19:56 BRENTON, A: Yes. The dollars is going so far down.
 00:19:58 ALFREDO, B: [interposing] But the-
 That is, starting the turn with “But” and not adding content that clearly agrees with the interruptee counts as negative.
 - ii. This would be coded as negative with elaboration because the second speaker disagrees with what the first speaker has suggested and offers an alternative perspective.
 0:04:21 FRANK, E: Well for the sake of the project, I think, I think they’re going to like give us money like not just in our

situation, like where we're greedy college students, but like depending on how we-

0:04:33 ROBERT, C: [Interposing] I don't know. I just think they probably thought ahead far enough on this in that if we're all trying to go for the same exact amount of money, split it evenly...

- b. Not all speaking turns that begin with "No" or another similar term will be coded as negative. It is possible that expressing disagreement is, in fact, a way of correcting a misconception that there is disagreement. For example, "No, I'm saying that I like your proposal." Watch carefully for double negatives, and be mindful of considering the immediate context of the individual words.
- c. Alternatively, a negative interruption could begin with an apparent agreement but move quickly to disagreement, by saying something like, "I agree with that, but" or "That makes sense, though" or "yeah, but" Because this has both positive and negative elements, this counts as an agreement and it also counts as a disagreement. The turn should be coded as a 1 on each of those two categories.
- d. If the interruption makes a statement that implicitly or explicitly conflicts with a points made in the interrupted turn it is negative.
- e. If it ignores it by addressing a prior speaker (not the interrupted speaker), it is negative – even if the interrupted and the interruptee have just been on the same side of the issue.

Eg:

A: We're not deliberating mercy.

B: It's part of society though.

C: But we're...that's...

Here C is addressing A while interrupting B and in the process C is ignoring B's content. Therefore C's interruption is negative toward B. Here we ignore the fact that C and B have been arguing on the same side of the issue against A. Even though B and C are allies until this point in the discussion, C is ignoring B's content and this makes C a negative interrupter in this particular exchange.

2.9.3 Neutral

1. Definition: An interjection that does not have agreement or disagreement content or a positive/negative tone.
2. Guidelines:

- a. This variable should be coded positively only if there is no plausible way to code it as positive or negative while following the guidelines for those variables. In particular, interruptions that seem neutral in substance may be positive or negative based on the few turns immediately preceding the interrupted turn. Our emphasis is on capturing positive and negative interruptions - it is that distinction that we are primarily interested in. Accordingly, though we recognize that sometimes an interruption is neither, we encourage you to see the neutral category as one to be used sparingly. That said, if the interruption is simply not positive nor negative even implicitly, then it is neutral.
- b. Examples:
- i. When interrupter complies with interruptee's request to provide input, or answers a non-rhetorical question the interruptee posed, this is neutral. We distinguish here between rhetorical questions that express an opinion in the form of a question versus questions that solicit input from the group or a member. Only a non-rhetorical question counts here as neutral. It is neutral even if the content of the interrupting utterance disagrees or agrees with what interruptee said in pre-interrupted turns. However, if the content of the interruption disagrees with some point articulated by interruptee during the interrupted turn then the interruption is not neutral but negative. By the same token, if the interruption agrees with a point articulated during the interrupted turn, then the interruption is not neutral but positive.
 - ii. E.g. below, A and B disagreed in the immediately preceding turns but in this exchange A interrupts B while B is soliciting clarification from A, so A is providing input that B solicits; therefore, A's interruption is neutral.

A: Is it the government's job to force people to be nice to each other?

B: How would, like what do you mean? How would they force...

A: [interposing] I mean, is it the government's job to force all the people that are good at what they do, to give up half their money to make sure the people that don't have money can have some.
 - iii. The following are rhetorical because it does not invite a reply, so does not count as soliciting input from the group or a member:

A: Is it the government's job to force people to be nice to each other?

A: If you don't even have a college within thousands of miles of your house, how would you ever consider going to college?
 - iv. The following are non-rhetorical because it directly solicits an opinion or clarification of a statement or asks for concrete information:

A: How would, like what do you mean?

A: Anyways, Tom?

A: what do we think?

A: so what is the vote on?

- c. In these examples the speaker is directly and explicitly asking a member of the group to clarify an opinion or statement, or to provide an opinion, or asking non-directly for concrete information or to clarify the group's procedure.
- d. You might need to look at the immediately preceding turns to determine if a question is rhetorical. Many neutral interruptions will ask a question (or repeat a phrase) for clarification or explanation of what was just interrupted. Do not count as neutral questions of something said before the interrupted turn, or questions that offer an opinion of their own, or questions that are subtly critical or subtly supportive. Not all questions are neutral; if there is an evaluative element (either positive or negative) in the question, then the direction of the evaluation should be noted and the interruption coded as positive or negative rather than as neutral. Note that an interrupting turn may include more than one type of question. If it includes a rhetorical question and a soliciting question code the turn as neutral for the soliciting question and also code the turn as positive/negative for the rhetorical question.
- e. Interruptions too incomplete to convey positive or negative may be neutral. For example, "I would say" does not provide enough content to count as either positive or negative and should be coded as neutral. However, some interruptions are very brief yet clearly negative ("But") or clearly positive ("Yeah").

2.9.4 Complex Examples

Some interruptions will be coded as a yes for more than one of the positive/negative/neutral options. This section provides some examples that would fall into this category.

Examples:

1. Positive and Negative, elaboration for both:

TODD, A: So, I support the floor constraint even though it's a tax. I guess I'm saying that taxes aren't necessarily bad - -

KATIE, C: Right, some taxes are necessary to keep us safe, but I don't think we should subsidize people who aren't making any effort on their own.

This interruption would be coded as positive because Katie agrees that some taxation is OK because of safety concerns but disagrees with the premise that a floor constraint (supported

by taxes) is a good idea. In both parts, Katie clearly adds new information, making both elaboration codes 1.

2. Positive and Negative, only negative elaboration

0:19:59 JULIA, D: So my point is that you should have enough money for food and housing and for education and that to make this - -

0:20:04 BRIAN, A: Right, but I'm saying that the right way to achieve this isn't cutting everybody a \$20,000 check.

Again, this is coded as both positive and negative because there is a mix of agreement and disagreement. There is no elaboration on the positive side, but there is elaboration on the negative side.

2.10 Sentence Completion: Interrupter & Sentence Completion: Interruptee

These two variables are three categories, 0 for incomplete, 1 for complete, and 9 for unclear if complete or incomplete. Your task is to determine whether each speaker - the interruptee and the interrupter - manages to finish a complete grammatical sentence, meaning their utterance could be appropriately punctuated with a period or a question mark:

- If you were a copy editor and had to decide whether to insert 1) a period or question mark vs. 2) a comma or nothing, and you choose 1) rather than 2), then the sentence is complete.
- Repeating one's own prior words verbatim during a turn does not decide this code for the interruptee or interrupter. Also irrelevant is the overall length of the turn – if the interruptee or interrupter clearly completes his/her sentence, no matter how long or short, the appropriate variable should be coded as a 1.
- If it is not clear - e.g., the sentence trails off and you cannot tell what was actually said – then code as 9. The 9 is to be used sparingly - use it if you cannot tell what is said after 3 attempts to listen. Code the sentence as complete if it shows up as complete in the transcript even if you can't hear the completion.
- If either party clearly fails to complete her/his sentence, then the appropriate code is 0. Do not code the contributions of any third parties. The sentences do not need to be completed during the interruption window - look at the target speaking turns and not the window for sentence completion. However, the conditions for sentence completion differ between the interruptee and the interrupter; details are below.

2.10.1 Sentence Completion Definitions

1. The interruptee has two speaking turns to consider: the turn that is interrupted and the first speaking turn that the interruptee takes following the interruption. If the

interruptee finishes the turn that is interrupted with a complete grammatical sentence as defined above, then he or she is coded 1. If the interruptee does not finish the turn that is interrupted with a complete grammatical sentence but his or her next speaking turn completes the cut-off sentence, then SC interruptee is coded 1. A clear instance of this is when the first utterance of the second turn can be joined with the cut-off utterance from the speaker's prior turn to form a complete grammatical sentence. The code is not affected when the second turn repeats any of the cut off utterance; if the second utterance can be joined with the cut off utterance once the repetition is set aside, the code is 1. The code is 1 even if the second turn contains words that do not complete the cut off sentence as long as the cut-off sentence is grammatically complete at some point during the second turn. The code is 1 even if the second turn does not end with a complete grammatical sentence. If the above does not hold then the interruptee SC is coded 0.

2. The interrupter has one speaking turn, the interruption only, to complete his or her last spoken sentence. If the interrupter finishes his or her last sentence by the grammatical criteria of sentence completion explained above, i.e. one can put a period or question mark on it by the rules of grammar, then the code is 1. If the interrupter does not finish his or her last sentence, then the code is 0. This is the correct code, even if the interrupter completed one or more complete sentences previous to the end of his or her speaking turn.
3. Clarifications
 - What if both interrupter and interruptee finish their comments? You can code them both positively.
 - What if both people audibly finish, but one of them clearly speaks more loudly than the other? If the completion is audible to you, then code it as if both parties spoke at an equal volume. Do not attempt to determine who held the group's attention.
 - What if you cannot hear well but the transcript shows a complete sentence? Then code according to the transcript.
 - What if a burst of laughter drowns out everyone and effectively resets the conversation? If this happens, then sentence completion should be coded as missing (.).

2.10.2 Sentence Completion Examples

1. A complete thought is not necessarily a complete grammatical sentence Eg:

A: A person needs \$20,000 to live on?
 B: What state?

“What state” is not grammatically complete and thus does not count as a complete sentence.

2. Another example:

COURTNEY, D: Yeah. But I mean if you're setting something for the whole - -
 CONRAD, E: [interposing] Yeah.

COURTNEY, D: - - United States you're going to have to pick something
 that's going to be higher for-more comfortable for some and less comfortable for
 others.

This would be coded as 1 for both interrupter and interruptee. The interrupter (Conrad) completes his sentence even though it is only a single-word interjection and Courtney's second utterance grammatically completes her cut-off utterance - the cut off and following utterances can be grammatically joined.

3. Another example:

JULIA, D: Yeah. And I, I don't think it should be handouts I think ideally it'd be like
 education, important things that would give the opportunities so that they could make
 more someday. So instead - -

BESS, C: [interposing] I agree with that but I - -

JULIA, D: - - we need a little, but not a lot 'cause education's a lot cheaper than
 \$20,000 a family so but I mean we'll bend but I, I would go 20.

The completion variables would be coded as a 0 for Interrupter but as a 1 for Interruptee. Bess fails to finish her sentence - one cannot put a period or question mark at the end of it by the rules of grammar. Julia's cut off utterance is joined with her second utterance to form a grammatically complete sentence.

4. An example of a complete sentence by interruptee (and incomplete by interrupter) that contains extraneous words before completion:

A: They need to have

B: just enough to get by, not to

A: yeah, they need to have food, shelter

Here A completes her cut off sentence in the second turn despite inserting "yeah" before the completion (and despite repeating part of her cut-off utterance). Setting aside the extraneous words preceding the completion (the "yeah"), and the repetition ("they need to have") the second turn provides the missing part of the cut off sentence. That counts as code 1 for interruptee's SC.

5. An example of an incomplete sentence by interruptee and by interrupter:

A: They need to have...

B: just enough to get by, not to

A: yeah, they need to have...we don't want people to starve.

Here A's second turn is a complete grammatical sentence on its own, but that does not decide the code. A's second turn does not form a complete grammatical sentence when joined with the cut off utterance even after setting aside extraneous or repeating words. A's cut off utterance is never completed grammatically even when A resumes the floor in the second turn. Although it is tempting to code A's second turn as completing A's cut off utterance, that is because it completes A's thought about what people need. But despite completing A's thought, A's second turn does not complete A's cut off sentence so the code for SC interruptee is 0.

6. Example of incomplete sentence by interruptee:

A: We should vote for option 3.

B: so, yeah

A sentence that starts with "so" implies that a thought is coming but none is provided beyond a too-vague "yeah". However, an utterance consisting only of "yeah" is a complete sentence.

F EXAMPLES OF EACH TYPE OF INTERRUPTION

Positive Without elaboration:

E: So, I think the key here is to establish some kind of sharing so that the poor - -

B: [interposing] That's ideal.

E: - - citizens have a safety net to fall into.

Positive With elaboration:

A: So, I think the key here is to establish some kind of sharing so that the poor - -

B: [interposing] That's great - I really like the idea of setting a floor so that we ensure that nobody falls below a certain income level.

Negative Without elaboration:

E: So, I think the key here is to establish some kind of sharing so that the poor - -

B: [interposing] Well, not necessarily.

E: - - citizens have a safety net to fall into.

Negative With elaboration:

E: So, I think the key here is to establish some kind of sharing so that the poor - -

B: [interposing] Well, not necessarily since it's so hard to set a limit on who is poor.

E: - - citizens have a safety net to fall into.

Neutral without elaboration:

A: it doesn't really matter if all of us worked as hard as we possibly could it wouldn't change the amount of dollars in the market. And one of us would get zero.

B: [interposing] I think - -

Neutral with elaboration:

A: Basically just because I want to get as much money as possible.

B: [interposing] Do you mean out of this, tonight?

Interruptee and Interrupter Complete:

A: Yeah. But I mean if you're setting something for the whole - -

B: [interposing] Yeah.

A: - - United States you're going to have to pick something that's going to be higher for-
more comfortable for some and less comfortable for others.

Interruptee and Interrupter Incomplete:

A: They need to have - -

B: [interposing] Just enough to get by, not to . . .

A: yeah, they just . . .

Interruptee Complete and Interrupter Incomplete:

A: Yeah. And I, I don't think it should be handouts I think ideally it'd be like education,
important things that would give the opportunities so that they could make more
someday. So instead - -

B: [interposing] I agree with that but I - -

A: - - we need a little, but not a lot 'cause education's a lot cheaper than \$20,000 a family
so but I mean we'll bend but I, I would go 20.

Interruptee Incomplete and Interrupter Complete:

A: But I mean you look at the range constraint and it doesn't help the poor person at all.
And you just keep that, that-

B: I think these are supposed to be like examples of extremes, like where it could go
wrong, where like the floor constraint really does hurt the high person the most.

Complex Examples

Negative Starts with Positive Disposition: Expressing disagreement can be a way of correcting a
misconception that there is disagreement. For example, "No, I'm saying that I like your
proposal." Or, a speaker posing a sarcastic rhetorical question met with an expected "no"
response:

0:25:08 A: Well, I don't think it's going to hurt rich people that much like between 28 and
\$30,000. Is that really going to make much of a difference?

0:25:14 C: No. No, that probably wouldn't make much of a difference.

Statements with Positive and Negative Dispositions: A statement might include an apparent
agreement but move quickly to disagreement, by saying something like: "I agree with that, but. .
. ." Because this has both positive and negative elements, this counts as a positive and it also
counts as a negative. The turn is coded as a "1" on each of those two categories.

G SAMPLE TRANSCRIPT**[START TAPE GROUP 1]**

00:00:04 MODERATOR: Starting at the A position, can you say your letter and your name?

00:00:08 SUBJECT A: My letter is A and my name is WOMAN A.

00:00:11 SUBJECT B: B, MAN A.

00:00:13 SUBJECT C: C, MAN B.

00:00:15 SUBJECT D: D, MAN C.

00:00:16 SUBJECT E: E, WOMAN B.

00:00:18 MODERATOR: Okay great. You're all - - . All right, and during the discussion, we'll have the principles up here. You'll notice that two of the principles need a dollar number attached to them, so to make the voting easier later on, whenever you guys say a dollar number I'm just going to write it up here on the board, so don't mind me while I do that. Does someone want to start off the discussion by saying which principle they prefer?

00:00:43 WOMAN A: Sure, I can do that. I think I prefer the, sorry I forgot the name of it, set a floor constraint because it basically ensures that everyone has enough to get by, and but there's

still a lot of incentive to work. If you have to maximize the floor, then you have a lot of people earning underneath the 80% mark, so they wouldn't have as much incentive to work. Basically, they'd get 80% no matter what they do. So with a set a floor constraint, I think they have basically incentive to breakout of the lower thing, but then they also have incentive to work if you're in the higher income bracket.

00:01:22

MAN A: I think that if we were going to go for that structure, the maximize the floor would be better. So I think that the high earners in almost every society wildly out-pace the middle earners, so by setting a maximum floor, you get the mass amount of useless income essentially from the high earners distributed essentially, mostly to the low earners and a little bit to the middle earners, which greatly brings up the average quality of life.

00:01:54

MAN C: You mentioned the high earners wild-being outliers, wildly outpacing the average, would it be possible to set a floor constraint and a range constraint to prevent that and it would keep the income levels less toward the middle, that the

80% would, but yet it would still set that floor where everyone could get by and prevent the outliers I think, because of the range constraint.

00:02:19 MAN A: But doesn't the range constraint initially apply to the bottom rather than the top according to the rules described.

00:02:26 MAN C: The range is the difference between the bottom and the top.

00:02:28 MAN A: Right, it's the difference between the bottom and the top, but it initially triggers on the bottom.

00:02:34 MAN B: Well, from the average though. So the average is going to be the same on everyone, so it starts from the average to the bottom and then the top, so it shouldn't really matter. I would-

00:02:47 MAN A: [interposing] No, it says all the incomes that are too low, that is the range between them and the highest income, would receive—as opposed to taxing from the top, it starts working at how much you need to give to the bottom and then chops off with everything.

00:03:01 MAN B: Right, depending on the range that we set.

00:03:05 MAN C: Can we do a floor constraint and a range constraint?

00:03:08 MAN A: Which order would we want them to be applied?

00:03:09 MODERATOR: For the purposes of this experiment, you have to pick just one constraint.

 WOMAN A: Okay.

00:03:16 WOMAN B: I think that by setting a floor constraint, that will—it increases inflation, that kind of thing, so it basically brings everything back down to zero, setting a floor constraint, it's kind of counterproductive.

00:03:28 MAN A: Why is that counterproductive?

00:03:30 WOMAN B: Well, if you have a floor constraint, then you have a definite amount that everyone will be earning, so then other things can—other you know, expenses can go up based on that and you just end up paying more for other things.

00:03:46 MAN A: We can't increase the total expenses in this society. It's a fixed—there's no economy in this society. We're like farmers, we're just obtaining income arbitrarily. There's no trading going on. We're just getting income and taxing. It's not like the income's coming from somewhere,

so inflation is not a worry.

- 00:04:08 MAN C: Especially if the floor constraint was set very low. If the floor constraint was set very high, that would kind of be like maximizing the floor income and that could maintain
- 00:04:17 MAN A: Well, except that it doesn't penalize the high earners as much. Because maximizing the floor, if everyone earns loads right, a floor constraint may be completely ineffective.
- 00:04:30 MAN B: [interposing] it might not even need to be used.
- 00:04:32 MAN A: [continues] So say we set a floor constraint of \$30,000 and everyone earns \$60,000 or above, it's going to be zero taxation.
- 00:04:43 MAN B: That's assuming that we can—is there—I might have missed it, is there a limit to the amount that the group can make? Is there a ceiling as a group?
- 00:04:53 MAN A: I was under the impression that we can—we each perform independently at the task and obtain.
- 00:04:58 MODERATOR: It's not a zero sum tax, so you're earning [crosstalk].
- 00:05:01 MAN A: So if everyone does well

MAN B: (interposing) so if everyone does well.
(continues) and the group can earn more total money.

00:05:06 MODERATOR: The general across all people who have done this the distribution looks something like the distribution of America, but you five might be very good at the task - - .

00:05:27 MAN A: I feel like maximizing the floor means that—I mean, the high earners are always going to have a very good quality of life, if not a quality of life where the additional income isn't helping, like the fifth or sixth helicopter doesn't make that much difference to quality of life. It's diminishing returns, every subsequent million dollars that you spend on stuff doesn't actually make you that much happier, but towards the lower income, the more you make, the more additional you make, the greater material difference it has on your quality of life.

00:06:11 WOMAN A: The problem with maximizing the floor though is that everyone—the rich are going to be very close to the average. It's not like it's going to be the difference between eight helicopters and four helicopters. It's going to

be the difference between one helicopter and zero helicopters.

00:06:22 MAN C: And as you mentioned earlier, it would reduce productivity amongst the lowest earners because they would all be artificially bumped up to so much closer to the average as opposed to being—if they're closer to the floor it might encourage them to be more productive.

00:06:36 MAN A: But, as-- Well first of all, you don't know if you're going to be a lowest earner until you start earning. And secondly, even as a lowest earner, every penny—so say you've got a task that's really difficult for you, but you know that however hard you work, you're increasing the group's average and essentially you're paying out to yourself more than a rich person is paying out to themselves, so you have if anything, a greater incentive. Like every penny that you make is worth more to you. Do you follow? You get a greater fraction of what you make.

00:07:12 MAN B: That's true, but—but when the floor is.

00:07:14 MAN A: If you're a low income person, you get like maybe 200% of what you make, so you have a

much higher—so that extra \$10 at the end is worth that much to you, right?

00:07:25 WOMAN A: Yeah, but then problem is with the higher income people, they know that there's going to be a cap basically on whatever they earn. So like there's—

00:07:30 MAN A: There isn't a cap. The more they—

00:07:32 WOMAN A: But it's going to go down to.

00:07:34 MAN B: They're going to be limited by the group.

00:07:35 WOMAN A: Very close to the average.

00:07:36 MAN A: Not very close to the average.

00:07:38 WOMAN A: If it's an 80% thing it's going to be very close to the average. 80% floor.

00:07:41 MAN B: I feel like though with the—

00:07:42 MAN A: [interposing] No, if it's spiking outliers for the rich, they still make a lot more money.

00:07:48 MAN C: You're right, most people would make more under that scenario, but at the cost of being less productive for society.

00:07:55 MAN A: I think that the society as a whole would produce more under a maximize the floor because people—first of all, people have less fear.

00:08:07 MAN C: And that's a reason to work harder.

00:08:08 MAN A: But everyone has a reason to work harder. The people who make the most have good reason to work harder because they're at the top, they always have good incentive to work. The people at the bottom have incentive to work because they're—essentially the government is matching them \$0.20 on the dollar for what they're making. If anything, it creates a greater incentive for the lowest earners and increases the quality of life for the lowest earners, thus increasing the average happiness of the society as well as the average productivity.

00:08:55 MAN B: Just to chime in here, I agree a little bit in part with the max floor. I think setting a floor, we're kind of all in agreement, we want to set a floor, we don't want to have no redistribution, just to keep this moving forward. I think that maximizing the floor isn't really going to be to the group's benefit as much as setting the floor. We don't have to set the floor super low, but just in terms of distributing—it's going to be more closer distributed to our actual performance if we set the floor you know kind of in the middle range

without really maximizing it and it's not—

00:09:35

MAN A: [interposing] But we don't know what the average income is going to be, so by maximizing the floor you make every dollar earned below the floor as an increased payout, but by setting a floor once you're near the floor there's no point in working. So say you set the floor of \$20K, as long as someone is earning \$16K, there's no point in working because their productivity is not contributing to their success. In fact, anyone below a fixed floor has no incentive to do anything, whereas a floor that is a fraction of the society success, everyone has an incentive to work. In fact, the bottom have the most incentive to work harder because they get the most benefit from their extra work.

00:10:20

WOMAN A: But they're not going to have a huge impact on the society's average if they're at the bottom.

MAN B: Right. (continues) It's the rich that are going to have more of an impact. So, their work.

00:10:27

MAN A: But they're going to have a strong impact—there are only five of us, it's a small society.

00:10:31 WOMAN A: I guess in this society that might be more applicable, MAN A: (interposing) They have a strong impact. (continues) but in the larger society it would not have as much of an impact. Are we all in agreement that we want either do set a floor or maximize the floor? Is anyone - -

00:10:45 MAN A: [interposing] The other thing that I'm really uncomfortable with about setting a floor is we have no idea how much we're going to make.

00:10:52 WOMAN A: He did say we have—we do have some idea. He said that it's going to be somewhat representative of the American household.

00:10:57 MAN C: Is there a maximum income level? I think your concern that if we set a floor of \$20,000 and some people are earning \$300 billion, then the maximize the floor is good, but if there's a maximum income level of \$300,000 and setting a floor of \$20,000 or something - -

00:11:20 MAN A: [interposing] Yeah, that was the example I was using.

00:11:25 MAN C: [continues] - - is different.

00:11:28 MAN A: Well but also—

00:11:32 MAN C: My question is, is there a maximum? Income level in this scenario.

00:11:33 MODERATOR: Is there a maximum.

00:11:34 MAN B: Is there a maximum income level in this scenario?

00:11:39 MODERATOR: There is a theory—

00:11:40 MAN A: [interposing] Presumably it's a finite performance task?

00:11:41 MODERATOR: Yeah, there is in theory, though it has never been reached.

00:11:45 MAN A: Can you plausibly perform perfectly at the task?

00:11:49 MODERATOR: In theory. No one has ever done it, but there is a theoretical task that's probably the best thing about it though. In real life there's a theory.

00:12:04 MAN C: And that's the way you're thinking about it, that there's no maximum. And that's why you want protect most people by setting the maximum—
—

00:12:11 MAN B: Well, if you are the top earner, the max floor isn't really going to affect you either way. You're still going to—if you're outpacing the group—

00:12:19 MAN A: [interposing] So we agree that either floor—so we're happy with a floor scenario, so

it's one or three.

00:12:24 WOMAN A: Are we allowed to maximize the floor not at 80% and something like 70% or something like that?

00:12:29 MAN A: Yeah, that's a-

00:12:30 MODERATOR: [interposing] Unfortunately, no. It has to be-

00:12:32 WOMAN A: It has to be 80%.

00:12:34 MAN A: So we agree that we want a floor of some kind, whether it's 80% or a fixed number.

00:12:41 MAN B: Right.

00:12:42 MAN A: Ideally, we would like something that's not 80%, so if we can estimate what 70% is, but I guess that doesn't create the same incentive at the bottom level. So do we agree that the people earning the most probably don't care about the difference between these two systems? They affect them roughly similarly, except that they might make more under maximizing the floor because the low income people are more likely to work more.

00:13:06 MAN B: [interposing] Assuming the low income people would step it up-right-respond to it.

00:13:09 MAN A: Would respond to it, right, but in our

society I think it's clear that the low income people all know that they have a lot to gain by working.

00:13:19 MAN B: Well right, but the other thing is though that we're all starting on equal ground here. There isn't a social structure to this group, so we're not starting like someone with no education, you know.

00:13:32 MAN A: Well, that's what I'm saying. Amongst us, the low income person or the low income people will know that they have little incentive to do better under a fixed floor, but a strong incentive to do better under a maximized floor.

00:13:52 MAN B: So, it almost sounds like we just need to decide what the floor would be, so it wouldn't be maximizing the floor.

00:13:58 MAN A: Well, except that if we set a fixed floor and after the first round of work everyone—so there are three rounds of work right. After the first round of work, everyone knows how much they're making. If you're making 80% of the floor, why bother working, of the fixed floor.

00:14:12 WOMAN A: Well, you could make, if you're making 80% of the fixed floor, then you're not that far

from making the average and going above the average. So-

00:14:20 MAN C: I think the problem with maximizing the floor income is that it creates a huge number of people who don't have to do anything and they'll make 80% of the average income.

MAN B: The average might be lower, but they'll still make 80% relatively.

MAN C: 80% is still pretty close.

00:14:36 MAN A: The more they do, the more 80% of the average is. That's the thing, because the average earning is linked to each individual's earning, whereas a fixed constraint is not linked to the individual.

00:14:47 WOMAN A: But then they only get one-fifth—if it's a group of five, they only get one-fifth of what they earn and one-fifth isn't that big of an incentive. At least.

00:14:55 MAN A: I'm sorry?

00:14:56 WOMAN A: Okay, since there are five of us working, the average would basically be divided by five, so for every basically dollar that they earn they only see one-fifth of it.

00:15:08 MAN A: Not if they're below the—if they're

earning below 80% of the average, they're earning significantly more than one-fifth bonus on the dollar. They're making more than \$.20 on the dollar in benefit from taxes.

00:15:24 WOMAN A: No, because the average would only go up by one-fifth.

00:15:29 MAN A: Right, but they get a better payment from it, because of the difference.

00:15:36 MAN C: I think maybe we should get the correlation between standard of living and productivity. I don't want to—I wouldn't want to make more people less productive because I think it could lower the standard of living on the society as a whole. Productivity is a good thing and maximizing the floor to where everyone is making 80% of the average, discourages productivity.

00:16:01 MAN A: I think it encourages productivity because if you're making less than the floor, which is a function of the group productivity, every bit of extra that your marginal productivity has X reward for you. You're making more than you're working towards right.

00:16:26 MAN B: But, and assuming there's no limit in

this society to what you can make, the high earners are still going to make the high amount and you could theoretically just sit back and say, I'm not really going to try at this because the super rich are still going to make the most.

00:16:44 MAN A: Do we think that one person is going to have like 80% of the wealth?

00:16:51 MAN B: No, but the majority of the wealth could go to one person if it is kind of reflective of-

00:16:58 MAN A: [interposing] But we're in competition with each other, so if one person does well, other people don't do badly.

00:17:05 MAN B: No.

00:17:06 MAN A: It's just a fixed task.

00:17:08 MAN B: Right.

00:17:08 MAN A: So, the person making the most is still going to be making the most. They're going to have every bit of extra work that they do won't be a huge extra consideration to them, but every piece of extra work that the low earners do will be a huge consideration because I still think that having a floor that's linked to the average, incentivizes those below the floor more than it incentivizes them if you just had a fixed floor.

00:17:44 WOMAN A: I don't think it has that much of an incentive. Basically, say you're well below the 80% of the thing, you make an additional \$10 right, so the average of the group goes up \$2 and you're making 80%, so you only get \$1.60 more when you actually made \$10. So I don't see that as a huge incentive. I don't see increasing the average a huge incentive because it doesn't increase the average that much based on what you do.

00:18:08 MAN A: But—

00:18:09 MAN C: I think there's less incentive to work harder if you're guaranteed to make 80% of the average.

00:18:13 WOMAN A: If you have the possibility of breaking out of the set floor. You have an easier way of breaking out of the floor constraint, then I think you have more of an incentive to work harder.

00:18:27 MAN A: But if you break just above a floor constraint, you're not—you're getting taxed on that above income. Whereas the harder you—the average earner goes up—you're unlikely to mess up and make your additional work be less valuable to

you, whereas if you're working with an average that's—sorry—a floor that's tied to the average, if you're a low earner you're almost certainly going to be making 20% at least extra on the dollar, that's a lot of money. Twenty percent on the dollar, if you got a 20% raise at work that's a lot of money. I think that's a really strong incentive to work hard.

00:19:23 WOMAN A: If we do set a floor constraint though what does everyone think a fair floor constraint would be based on the—

00:19:28 MAN C: It's hard to say without knowing what the maximum income could be, but do you—

00:19:33 MAN A: [interposing] I really want to know what the average is.

00:19:35 MAN C: Okay.

WOMAN A: I mean the average in American society--

00:19:37 MAN B: It sounds like the average is going to be whatever we make it.

00:19:40 WOMAN A: How much is it in the U.S, \$40-50,000?

00:19:44 MAN A: I have no idea.

00:19:46 MAN B: I think it's lower than that.

00:19:48 MAN C: The median is probably around \$40,000 I think. The mean is higher.

00:19:55 MAN B: Well, if we assume it's \$40,000, should we just I guess get into the discussion hypothetically based off the U.S., just amounts? So, if it was \$40,000 and we were to maximize the floor that would put it at—\$32.

00:20:11 WOMAN A: \$32,000.

00:20:12 MAN B, C \$32,000 would be the minimum right.

00:20:15 MAN C: You said 80%, but we were talking about if we wanted to use 60%.

00:20:18 MAN B: So maxing the floor would make it \$32,000, but if were to set it at 60% that would be \$24,000.

00:20:34 MAN A: Umm, what about setting a range constraint to zero?

00:20:37 MAN C: That's socialism.

 MAN B: Yeah, no one.

00:20:38 WOMAN A: Yeah, no one has no incentive to do anything.

 MAN C: That's—that'd be—you're going to make the same as everyone and there's no incentive to do anything, except what the government tells you.

00:20:48 MAN A: But you're going to make the same as everyone, but however much you work, you make everyone get more money.

00:20:57 MAN B: That's assuming that everyone has the intention to do that, but I don't-

00:21:02 MAN A: [interposing] But everyone wants to make as much money as they can.

00:21:02 MAN B: Not everyone has the ability to do that.

00:21:04 WOMAN A: But your work is five times more meaningless if everyone makes the same money.

00:21:11 MAN A: I don't think it's meaningless. You're still making money for yourself.

 WOMAN A: It means five times less-it means five times less.

00:21:17 MAN C: You mentioned that you wanted people to have incentives, if there's not going to be an increase in their income, there's no incentive to work harder or innovate.

00:21:29 MAN A: I feel like there's still-

00:21:30 MAN C: [interposing] No financial incentive.

00:21:31 MAN A: I feel like you're discounting people's ability, especially in a small society to see the outcome of their increased productivity through the taxing.

00:21:45 MAN B: But there will always be people with that opinion though. If the three of us in this discussion could bring up that point, then I

think that's enough of a representation.

00:21:55 MAN A: Yeah, but you don't have to act like it.

00:21:56 MAN B: [interposing] I don't know that I personally would act that way, but there's a chance that that would happen and if only one of us did, that's still 20%.

00:22:06 MAN A: But why base the perception on this possible malicious lazy person in your society-

00:22:11 MAN B: [interposing] It doesn't even have to be lazy. What if the tasks were assigned, someone just can't wrap their head around it?

00:22:17 MAN A: But they're still going to try as hard as they can. They're going to do the best-

00:22:19 WOMAN B: Well, even if they try as hard as they can, that doesn't necessarily mean that they're going to be able to earn as much as a person who earns the highest.

MAN B: Right.

00:22:28 MAN A: And? That's the whole point of the distribution of wealth.

00:22:33 WOMAN B: But if we have a range of zero, if you can't make as much as the highest earning person, it doesn't matter because you just take that money away from them and then it gives us all the

same amount of money at the end.

00:22:44 MAN A: Why- I don't see how that's problematic. You still have the incentive to work harder because you're contributing to the social good as well as your own good. It's a small social good that you can see the effects of. We're not talking about a society of a couple of million people right. This is like a village or smaller sized society. You can see the benefits of your work if everyone is getting the same amount, if everyone-

00:23:14 WOMAN B: Yeah, but we don't know what the task we're doing is right now, so it could be something that you are-one of us is just incapable of doing and so even if you try harder it doesn't necessarily mean that your income is going to go up.

00:23:28 MAN A: And why is that a problem? I'm not following you.

00:23:31 MAN B: Well, because then the rest of the people-

00:23:33 MAN A: [interposing] Are supporting that person. And--

00:23:35 MAN B: Right. At what point though within a

society do you—how long do you support that person when they're just a burden? Especially in a small society you have the people that are the burden on society.

00:23:49 MAN A: I think we've decided that we're going to support someone anyway. We're definitely going to be using.

WOMAN A: To an extent.

00:23:53 MAN B: To some extent, but if we're studying the hypothetical numbers, 80% at \$40,000 I think is more than enough to sustain or no, 80% of \$32,000 if \$40,000 was the average. Eighty percent of \$32,000 is—

00:24:15 MAN A: Well, why don't we go 80% at \$32,000? Assuming it'll come out to \$32,000.

00:24:22 MAN C: I thought we were just using \$24,000, now you're talking about \$25,000, it's not a big difference. But you are talking about setting a floor constraint.

00:24:29 MAN A: Well, I'm still gunning for maximize the floor because I still think that creates the greatest incentive at the bottom end to do that extra.

00:24:38 MAN C: But you said you would be happy with the

80% of \$32,000?

00:24:41 MAN A: Well, except that—sorry, 80% of \$40,000.

00:24:45 MAN B: No, the 80% of \$40,000, being \$32,000.

00:24:47 MAN A: So, because when you have a fixed floor, it's fundamentally different from a fractional floor in that you don't see benefit from your increased work. In fact, if you're below the fixed floor, by working, you're only decreasing the taxation on the rich. If anything, once you work out that you're earning below a fixed floor, you have an incentive to just stop working because then the rich will just pay for you completely.

00:25:24 MAN C: That was my argument against maximizing the floor.

00:25:26 MAN A: But maximizing the floor, if you stop working, you make less.

00:25:33 MAN C: If you stop working, you're guaranteed to make 80% of the average.

00:25:36 MAN A: Which is going to be a lot less.

00:25:39 MAN C: It would be more than what you would make if you stopped working under setting a floor constraint.

00:25:42 MAN A: You definitely have more incentive to

work below the floor in a maximized floor than a fixed floor because when you work more in a maximized floor, you see—there is a difference to your income, but when you work more in a fixed floor, which you are below, you don't see anything.

00:26:08 MAN B: I don't think that that's actually—that in every case that's going to hold true.

00:26:15 MAN A: No, it's definitely true that if you're below the floor in a fixed floor and you're not going to hit the floor by working more, then the extra work is useless to you. It's only decreasing the taxation on the rich, it's decreasing your gap to the floor, which is just being taxed off the rich.

00:26:37 MAN B: That's only going to be—It's not going to work that way with every distribution because the lowest—the lowest floor, depending what percent it is, the lowest actual income, you know, it'll change more depending how low they go. So, if you make two and you've got a set floor that brings you up to 15, versus making two and a set floor that brings you up to like 30.

00:27:17 MAN A: There's no incentive for you to do any

work whatsoever in either of those cases.

00:27:23 MAN B: Right.

00:27:24 MAN A: Whereas if you have a maximized floor, and the maximized floor happens to be about 15 when you're making two, you still have the incentive to make the two otherwise—to do the work for the two, otherwise you'll make even less.

00:27:37 MAN B: But with a set floor versus a maximized floor, everybody will benefit from everyone making more.

00:27:45 MAN A: No, with a set floor, the people at the bottom won't benefit from themselves working more.

00:27:50 MAN B: They still will.

00:27:51 MAN A: No. At a set floor? No, they won't because they'll definitely make the floor unless the entire society can't support the floor.

00:27:57 MAN B: [interposing] They'll definitely make the floor, but that's assuming that the floor is—

MAN A: (interposing) Out of reach. (continues) we're not going to lower people. We're not speaking that way are we?

00:28:06 MAN A: No.

00:28:06 MAN B: Like if someone makes—well, I guess it's not possible.

00:28:08 MAN A: The people who make more than the floor are paying for the people who make less than the floor. Assuming the society can support everyone at least at the floor, everyone below the floor has no reason to continue working.

00:28:21 WOMAN B: Well, we do also have a scenario that everyone can make more than the set floor and if everyone is making more than the set floor, then everyone has more incentive to work because that increases their own money.

 MAN B: Right.

00:28:30 MAN A: But if just one person is below a fixed floor, that person has no incentive to work and everyone makes less.

00:28:39 MAN C: No one would go bellow a fixed floor.

00:28:40 MAN A: What?

00:28:40 WOMAN A: But, if that person in subsequent years can make more than a set floor then he does have incentive to work.

00:28:44 MAN A: But say they're making two and the floor is 15, they're not hitting that floor because that's not happening. It is the same task in

subsequent years?

00:28:58 MODERATOR: I can't—yeah it is the same task.

00:29:02 MAN A: The same skill, like if you're good at year one, you'll be good at year two?

00:29:04 MODERATOR: Yeah.

00:29:08 WOMAN A: I mean I'd probably be in favor of a maximized floor if it was lower than 80%. I just think 80% is too high.

MAN C: Me too.

00:29:15 MAN B: [interposing] So you're in favor of a floor, that's kind of how I feel. Just looking at this graph and these numbers, even discounting the highest earner, looking at the averages, with this one, the max floor and even over here, with the max floor it puts medium, medium, low and low all at the same level. To that, as a—I'm not assuming that I'm going to be the floor, the lowest or the highest, but if I'm somewhere in the middle, I feel like I'm going to pay for it more by being equal with the people who are doing less quality or not as much work as I am. Whereas with the set floor, it's still going to be relative. You know, they're still—there is some stratus there. You can be a little—

00:29:57 MAN A: You care about being better than people rather than just being able to enjoy a standard of life?

00:30:01 MAN B: I care about getting out what I'm putting in.

00:30:03 MAN A: (interposing) Ah, see, now that's why we have a difference of opinion. (continues) So I feel like if I'm doing more quality—if I'm going to do better quality work—and you know what, I also feel that, if I'm not doing the better quality that I don't necessarily need to be a drain on someone else who is.

00:30:19 MAN A: I feel like everyone deserves a good standard of living.

00:30:24 MAN C: That's why we are setting a floor.

00:30:25 MAN B: Well, I think the floor should be set at a good standard, I'm just saying that if someone is able to get higher than that standard—you know like—the medium-high in here and here they get penalized.

0:30:36 MAN A: If I'm—after the first year realizing that I'm getting this good standard of living, I'm not making anything near the floor is, I have no incentive to keep working. I can just stop

working and live on the fruits of the society.
Whereas in a maximized floor I can't.

- 00:30:50 MAN B: Still going to make less.
- 00:30:52 MAN C: You would make more under the maximized
floor by doing less work.
- 00:30:55 MAN A: No, I'm making more under the maximized
floor, by doing more work.
- 00:30:57 MAN B: You make more relatively, but not more
overall since the average is still dependent on
what everyone makes.
- 00:30:59 MAN A: In a maximized floor, you definitely make
more by doing more work. Because by doing more
work the average goes up, so 80% of the average
goes up.
- 00:31:06 MAN B: It's same in the set though.
- 00:31:07 MAN A: No. But in a set floor, the floor is
set, so if I'm making 10 and I can make 12 by
working harder, then there's no reason—
- 00:31:17 MAN B: [interposing] But the floor is not set at
10, the floor is set at a percent of the average.
- 00:31:21 MAN A: In a floor? No. The floor is set at a
number.
- 00:31:28 MODERATOR: In a set floor, the floor is set at a
number.

00:31:30 MAN B: Okay.

00:31:31 MAN A: So you get no benefit from extra work in a fixed floor. If you're below the floor, which is fixed, you get no benefit from extra work. In fact, if anything you maximize your utility by doing no work and enjoying your leisure time.

00:31:45 MAN C: Even more so under maximizing the floor income.

00:31:47 MAN A: No, because under maximizing the floor, whenever you work, you increase the floor, so you're increasing what you're making.

00:31:56 MAN C: The higher income people increase the floor

 MAN A: (interposing) So do the low income.
(continues) because the floor is set at 80% of the higher income.

00:32:02 MAN A: No it's 80% of the average.

 MAN B: The average.

00:32:05 MAN C: Okay.

00:32:07 MAN A: So in a maximized floor, the people at the bottom still contribute to the average. And as someone who's below the floor, I know that every dollar that I earn will be worth more to me because I'm going to raise the average and get a

better 80% of the average.

00:32:28 WOMAN A: In a large scale society that wouldn't work because you wouldn't affect the average basically, but in five people that might work maximizing the floor.

00:32:35 MAN A: Well, I think it'll work in any small society where you can see the benefits.

00:32:39 WOMAN A: In a very small society, like five people.

00:32:40 MAN A: Well no, I think like even a small society on the scale of a small village or a small community.

00:32:45 MAN C: But we're talking about the whole country. I think when you're talking about the economy of this country in this scenario right?

00:32:52 WOMAN A: Are we supposed to decide what we think is best for this society of five or what we think is best for any society?

00:32:58 MAN C: The size of this country I think we're talking about.

MAN A: So, in an economy--

00:32:59 MODERATOR: So when it says in the instructions that you think of yourself as designing a new society that you will be part of, there's no

explicit instructions about the scale of the society, but think about it as designing the roles for a new country.

00:33:12 MAN A: And moreover, as the country gets bigger it starts to get more economic complexities and you start competing, you're still getting economic problems. We're setting the rules that start out at the beginning when it's just—we're essentially living off the land here. We're doing—or like mining or whatever. You know, There's a fixed—there's this endless pot of money that you're just going in and picking up and if you're better at the picking up of the money, the more you make. There are no externalities, there's nothing complicated going on.

00:33:44 MAN C: One good thing about maximizing the floor income is that it kind of puts a cap on the super rich becoming even super richer, since we're not able to set a range constraint or a maximum, so that's one good thing that it would prevent. We're setting a floor—

00:34:03 MAN A: It's more of a creeping effect rather than a like a strong—

00:34:06 MAN C: It would enable the outlying super rich

to just take over everything.

00:34:11 MAN B: But if we want to do that, then we just set a range constraint.

0:34:24 MAN A: So do we want to set a small range constraint or a large range constraint to do that? So what do we think the range is going to be? Should we take one of these examples? Say the range is maybe—

00:34:36 WOMAN A: But the problem with the range constraint is that if you're in the highest, you basically don't have as much incentive to work.

00:34:43 MAN B: It's the same problem.

00:34:44 MAN A: No, you do because at the—the way that the range constraint is calculated is first of all, it looks the highest and it says, okay that's the top. Then it looks at the lowest and it says, is this person outside of the range and if it not, it'll work out where they have to be for the range and then it'll resort everything in order up to the highest. It has a more liberal effect.

00:35:06 MAN B: [interposing] Although the problem with the range constraint is going to be if it's too wide of a range, then people on the low end could

end up with very, very low. If the top earners don't get high enough.

00:35:21 WOMAN A: And it doesn't ensure everyone—yeah, if it's too big it doesn't ensure everyone a decent standard of living.

00:35:26 MAN B: [interposing] Right, but if we look on page seven, the range constraint example they give us, if it's \$70,000 the bottom earner is still—

00:35:33 WOMAN A: Yeah, you're not going to be able to live on \$2,500 and we don't know enough about this society to do a range constraint. That's why I'd be either in favor to maximize the floor or set a floor. If we knew more about the society I think we could set a range.

00:35:48 MAN A: right--I feel like we should—I mean, just because the—basically because of our ignorance, because we can't do things that are strongly linked to the society, we can only pull numbers out of my heads, I think the maximize the floor makes more sense, just because it's strongly linked to the society that actually happens, as opposed to simply like—in any of the ones where we pick numbers, in setting a range constraint or

setting a floor constraint, like we could miss.
We could completely miss and get it wrong.

00:36:23 MAN C: I forgot your name.

00:36:24 WOMAN A: Oh sorry it's WOMAN A.

00:36:25 MAN C: WOMAN A and I and maybe I'm trying to
remember—

00:36:28 MAN B: MAN B.

00:36:29 MAN C: MAN B. I think we all kind of agree on
the maximize the floor is a good thing, but that
the 80% is too high of a number.

00:36:36 MAN A: I think the problems with the 80% are
less dangerous than the problems with messing up
and dis-incentivizing the floor for a fixed
constraint.

00:36:48 WOMAN A: For this society I might agree with
that.

00:36:54 MAN B: Yeah, with this smaller group.

00:36:57 MAN A: Okay.

00:36:58 MAN C: But are we talking about, is this
experiment talking about for the small group,
we're talking about for a lot of people.

00:37:05 MODERATOR: [interposing] It's supposed be - - is
designing a new society, but it will affect your
- -.

00:37:15 MAN A: We're designing a small new society of farmers. I mean-

00:37:22 WOMAN A: Are we basically ready to vote?

00:37:24 MAN C: sure.

00:37:27 MODERATOR: Okay. The voting process is a little complicated, so I'm going to explain it. First, we have to vote to end discussion. This has to be a unanimous vote. So can everyone should have a pad of paper in front of you. This is by secret ballot, so even if you feel like the group has reached a consensus, please vote secretly. So if you want to end discussion write "yes" on the piece of paper and then fold it in half and pass it over to me. And if you don't want to end discussion, write "no".

Okay. You have agreed unanimously to end discussion. So now this is the part where we vote on a principle. So these are the principles that we're voting on. These are the two numbers I heard associated with the floor constraint. The only specific number I heard associated with the range constraint is zero, is that correct?

Okay. So-

00:38:36 MAN A: So write down the number? Like 1 or 3a.

00:38:38 MODERATOR: Yeah, write down the number and if you want to vote for a floor constraint or a range constraint, please also write down the letter of the floor constraint or range constraint.

00:38:50 WOMAN A: This is just a majority? We have to have a majority.

00:38:52 MODERATOR: This is by majority. This vote, so three people need to vote for the same principle. Okay, thank you. Okay, we have a majority in favor of principle one, maximize the floor income, so congratulations, you've completed the second part of the task, of the experiment, sorry. So at this point in time, can you move back to the computer that you were seated at before. You'll probably want to bring your - - with you.

[END TAPE 1]

H EXCERPT FROM A SAMPLE OF CODED SCHOOL BOARD MINUTES

Craig City School District

Jim Thomas, Superintendent

P.O. Box 800 Craig, Alaska 99921
 www.craigschools.com
 Phone (907)826.3274, FAX (907) 826.3322

Jackie Hanson, Elem/MS Principal
 Josh Andrews, HS Principal
 Ronald W. Erickson, PACE Director

The Craig City School District prepares all students for active participation as global citizens through quality education and community involvement.

SCHOOL BOARD MEETING
Wednesday, November 30, 2011
 Elementary School Library, 7pm

1. Call to Order

Mr. Kampnich called the meeting to order at 7:00 pm.

2. Flag Salute

A salute to the flag was given.

3. Roll Call

Board Present
 Dolores Owen
 Mike Kampnich
 Dave Nelson
 Bob Claus
 Mary Isaacs
 Shannon Yates

Staff Present
 Jim Thomas
 Joni Kuntz
 Ron Erickson
 Josh Andrews
 Suzie Michaud
 Karen Head
 Greg Head
 Karen Cleary
 Jackie Hanson

Other Present
 Mike Cleary
 John Rice
 Candace Matson
 Sarah Altland
 Melinda Bass
 Ken Owen

4. Consent Agenda (Includes all items with ~)

- a. Approval of Revised Minutes of August 31, 2011
- b. Approval of Minutes of September 27, 2011 and October 24, 2011
- c. ~Approval of Payments
- d. ~Correspondence

M/S CLAUS/NELSON
 AGENDA AS PRESENTED.

MOTION TO ACCEPT THE CONSENT

Voice Vote: All in Favor
 Motion Carried Unanimous

5. Public Comments

Mr. Owen said he supports Ms. Beardsley coming back to Craig. He wanted to know what steps the district was taking to make this happen.

Mr. Thomas said Ms. Beardsley took a years leave of absence and has until March 1st to let the district know if she plans on returning. He spoke with Ms. Beardsley at the CTE conference and she said she would like to return to Craig.

Mr. Kampnich said this is an issue before the district. We need to start working with Ms. Beardsley as soon as possible and see what works for her and the district.

Mr. Thomas said it is in her ballpark now.

6. Reports

a. Board Members

Ms. Owen reported she attended the AASB conference held in Anchorage. It was a good conference and she learned a lot. She went to the budget process meeting and has lots of good ideas from that meeting. Ms Owen reported the policy committee has been busy and she congratulated Melissa Castle for signing with UAA.

Mr. Claus said this has been a busy month. The policy committee has met three times. The entire policy manual is done and we should be able to have the complete policy online by March or April. This is a goal he has been working towards for two years now.

Mr. Claus said the board received a nice letter from the Wrangell City Manager in regards to housing Craig's wrestlers. He was very happy with the wrestlers that he housed for the tournament held in Wrangell.

Mr. Claus said he attended the NHS induction. It is good to see this program continue. He thanked the district for sending the board to the AASB conference. He also thanked the district for sending him to Nome.

Ms. Isaacs thanked the district for sending her to the AASB conference. She was able to learn a lot she can now use as a board member.

Mr. Kampnich thanked Mr. Claus and Ms. Owen for the time they put into the policy committee. Mr. Kampnich said he appreciated Mr. Claus having a written report from his trip to Nome.

Mr. Kampnich said things coming up for the board is the superintendent evaluation and board evaluations in December. There will be a committee set up from the board that will accept superintendent evaluations. Once they have gone through those evaluations they will meet with the superintendent with the results. He would like all evaluations signed by the evaluator.

b. Principal Reports

Ms. Hansen reported there have been a lot of spelling and geography bees going on. Students are working on winter concert coming up in about a week. Ms. Hansen said she did note in the board report regarding need new playground equipment. Playground equipment is very old and

worn. The district needs to make the playground safe for our kids to play on. There are over 180 students using the playground 3 times a day. There is a huge cost but she feels this is very important for health and safety of students. PTSA does have some funds and will help with what they can. Ms. Hansen said she wanted to put it out there so the board can think about it

Mr. Andrews reported he neglected putting in his report the seven additional students at the NHS induction. Mr. Andrews said it is great to come to work with a great staff.

Mr. Claus asked about the accreditation committee. Mr. Andrews said we are looking for a week that will work for everyone. He has sent out a letter to parents asking for their involvement. He hopes to have meetings before the end of the year.

Ms. Owen asked why there was not a strive report in the packet. Ms. Hansen said Mrs. Westfall has been out on leave. Typically STRIVE has a report for the packet.

c. Maintenance Director

Mr. Head said playground equipment is bad; he would like to get something formulated on the CIP List.

Ms. Owen asked what the cost would be? Mr. Head said anywhere from \$50,000 to \$75,000 dollars. Ms. Hansen said she talked to Coffman and it came to around \$100,00 with shipping and installation.

d. PACE Director

Mr. Erickson said he has nothing to add to his report. Mr. Kampnich commented on number five on Mr. Erickson's report. He thought this an interesting way to get kids for PACE.

e. Mike Cleary, Nome Voc Tech Center Visit

Mr. Cleary gave a power presentation of the Nome Voc Tech Center visit.

Mr. Thomas reported on the building and Design Company the Voc Tech committee has selected. The project is on the way and moving forward. They have established the completion date of July 2013. Mr. Thomas thanked Mr. Cleary, Ms. Cleary and Mr. Claus who has put a lot of work into this.

Mr. Kampnich said he appreciates the reports on the trip to Nome. Sometimes seeing things that don't fit are just as good as what does fit.

f. Superintendent Report

Mr. Thomas reported on the voc tech center. Mr. Thomas said he sent an email out to Mr. Cole, Forest Service Supervisor in regards to the Voc Tech center.

Mr. Thomas reported he has spent this last month building partnerships around the state on Voc Tech programs.

Mr. Thomas thanked Ms. Owen and Mr. Claus and Bob for all the time spent on policy development,