Does growing economic interdependence among great powers increase or decrease the chance of conflict and war? Liberals argue that the benefits of trade give states an incentive to stay peaceful. Realists contend that trade compels states to struggle for vital raw materials and markets. Moving beyond the stale liberal-realist debate, Economic Interdependence and War lays out a dynamic theory of expectations that shows under what specific conditions interstate commerce will reduce or heighten the risk of conflict between nations.
Taking a broad look at cases spanning two centuries, from the Napoleonic and Crimean wars to the more recent Cold War crises, Dale Copeland demonstrates that when leaders have positive expectations of the future trade environment, they want to remain at peace in order to secure the economic benefits that enhance long-term power. When, however, these expectations turn negative, leaders are likely to fear a loss of access to raw materials and markets, giving them more incentive to initiate crises to protect their commercial interests. The theory of trade expectations holds important implications for the understanding of Sino-American relations since 1985 and for the direction these relations will likely take over the next two decades.
Economic Interdependence and War offers sweeping new insights into historical and contemporary global politics and the actual nature of democratic versus economic peace.
Dale C. Copeland is an associate professor in the Department of Politics at the University of Virginia. He is the author of The Origins of Major War.
"This bold, well-written, and landmark work draws together the fields of international political economy and security studies. It also illuminates modern international history and the future."--Choice
"[A] landmark book."--Foreign Affairs
"[A] stimulating and penetrating book. . . . A landmark contribution to the ongoing debate on the relationship between interdependence and peace."--Jack Snyder, International Security
"Exhaustively researched. . . . Copeland is a rarity among contemporary international relations scholars."--Erik Gartzke, Political Science Quarterly
"Economic Interdependence and War is international relations on a gigantic scale. Copeland asks big questions, makes big arguments, engages big alternatives, and tests them all on big powers over a big time span. . . . Books like this one are a healthy reminder that there remains trenchant things to say about the big picture. . . . A work of passion, conviction, and erudition."--Joseph Parent, Perspective on Politics
"This book provides a novel, nuanced and highly illuminating examination of the relationship between economic interdependence and war. . . . The book's central arguments and findings will also be of clear interest and importance for current and future policy makers as they seek to grapple with the long-term effects of increasing economic interdependence."--Stephen Ellis, Political Studies Review
"A landmark study, Economic Interdependence and War presents a novel and compelling argument about trade expectations and the prospects for peace and war among the great powers. This well-written and accessible book buttresses its argument with an extraordinarily valuable historical analysis of great-power interactions from the 1790s to the present day, and a superior intellectual engagement of the quantitative literature."--Joseph Grieco, Duke University
Table of Contents:
Chapter Oone: Theory of Economic Interdependence and War 16
Chapter Two: Quantitative Analysis and Qualitative Case Study Research 51
Chapter Three: The Russo-Japanese War and the German Wars for Hegemony, 1890-1939 97
Chapter Four: The Prelude to Pearl Harbor: Japanese Security and the Northern Question, 1905-40 144
Chapter Five: The Russian Problem and the Onset of the Pacific War, March-December 1941 184
Chapter Six: The Origins, Dynamics, and Termination of the Cold War, 1942-91 247
Chapter Seven: European Great Power Politics, 1790-1854 319
Chapter Eight: Great Power Politics in the Age of Imperial Expansion, 1856-99 375
Chapter Nine: Implications of the Argument 428