The current rise of nationalism across the globe is a reminder that we are not, after all, living in a borderless world of virtual connectivity. In Nationalism, historian Eric Storm sheds light on contemporary nationalist movements by exploring the global evolution of nationalism, beginning with the rise of the nation-state in the eighteenth century through the revival of nationalist ideas in the present day. Storm traces the emergence of the unitary nation-state—which brought citizenship rights to some while excluding a multitude of “others”—and the pervasive spread of nationalist ideas through politics and culture.
What compelled you to write a world history of nationalism?
ES: Nationalism seems to be more alive than ever. Rightwing populists are winning elections around the world by claiming to put their nation’s interests first. Borders are increasingly closed to poor immigrants, and national cultures are presented as being under threat from globalization. Although nationalism clearly is a global phenomenon, it has primarily been examined through national case studies, providing a very fragmented overall picture. My aim therefore was to write a comprehensive overview of the global rise and evolution of nationalism showing the myriad common patterns and trends.
In your book you write that the role of nationalist activists is overrated. How can you write a book on nationalism without paying much attention to the nationalists themselves?
ES: According to dedicated nationalists, each nation is unique an therefore deserves its own state. Those who fought for independence only wanted the best for their fellow nationals and as a consequence should be seen as national heroes. But a close analysis of the rise of new nation-states shows that the nationalist rhetoric in different parts of the world has been remarkable similar, that nationalist claims were often quite exaggerated, and that most potential nations never got their own state. So instead of studying nationalist leaders and their discourse, it is much more useful to look what actually happened in practice. This way, it becomes clear that most new nation-states came into being as a result of a major geopolitical crisis, such as the Age of Revolution or the First World War, while very few of them were ethnically homogeneous. And despite of nationalist slogans such as ‘all men are created equal’ or ‘liberty, equality and fraternity’, women, blacks, people of color and indigenous populations were largely excluded from full citizenship rights until well into the twentieth century.
What do you mean when you assert that nationalism was not transferred from the West to ‘the rest’.
ES: Traditionally, nationalism is seen as a European invention that rapidly spread to the Americas and during the nineteenth-century and made inroads in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Only after the First World War did it begin to have a real impact in the non-Western world. This might largely be true if you focus on nationalist movements, but a very different picture arises when looking at the nation-state model that arose during the Age of Revolution. Many intellectuals in the Global South were inspired by this model from very start. On top of that, many princes in Asia, Africa and the Pacific actually began to implement various aspects of the new political model, which included conscription, legal equality and modern forms of political participation, while abolishing feudal remains. Thus, authoritarian reform policies in independent Asian and African states were more important in disseminating the ideals of the nation-state than the nationalist activists who in the twentieth century began to oppose imperial rule in the colonies.
One of the striking features of your book is the strong emphasis on banal forms of nationalism. Why did you pay so much attention to these everyday forms of nationalism?
ES: The omnipresence of banal forms of nationalism makes it very easy to mobilize nationalist feelings in times of crisis. This can be seen around the world, for instance, in cases of foreign aggression, terrorist attacks or natural disasters. However, the idea that every nation has its own culture that is shared by all members is relatively recent; it only arose during the Romantic era in the early nineteenth century. Initially, nationalism primarily entered high culture, including historical novels and classical music, while leading to the creation of statues of national heroes and national museums. At a later stage, nationalism began to find its way into popular culture, such as comics and films. It also influenced the physical environment as exceptional sites and landscapes were converted into cultural heritage and national parks. This process continued even in periods when national differences were not seen as very relevant. A world divided into nation-states, each with its own unique character, is nowadays fully taken for granted. Even cars, fashion and food have become associated with particular nations. Sporting competitions, such as the Olympic Games, and social media have only increased the dominance of a nationalist world view. As a consequence, today the identification with the nation is seen as self-evident.
Most of your chronological chapters start with a clear turning-point, such as the end of the Second World War. Surprisingly, your last chapter starts in 1979. Why was this an important moment?
ES: Initially, I thought that the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 would be the main watershed moment, as it was followed by a sharp nationalist revival, the dissolution of the Soviet-Union, the Yugoslav Wars and the genocide in Rwanda. This stood in marked contrast with the immediate post-war era, when national differences were not seen as extremely relevant. In the 1950s and 60s, the focus had been on modernization and development, while concrete buildings, abstract monuments and the agricultural revolution made the world much more uniform. This forward-looking period, however, entered into crisis in the 1970s. The earliest manifestations of our present era, which is characterized by neoliberal globalization and identity politics, became visible in 1979. With the election of Margeret Thatcher in Great-Britain, neoliberalism began its triumphal march, paradoxically combining the removal of trade barriers with a new emphasis on national differences. At the same time, Deng Xiaoping set the first steps to liberalize China’s economy, a policy he later defined as ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’. In that same year, the Iranian Revolution brought political Islam to the center of power in a major Middle-Eastern country, while in the United States evangelicals, led by Jerry Falwell, began to politically mobilize their followers with the argument that politics should be based on the nation’s traditional values. Elsewhere, conservative Catholics and Hindu nationalists espoused very similar ideas. But not only ‘silent majorities’ embraced identity politics, the same happened with indigenous communities, ethnic minorities, feminists and LGTBQ-activists. They began to use identity-based arguments to improve their positions within the national community. In many countries, various groups now clash over the true nature of the nation, leading to a polarized climate and open ‘culture wars’ that are largely fought out on the internet.
Eric Storm is associate professor of general history at Leiden University. He has been a visiting scholar at the University Complutense of Madrid, Oxford University, and the Free University in Berlin. He is the author of The Culture of Regionalism and The Discovery of El Greco and the coeditor of Writing the History of Nationalism, Colonial Soldiers in Europe, Regionalism in Modern Europe, and World Fairs and the Global Moulding of National Identities.