Has globalization diluted the power of national governments to regulate their own economies? Are international governmental and nongovernmental organizations weakening the hold of nation-states on global regulatory agendas? Many observers think so. But in All Politics Is Global, Daniel Drezner argues that this view is wrong. Despite globalization, states--especially the great powers--still dominate international regulatory regimes, and the regulatory goals of states are driven by their domestic interests.
As Drezner shows, state size still matters. The great powers--the United States and the European Union--remain the key players in writing global regulations, and their power is due to the size of their internal economic markets. If they agree, there will be effective global governance. If they don't agree, governance will be fragmented or ineffective. And, paradoxically, the most powerful sources of great-power preferences are the least globalized elements of their economies.
Testing this revisionist model of global regulatory governance on an unusually wide variety of cases, including the Internet, finance, genetically modified organisms, and intellectual property rights, Drezner shows why there is such disparity in the strength of international regulations.
"Rewarding. . . . Mr. Drezner . . . finds that the challenges of the future will be increasingly transnational. As globalization intensifies, the rewards for coordination will increase as well."--Economist
"Important.... Drezner shows that it is control of their own large domestic markets that give major states the ability to wield power in the global economy. His main contribution, however, is to explode a popular notion of globalization and thereby to set an agenda for the study of global regulatory politics."--G. John Ikenberry, Foreign Affairs
"All politics is global is a highly readable, authoritative, and well-investigated piece of political science literature on the globalization-global governance nexus. The explicit strength of the book is the logical and consistent development of the theory of regulatory outcomes, as well as the rigorous review of the scholarly literature. In this respect, it is strongly recommended to advanced graduate and doctoral students interested in the setting-up of game-theoretical models. . . . [T]he detailed case studies enhance the book's attractiveness for a broader readership."--Jale Tosun, Cambridge Review of International Affairs
"Among the many strengths of the book lie Drezner's skill in developing a clear and cogent analysis of state power in the global economy and the meticulous way he develops his argument for the key role state preference continues to play in international regulatory regimes. . . . Drezner never wearies in his task of refining our understanding of international regulation and in providing a more lucid insight into the politics of great power preference. The result is a book that challenges popular notions of globalization by placing the power and interests of governments back into the centre stage of debate."--Stephen G. Hughes, International Affairs
Table of Contents:
List of Tables ix
Glossary of Acronyms xix
PART I: THEORY
CHAPTER ONE: Bringing the Great Powers Back In 3
CHAPTER TWO: A Theory of Regulatory Outcomes 32
CHAPTER THREE: A Typology of Governance Processes 63
PART II: PRACTICE
CHAPTER FOUR: The Global Governance of the Internet 91
CHAPTER FIVE: Club Standards and International Finance 119
CHAPTER SIX: Rival Standards and Genetically Modified Organisms 149
CHAPTER SEVEN: The "Semi-Deviant" Case: TRIPS and Public Health 176
CHAPTER EIGHT: Conclusions and Speculations 204
Another Princeton book authored or coauthored by Daniel W. Drezner: