This book provides a new analysis of why relations between the United States and the Chinese Communists were so hostile in the first decade of the Cold War. Employing extensive documentation, it offers a fresh approach to long-debated questions such as why Truman refused to recognize the Chinese Communists, why the United States aided Chiang Kai-shek's KMT on Taiwan, why the Korean War escalated into a Sino-American conflict, and why Mao shelled islands in the Taiwan Straits in 1958, thus sparking a major crisis with the United States.
Christensen first develops a novel two-level approach that explains why leaders manipulate low-level conflicts to mobilize popular support for expensive, long-term security strategies. By linking "grand strategy," domestic politics, and the manipulation of ideology and conflict, Christensen provides a nuanced and sophisticated link between domestic politics and foreign policy. He then applies the approach to Truman's policy toward the Chinese Communists in 1947-50 and to Mao's initiation of the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis. In these cases the extension of short-term conflict was useful in gaining popular support for the overall grand strategy that each leader was promoting domestically: Truman's limited-containment strategy toward the USSR and Mao's self-strengthening programs during the Great Leap Forward. Christensen also explores how such low-level conflicts can escalate, as they did in Korea, despite leaders' desire to avoid actual warfare.
"[Christensen] makes a convincing and original argument that political leaders, in order to secure public support for their fundamental grand strategy, may have to adopt a more hostile foreign policy than they would prefer . . . This volume is indispensable for anyone interested in Sino-American relations."--Foreign Affairs
Table of Contents:
List of Figures and Tables
Note on Translation and Romanization
Ch. 1 Introduction 3
Ch. 2 Grand Strategy, National Political Power, and Two-Level Foreign Policy Analysis 11
Ch. 3 Moderate Strategies and Crusading Rhetoric: Truman Mobilizes for a Bipolar World 32
Ch. 4 Absent at the Creation: Acheson's Decision to Forgo Relations with the Chinese Communists 77
Ch. 5 The Real Lost Chance in China: Nonrecognition, Taiwan, and the Disaster at the Yalu 138
Ch. 6 Continuing Conflict over Taiwan: Mao, the Great Leap Forward, and the 1958 Quemoy Crisis 194
Ch. 7 Conclusion 242
App. A American Public Opinion Polls, 1947-1950 263
App. B Mao's Korean War Telegrams 271
Another Princeton book authored or coauthored by Thomas J. Christensen: